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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an autoenthnographic study exploring ineffective practices of American 
information sharing and intelligence in a post-9/11 world. It answers the questions: 1) 
What is there to learn about the relationship between homeland security information 
sharing, leadership doctrine, and personal experience?, and 2) How does complexity 
science influence this relationship? The study combined personal experience with a 
methodological framework that leverages complexity science, social planning (wicked 
problems), and leadership doctrine to discover improved coordination between the 
federal intelligence community (IC) and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private 
(SLTTP) first responder levels. The analysis reveals virtually no interaction or 
understanding of the available resources occurred on either level before the 9/11 attacks. 
Pre-9/11, both entities were focused on their respective missions, the IC on post–Cold 
War Soviet issues, and state and local first responders on local criminal issues. After 
9/11, both were forced to somehow coalesce, to mitigate gaps identified by the 9/11 
Commission, which created a paradox of conflict and resistance within reform systems 
that would not have existed but for the efforts to coalesce them, within which this nation 
continues to flounder. The conclusion provides recommendations and potential solutions 
to remaining information gaps, as well as leadership doctrine that can provide a 
foundation for operating within the complex domain. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
During the cold war, the intelligence community (IC) was primarily focused on the 
Soviet Union, which influenced the majority of intelligence activity in the United States. 
In 1946, George Keenan devised the concept of containment, which initially focused on 
economic and political impacts but later grew to have a military context. Much of today’s 
IC mentality is a post–Cold War Era residual.1 Post 9/11 intelligence functions required 
the IC to acknowledge a shifting of intelligence priorities including becoming aware of 
and working more closely with state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector (SLTTP) 
first responders. While the intelligence mission has not changed, the priorities have 
become so interrelated that they may become blurred. For example, the relationship 
between terrorism and illicit narcotics trafficking can be closely aligned, often to the 
point that a decision must be made to consider both as collective priorities or segment 
them, subordinating one or the other.2  
As a result, the IC and the SLTTP have been forced to interact more, which may 
provide an understanding of the existing rift between the IC and SLTTP. Yet, post-9/11 
reform has emphasized the critical need to create ways to coordinate information sharing 
between the two realms.  
The homeland security enterprise extends far beyond DHS and the federal 
government. A key part of the enterprise includes working directly with 
law enforcement, state and local leaders, community-based organizations, 
and private sector partners to counter violent extremism at its source…3 
This thesis focuses on the multitude of government entities involved in United 
States (U.S.) information sharing, the pre-9/11 mindset of segregation between the IC and 
SLTTP, and the post-9/11 emphasis to strengthen information sharing by closing the gaps 
perpetuated today between the two entities. It analyzed the evolution of the relationships 
                                                 
1 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE/CQ 
Press, 2012), 252.  
2 Ibid., 273. 
3 The Department of Homeland Security, Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress 
Report 2011 (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2011), 9. 
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within the information sharing environments at the federal and SLTTP levels, how on one 
hand, strategies, executive orders, public laws, and policies have urged stronger 
relationships between the IC and SLTTP, and on the other hand, struggles to accomplish 
these directives and guidelines linger. It explores how leadership plays a role in 
coalescing information sharing at all levels of government and the impact complexity has 
had on the information sharing effort in the homeland security enterprise. The author 
leveraged his unique first hand experience operating within the IC and the SLTTP 
environments to help identify those concepts that would be necessarily considered in 
analyzing current and future information is shared in the United States.  
The thesis demonstrates that the evolution of information sharing in the United 
States has shifted from a pre-9/11 relationship between the IC and SLTTP, where the IC 
has been predominantly focused on the Cold War concerns related to the former Soviet 
Union, and the SLTTP that was primarily focused on reducing crime and the fear of 
crime within law enforcement and for other disciplines, responding to natural or man-
made disorder. Both produced structures, procedures, laws, and policies to support their 
missions. Each component of the current-day homeland security project (IC and SLTTP) 
was virtually unconscious of the other’s presence and certainly each other’s equities.  
Post-9/11 reform has forced a shift from the pre-9/11 relationship to one in which 
the two massive disciplines must not only become aware of each other’s missions and 
equities, but to form new relationships and resulting government structures to support 
emerging relationships between the two. While innumerable strategies, policies, 
executive orders, laws, and guiding documents call for improved collaboration across all 
segments of government, no central doctrine exists from which the information sharing 
stakeholders, deemed critical to each other in post-9/11 lexicon, can draw central 
guidance for information sharing while meeting the unique demands of local 
jurisdictions. The research has explored how leadership doctrine and complexity science 
interact and how they might play a role in the future of information sharing in the United 
States.  
21st century leaders in all disciplines and industries are faced with uncommon 
levels of complexity, and leaders in homeland security are no exception. This period in 
 xvii
history could well be construed as a renaissance for those in the business of protecting 
this country because state and local first responders, national intelligence community 
members, and private security professionals are facing the urgency of creating new, 
never-before-experienced relationships between jurisdictions, disciplines, and 
organizations in an effort to share information and better coordinate resources. These 
fledgling relationships, coupled with the emergence of new technology and the use of big 
data, have catapulted the world and those responsible to lead into the realm of 
identifying, assessing, and addressing problems while in the midst of discovering them; 
all the while, being mindful of the pace at which technology offers solutions, as well as 
dangers of potentially abridged liberties. 
The result of producing this thesis and the process leading to its conclusion has 
brought forward the following realization.  
 Pre-9/11, the IC and SLTTP were focused on their respective missions: the 
IC on the former Soviet Union, and SLTTP on reducing crime or 
responding to natural or man-made hazards. Each constructed structures, 
laws, policies, processes, and procedures to address their needs and were 
virtually not conscious of each other’s existence much less their equities.  
 After 9/11 occurred, the IC and SLTTP were forced to become aware of 
each other, to somehow come together to solve what the 9/11 Commission 
listed as gaps in this nation’s system. Numerous strategies, policies, 
executive orders, laws and government restructure have been aimed at 
providing better coordination, and yet a paradox still exists; conflict and 
resistance have been created within this country’s systems of reform that 
would not have existed except for the efforts to coalesce them that 
continue to flounder. Some members of the SLTTP first responder 
community, such as the author, have been introduced into the mysterious 
realm of the IC. This community has been encouraged to learn the ways of 
the IC and to notice where the gaps lie between the IC and SLTTP. It has 
also been challenged to provide suggestions for improvement. When this 
occurs, and suggestions are introduced for improvement, resistance is 
encountered in part by individual agendas but also due to a lack of a 
central guiding doctrine from which the whole of government can derive 
its strategies whether at the federal or state, local, tribal or territorial level.  
 An analysis into the thematic evolution of the homeland security 
information-sharing enterprise can provide clarity as to what to do next. 
How are these gaps improved upon and the self-imposed resistance 
overcome? How can a better understanding of complexity science and 
leadership help to create the new thinking, doctrine, laws, and policies 
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necessary to better blend these two massive disciplines? The analysis in 
this thesis has allowed for recommended solutions to remaining 
information gaps, as well as leadership doctrine that can be leveraged to 
provide a foundation for operating within the complex domain.  
As a result, the thesis concludes that three major shifts in American information 
sharing could provide for more effective structures and environments to meet the 
emerging complexity of sharing information between the SLTTP and IC. 
First, create a national information-sharing doctrine serving as the genesis from 
which continuity in mission, vision, and values would emanate across all levels of 
government. The 9/11 Commission contemplated recommending a cabinet level 
intelligence director but felt it was untenable at the time. Today, many who operate at the 
national intelligence level and some who were involved in the 9/11 Commission wonder 
if now may be the time to reintroduce this concept. 
Second, a gap exists in the American information-sharing architecture, which 
does not allow for a bottom-up collection process. Since police, fire, and private sector 
first responders number nearly 3 million, some mechanism for providing training, 
awareness, and reporting is needed to bridge this gap.  
Finally, the information-sharing realm in America is steeped in complexity. To be 
effective in leading new ways of thinking and applying innovative initiatives relative to 
complex problems, adapting to complex adaptive systems and applying solutions, which 
are resilient in these environments, the homeland security leader will need effective 
leadership tools and principles. Complexity Leadership Theory provides for the 
understanding of complexity science and the leadership principles specifically designed 
or combined to create milieus for creating results in complex environments. This 
leadership approach should be included in the national doctrine patterned after the 
Leadership in Police Organizations (LPO) curriculum currently being delivered 
nationally by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW TO THE WICKED 
PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
INFORMATION SHARING 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
 The Lingering Problems in American Information Sharing Between the 
Intelligence Community and State, Local, Tribal, Territorial and Private 
Sector First Responders 
During the Cold War, the intelligence community’s (IC) primary concerns were 
focused on the Soviet Union, which influenced the majority of intelligence activity in the 
United States. In 1946, George Keenan devised the concept of containment, focused 
externally on the Soviet Union, which initially was an economic and political concept but 
later grew to have a military context. Much of how the IC thinks and operates today is 
residual from the Cold War era processes.1 Post-9/11 intelligence functions have required 
the IC to acknowledge shifting intelligence priorities including becoming aware of and 
working more closely with state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector first responders 
(SLTTP). While the mission of intelligence has not changed, the priorities have become 
so interrelated that they may become blurred. For example, the relationship between 
terrorism and illicit narcotic trafficking can be so closely aligned that a decision must be 
made to consider them both priorities or to segment them, subordinating one or the 
other.2  
As a result, the IC and the SLTTP have been forced to interact more; it may 
provide an understanding as to the rift existing between the IC and SLTTP. Yet, post-
9/11 reform has emphasized the critical need to create ways in which to coordinate 
information sharing between the two realms.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE/CQ 
Press, 2012), 252.  
2 Ibid., 273. 
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The homeland security enterprise extends far beyond DHS and the federal 
government. A key part of the enterprise includes working directly with 
law enforcement, state and local leaders, community-based organizations, 
and private sector partners to counter violent extremism at its source…3 
This thesis focuses on the myriad of government entities involved in information 
sharing in the United States the pre-9/11 mindset of segregation between the IC and 
SLTTP, the post-9/11 emphasis to strengthen information sharing and the gaps 
perpetuated between them today. It endeavors to analyze the evolution of the 
relationships within the information-sharing environments at the federal and SLTTP 
levels, how on one hand strategies, executive orders, public laws, and policies have urged 
stronger relationships between the IC and SLTTP, and on the other hand, struggles to 
accomplish these relationships linger. It explores how leadership plays a role in 
coalescing information sharing at all levels of government and the impact complexity has 
on the information sharing in homeland security enterprise. The author also leverages his 
unique and first hand personal experience operating within the IC and the SLTTP 
environments to help identify those concepts that would necessarily be considered in 
analyzing how information is shared in the United States now and how it could be in the 
future.  
Why is this important? While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have created significant inroads in improving 
how information is shared with local law enforcement through mechanisms informing 
them of threat pictures and vulnerabilities, as well as efforts to train SLTTP responders 
on indicators of extremism or terrorist activity,4 struggles still exist that emanate from the 
previously illustrated dichotomy. For all intents and purposes, information sharing 
between the IC and SLTTP is not part of a national construct; rather, individuals among 
or within the two domains share information through incongruent strategies or  individual 
good will efforts. Without a common understanding, belief system, or doctrine to drive 
these efforts, they will remain random with occasional, and perhaps, resulting in 
                                                 
3 The Department of Homeland Security, Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress 
Report 2011 (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2011), 9. 
4 Ibid. 
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inadvertent increased levels of performance and outcomes. As suggested by Phillip 
Zelikow, the former director of the 9/11 Commission, the timing may now be right for a 
Secretary of Intelligence, at the cabinet level, to make this effort a priority.5 Whether 
such a central guiding paradigm is instituted or not, homeland security leaders of the 
future will face uncommon levels of complexity to help lead through emerging 
relationships among thousands of disciplines and jurisdictions to coalesce information-
sharing efforts across all levels of government. 
The United States has proven it is capable of massive governmental reform as 
evidenced by the creation of the DHS, the creation of important transformation within the 
IC, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, as well as key 
executive orders and public law. The challenge is to consider implementing such levels of 
transformation in a deliberate, innovative fashion outside the necessity of a national 
emergency such as 9/11.  
Further, in a departure from the deluge of national strategies, the National 
Strategic Narrative calls for “renewing American leadership—building at home, shaping 
abroad.”6 Authors Porter and Mykleby challenge Americans to reframe from a zero sum 
orientation of control in a closed system to a more collaborative and influential posture of 
an open system. Translated to information sharing in America, this new paradigm would 
invite those insidiously focused on myopic interests and agendas to abandon them in 
favor of a more open system—whole-of-government approach. The authors invite 
American leaders to shift from the constricted posture of containing other nations as 
introduced by Keenan in 1946, to an intrinsic focus of sustaining America by 
concentrating on important socio-economic aspects for long-term sustainment. This shift, 
say the authors, will not only strengthen American resolve and reinforce American 
values, but will also serve as a model framework for other nations to follow.7 How 
information is shared among the entities within the IC and SLTTP can take this idea, 
                                                 
5 Bipartisan Policy Center, “The Current State of Intelligence Reform,” December 11, 2013, 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/events/2013/12/current-state-intelligence-reform. 
6 Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, A National Strategic Narrative (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011). 
7 Ibid. 
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expand, and integrate it into a national mindset focused on a more expansive and accurate 
intelligence collection architecture including a bottom-up component from SLTTP 
entities to provide a holistic view of the threat rather than the current approach analogous 
to the allopathic view of medicine wherein the symptoms are treated rather than the 
causal effects. In American counterterrorism intelligence, the threat is determined without 
a comprehensive bottom-up, domestic perspective. What would it take to cause such a 
shift within the innumerable levels of government?  
Certainly, a need exists to understand better what leadership tools and principles 
might produce outcomes, which could provide such a shift in this nation’s collective 
outlook. A critical examination of the literature related to leadership doctrine, evolution 
in homeland security information sharing, as well as this author’s experience in leading 
homeland security initiatives, may identify emerging complexity, as well as supporting 
principles from which homeland security leaders may more effectively embrace 
adaptability, creativity, and learning.8 This review would be important to be able to 
understand and address the complex relationships between the IC and SLTTP at the 
operational, as well as the analytical levels, and to provide creative outcomes when 
formulating appropriate policies, budgets, and discerning guidance to legislators and 
senior policy makers, which may be more sustainable for the future.  
The homeland security project has existed since the attacks of 9/11. Changes in 
American government after the attacks represent the most complex and significant since 
the creation of Department of Defense in 1947. Much of the homeland security project 
has been focused on streamlining information and intelligence sharing at all levels of 
government, as well as with the private sector.9  
Advances in information sharing have occurred within the federal IC. For 
example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 created 
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which superseded the Director of Central 
                                                 
8 Mary Uhl-Bien, Marion Russ, and Bill McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting 
Leadership from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” Leadership Quarterly 18, no. 4 (August 2007): 
298–318. 
9 Philip Zelikow et al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2004). 
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Intelligence (DCI) as the chief intelligence community official. The DNI is now the 
principal intelligence advisor to the president and National Security Council (NSC). 
Formerly, the focus of the IC has been on foreign and domestic intelligence as distinct 
realms. The DCI’s responsibility was centered on foreign intelligence. The IRTPA 
generated two shifts. First, it altered the definition of intelligence to that of national 
intelligence with subsets of foreign, domestic, and homeland security. Second, it has 
broadened the DNI’s responsibility beyond that of the DCI’s, particularly in the domestic 
realm. While the DCI represented a specific agency, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the DNI does not. Thus, the DNI is not only in a position to have access to all 
intelligence but to ensure intelligence is shared appropriately across all IC agencies. The 
position is also responsible for safeguarding intelligence sources and methods. The main 
thrust of the act was aimed at improving intelligence sharing between IC agencies, 
particularly within the foreign-domestic intelligence rift.10  
A word about the use of the expression state, local, tribal, territorial and private or 
SLTTP. This term and its variations are commonly used in the modern homeland security 
lexicon to simply describe what is a much more complicated group of disciplines, levels 
of government, and jurisdictions. It is utilized in this thesis and within the literature as a 
distinguisher between the federal services, predominantly, the IC, and essentially, state 
and local first responder agencies. This simplified distinction may be a disservice to those 
in the SLTTP category, and certainly, the federal service, if the goal is to provide clarity 
through education and awareness of each other’s domains by collapsing SLTTP into one 
collective group. In reality, very stark differences exist between state and local levels of 
government culturally, operationally, fiscally, and politically, however, for purposes of 
this thesis, they remain as a collective, separate and distinct from the federal services 




                                                 
10 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 417. 
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SLTTP information-sharing innovations have revolutionized how information is 
shared and crimes are solved (in the case of state and local law enforcement). As an 
example, state and local law enforcement has endeavored to simplify and improve efforts 
in information sharing to address crime trends better through cross-jurisdictional and 
multi-discipline information sharing. Recent examples include the creation of the 
Criminal Intelligence Enterprise initiative (CIE), a groundbreaking initiative that 
proposes an intelligence-cycle-driven approach that emphasizes valuable analysis, which 
cannot occur without a formal and quality driven collection process.11 In addition, state, 
local, tribal, and federal partners, along with several national law enforcement 
organizations, have collaborated to develop the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which was formalized by the Office of Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), and program manager for the information sharing 
environment (PM-ISE). The NSI struggles to provide comprehensive data and 
meaningful analysis of suspicious activity reporting but the concept of such a resource 
evolving into a national program to share terrorism-related SAR data at all levels of 
government, provides the genesis for an effective system for detecting and disrupting 
threat streams.12  
Originating from the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007, the first-ever initiative of its kind created the former Interagency Threat 
Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), and current Joint Counterterrorism 
Assessment Team (JCAT). These programs were created to bring SLTTP and IC 
members together in a one-year fellowship format to create new levels of awareness and 
innovative relationships for information sharing between the two cultures.13 Finally, 
information sharing between the government and private sector has been reinforced 
through emerging associations, such as InfraGard. Such efforts create information-
                                                 
11 Major Cities Chiefs and Major County Sheriffs Intelligence Commanders Groups, Criminal 
Intelligence Enterprise: Threat Domain Assessment, How-to-Packet (Chicago IL: Major Cities Chiefs and 
Major County Sheriffs, 2013). 
12 See ODNI at Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Home,” November 17, 2013, 
http://www.dni.gov/; also see PM-ISE NSI at Information Sharing Environment, “Nationwide SAR 
Initiative,” November 17, 2013, http://ise.gov/nationwide-sar-initiative. 
13 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53 (2007). 
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sharing alliances between the government, (FBI in the case of InfraGard), and the private 
sector to better prevent, detect, respond, and recover from intrusions or attacks on critical 
infrastructure sectors.14 
The stage has been set, while the IC and SLTTP have focused on streamlining 
information sharing in their respective spheres, the need for a strengthened relationship 
and collaborative efforts between the IC and SLTTP remains. If considering that law 
enforcement and fire first responders at the state and local level number approximately 2 
million, and that they are in American homes providing service every day, it is easy to 
imagine the importance of ensuring they are aware of terrorist tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs). The Najibullah Zazi and Naser Jason Abdo cases illustrate the 
possibility of terrorist planning within the homeland, and the opportunity for detection by 
first responders.15 James Clapper, the current DNI, has recognized the value of the 
federal IC having a role in domestic counterterrorism and transnational crime.  
We need to deal with the realities of globalization –the blurring these days 
of foreign and domestic matters. Because when threats like terrorism and 
international organized crime transcend borders, it’s critical that we think 
holistically about intelligence.16  
The IC, through foreign counterterrorism surveillance efforts, discovers these 
TTPs. The potential for a strengthened relationship between the IC and state, local, tribal 
and territorial (SLTT) governments may create opportunities for increased reporting 
between the two. If first responders do not know what is important, they clearly will not 
be alert to terrorist indicators or be in a position to intervene in a terrorist plot. An 
enhanced relationship would inspire a vision for the future, which would ensure better 
                                                 
14 InfraGard, “Home,” accessed July 28, 2013, https://www.infragard.org. 
15 Phil Hirschkorn, “Would-be Subway Suicide Bomber Najibullah Zazi Speaks,” CBS News, accessed 
July 21, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57416351/would-be-subway-suicide-bomber-
najibullah-zazi-speaks/; J. David Goodman, “Soldier Held Amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,” The 
New York Times, accessed July 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29awol.html?_r=0. 
16 James Clapper, 2010 State of Domestic Intelligence Reform Conference (Washington, DC: 
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010). 
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collection methods, heightened ability to respond to emerging threats, and more effective 
resource utilization.17  
Despite this growing need, barriers exist that must be acknowledged and 
embraced as opportunities for redefining the relationships within the IC and SLTTP. An 
operational divide exists between the IC and SLTTP communities based on philosophy, 
policy, constituency, and legislation of empowering statutes or ordinances. The 
fundamental differences between the IC and SLTTP agencies represent a legitimate issue 
to consider, and may place some appropriate constraints on aspects of coalescing the IC 
and SLTTP. For instance, the IC is charged with “provid[ing] the President, the National 
Security and Homeland Security Councils (now combined) with necessary information 
on which to base decisions concerning conduct and development of foreign, defense and 
economic policies and the protection of United States national security interests from 
foreign security threats.”18 Further, the IC is directed by Title 50 of the U.S. Code 
designated for agencies and activities involved in war and national defense activities.  
The IC operates almost exclusively in a classified environment. Very few SLTTP 
community members have security clearances, and by contrast with the IC, work 
predominantly within the open source realm. Further, obtaining a clearance requires that 
a federal agency sponsor the state or local employee at a significant cost to the 
sponsoring agency. In addition, at times, difficulties arise in reciprocity, or having a 
security clearance from one sponsoring agency recognized by another federal sponsor. 
The IC has vastly different rules than the SLTTP community in terms of the 
collection and storage of information. For example, IC information is collected through 
specific and various methods, and is treated as classified national security information on 
varying levels.19 By distinction, state and local government cannot store personally 
                                                 
17 David L. Carter, “Law Enforcement Intelligence and National Security Intelligence: Exploring the 
Differences,” Journal of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 21, no. 1 
(2012): 2.  
18 President of the United States. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1981, 2003, 2004, 2008), Part 1.1. 
19 Safeguarding Classified National Security Information, 32 CFR Part 2004.  
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identifying information (PII) on U.S. persons without a criminal nexus,20 and all actions 
must be based on a minimal standard of reasonable articulable suspicion or probable 
cause (in which case an arrest can be made).  
This divide results in lost opportunities for deeper understanding of the 
differences between the two cultures. To highlight the importance of building stronger 
relationships, Cilluffo et al. assert state and local law enforcement may well be the “first 
and last line [of defense].”21 One of the most compelling reasons for the IC and SLTTP 
communities to build deeper understanding of the other’s culture is the blurring 
distinction (as described by Director Clapper) between crime at the state and local level 
and terrorism.22 In a white paper published by the Major Cities Chiefs Association, 
attention is drawn to the growing number of incidents resulting in disrupted terror plots, 
which were exposed at the local policing level. In a study cited by this paper, 22 percent 
of 68 thwarted terrorist schemes (15 incidents from 1999 to 2009) were discovered by 
state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, 50 percent of these cases required 
some form of state or local preliminary investigation before being forwarded to federal 
law enforcement. Finally, in 18 percent of these cases, initial detection of the plots came 
from traditional police interaction in a non-terrorism scenario.23  
An effective relationship between the IC and SLTTP easily becomes a focal point 
when it is understood that an ever-present likelihood exists that domestic crime may 
correlate to terrorism. Further, according to a poll of section chiefs from the intelligence 
units of major American metropolitan police departments, a consensus exists that 
counterterrorism intelligence collection and analysis is a shared function between local 
and federal governments. What is more, they felt that analytical skills and collection 
skills were interchangeable when compared to traditional police work and 
                                                 
20 Criminal Intelligence Systems Operation Policies, 28 CFR Part 23. 
21 Frank J. Cilluffo, Joseph R. Clark, and Michael P. Downing, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law 
Enforcement Perspective (Washington, DC: George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, 2011), 1. 
22 Clapper, 2010 State of Domestic Intelligence Reform Conference. 
23 Major Cities Chiefs and Major County Sheriffs Intelligence Commanders Groups, Criminal 
Intelligence Enterprise: Threat Domain Assessment, How-to-Packet. 
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counterterrorism. However, the same survey participants expressed concern about the 
training and skill level of state, local and tribal analysts. Twenty-six of 42 respondents 
indicated that increased analytical capability was either their first or second most 
important area of needed improvement within their department.24 
The existence of 17 national intelligence agencies and 18,000 state and local law 
enforcement organizations highlights the complexity from which any effort at coalescing 
information sharing between these levels of government would have to be considered by 
the PM-ISE, ODNI, and various guiding organizations, such as the IACP, as well as other 
organizations responsible for creating and planning future initiatives to enhance these 
relationships. Leading such an initiative may require a unique understanding of how 
complexity and emergence allow for new and innovative approaches in leadership to 
realize effective results.  
While expanding information sharing components between the federal IC and 
SLTTP produces clear potential benefits, opponents are concerned that broadened 
information collection and sharing processes may jeopardize privacy, civil liberties, and 
civil rights of citizens, a concern shared by law enforcement and intelligence leaders 
alike.25 
Although American homeland security achievements since 9/11 may be viewed as 
extraordinary in terms of American resolve and ingenuity, it may also be said that the 
national collective worldview is one of victimization and retribution toward U.S. 
enemies.26 Mueller and Stewart declare that Americans have invested in a perpetual 
hysterical mindset around terrorism, born of the 9/11 attacks, and carried through by 
government officials’ carefully chosen phrases, such as “existential” risks or threats, 
                                                 
24 Cilluffo, Clark, and Downing, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law Enforcement Perspective, 13. 
25 It is important to note that all changes in information sharing practices require the creation of 
stringent privacy policies and adherence to the privacy and civil rights guidelines of the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE). See ISE, “Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protection Framework,” 
December 20, 2013, http://ise.gov/privacy-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-protection-framework. 
26 John E. Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, 
and Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 267. 
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“critical infrastructure,” and “key resources.”27 They claim when the risk is assessed, 
whether based upon past documented atrocities or the potential for future attacks, the 
potential worst-case scenario does not support a “significant existential [struggle]”28 for 
America. Yet, America has spent in excess of $1 trillion on domestic homeland security 
between 2002 and 2011.29 How does this mindset translate into the information-sharing 
mandates of post-9/11? What shifts in collective consciousness among leaders could be 
explored to focus on legitimate threats and subsequent outcomes better? What leadership 
tools and principles could be identified as providing a way for homeland security leaders 
to be consistently open and resilient to complexity; thereby, better able to adapt and 
respond effectively? 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
What can be learned about the relationship between homeland security 
information sharing, leadership doctrine, and personal experience? How does complexity 
science or the presence of wicked problems affect this relationship? 
These questions are important because of the advancing interconnectedness 
between all levels of U.S. government with an expectation to share information to 
identify, prevent, or intervene in threats to this nation’s security. The relationships 
between these levels of government exist and will continue to morph whether they are 
acknowledged and nurtured, or ignored;30 each approach, therefore, producing its own 
distinct outcome. Due to the shear size and complexity of the government entities 
involved at the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial levels, and due to the structures, 
laws, policies, and individual interests, it highlights the possibility and potential benefit to 
intimately understand, and therefore, operate within these relationships.  
                                                 
27 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security, 267. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Angelique Keene, “Complexity Theory: The Changing Role of Leadership,” Industrial and 
Commercial Training 32, no. 1 (2000): 16.  
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A recognized value exists for creating fellowship opportunities for SLTTP 
members to work within the federal government, at Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), DHS, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or others to name 
a few.31 Those who experience these opportunities are naturally exposed to the gaps 
between the two realms, intrigued by the possibilities presented and urged to address 
them through innovative national initiatives. The former ITACG was such a fellowship, 
and in part, serves as the impetus for this thesis. The ITACG environment encouraged 
SLTT first responders to identify gaps within the system, to assess options critically, and 
to create national initiatives to address them.32 With increased integration between first 
responders and federal services, an increased consciousness of the value of better 
coordination will continue to emerge. As time progresses, and more cross-jurisdictional 
and cross-disciplinary opportunities for a more coalesced information-sharing 
architecture emerge, the importance of the development of interrelationships between 
information sharing, leadership, and complexity increases exponentially. Leaders will 
need to understand the intricacies and implications of emerging methods and the 
relationship between the ability to navigate complexity and the capacity for creating and 
leading initiatives for information sharing in the future. Not only will emerging 
technologies for information sharing be required, but innovative critical thinking in 
leadership is also necessary to match the unrelenting demands within the complex 
domain.  
C. METHOD 
This thesis is based on the review of the literature, an analysis based on the 
author’s first-hand experience from both the first responder’s worldview, as well as the 
experience he has had operating within the IC. Appreciative inquiry, as well as the 
autoethnographic method, was included when practical, which focused the analysis 
toward creating better outcomes while recognizing what has not worked in the past.33 
                                                 
31 110th Congress, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
32 Author’s first-hand account: ITACG member 2011/2012. 
33 Frank J. Barrett and Ronald E. Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building 
Cooperative Capacity (Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications, 2008), 121. 
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Appreciative inquiry leverages the art of asking effective questions to focus on what is 
already working, which helps to orient an individual’s thinking toward a productive 
outcome. Krug and Oakley discuss the power of effective questions in their book, 
Enlightened Leadership: Getting to the Heart of Change, in which they suggest that the 
quality of the question asked will determine the quality of the answer received or the 
outcome produced. Why? The mind searches for answers no matter the origin and if the 
question is open-ended and forward-focused, it will produce a result oriented toward 
growth, learning, and expansion all through innovative thinking.34 Both appreciative 
inquiry and enlightened leadership support the notion that to focus first on what is 
working supports a barrier free inquiry of how to best advance an idea or system. 
Outcomes that have been successful are identified as part of this analysis. Aspects of 
what led to the successful result are synthesized and considered for utility in less 
successful facets of the analysis.  
The first phase consists of a review of the literature dealing with complexity 
science, in particular, wicked problems as they relate to homeland security information 
sharing and leadership doctrine, as well as the author’s experience in homeland security. 
He has drawn findings based on a synthesis of how these facets interact and how that 
interaction may be useful to future homeland security leaders who will operate in an 
increasingly complex environment 
In the second phase, a critical analysis of the literature is conducted on leadership 
doctrine, theory, practice and approaches, how complexity is viewed by modern 
leadership theory, and how this relationship can be leveraged to support the improvement 
of information-sharing efforts or the development of innovative information-sharing 
models and policies within a complex adaptive system across the homeland security 
project.  
In the third phase, an examination of the literature is conducted on pre- and post-
9/11 government and intelligence frameworks, policies and laws to include the following 
post-9/11 initiatives.  
                                                 
34 Doug Krug and Ed Oakley, Enlightened Leadership: Getting to the Heart of Change (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1991). 
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 Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act; Presidential Directive 
12333 (2008) (prior versions may be useful in pre-9/11 focus) 
 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act; Public Law 
110–53 
 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) and 
subsequent Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) 
 Director of National Intelligence (DNI); National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) 
 Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) 
 Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) 
 Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) 
 Criminal Intelligence Enterprise (the genesis of which is state and local) 
The fourth phase chronicles the author’s personal experience in homeland 
security, information sharing and intelligence, as well as an analysis of leadership 
development. In this phase, the autoethnography methodology is used to leverage the 
author’s background. This methodology approaches research and writing in a way that 
seeks to describe and analyze personal experience to understand the cultural 
experience.35 Based on the foundations formed from a law enforcement career beginning 
in 1980, this analysis synthesized lessons learned from assignments to a number of senior 
leadership positions both pre- and post-9/11.  
The author’s experience allows for a unique perspective from which to perform 
this reflection and analysis. Upon appointment as the Deputy Executive Director of the 
Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) (Colorado’s fusion center) in March 2012, 
he gained valuable experience in information sharing at the executive level. The deputy 
director is responsible for executive level policy development, organizational strategy, 
and coordinating with the National Network of Fusion Centers in a time when fusion 
centers are at the forefront of criticism. In 2011, he was detailed for a year to the ITACG, 
located at the NCTC in Washington, DC. This initiative was aimed at building two-way 
                                                 
35 Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams, and Arthur P. Bochner, “Autoethnography: An Overview,” Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research 12, no. 1 (2011). 
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awareness and training between state and local first responders and the IC as a result of a 
post-9/11 congressional mandate.  
In addition, the author has served on the CICC since 2007. The CICC and Global 
Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) are national level post-9/11 efforts focused on 
improving the critical process of information sharing. The GIWG supported the 
development of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). The NCISP 
recognized the importance of state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies as a key 
ingredient in the nation’s intelligence process and called for the creation of the CICC to 
establish the linkage needed to improve information sharing among all levels of 
government. Key focus areas include the following. 
 Assisting the U.S. Department of Justice in ensuring that every chief, 
sheriff, and law enforcement executive understands their agency’s role in 
developing and sharing information and intelligence 
 Providing input to the federal government in its efforts to develop and 
share criminal intelligence 
 Recommending a framework for implementing and ensuring the longevity 
of the standards-based intelligence plan, training and technology 
coordination, outreach and education, and resource coordination 
 Advising the U.S. Attorney General on the best use of criminal 
intelligence to keep the nation safe 
The review included the following. 
 Planning for the Democratic National Convention 
 Planning and collaboration during a full-scale exercise 
 The author’s experience in the Interagency Threat Assessment and 
Coordination Group 
 His experience as deputy director of the Colorado Information Analysis 
Center, examples of expanded support for major events…the Aurora 
theater shooting, state corrections chief assassination, record-setting fires 
in Colorado, private sector collaboration referencing Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 2011 
 His involvement in the Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council 
 
 16
This outlined background has provided a distinct perspective based on an intimate 
knowledge of the state and local information-sharing community, as well as a first hand 
practitioner’s view of the IC. As such, the author has been exposed to the tremendous 
potential to coalesce information-sharing best practices of the two communities. The 
combined analyses as outlined provide a comprehensive examination of the relationship 
between key aspects of the homeland security project and leadership best practices. This 
thesis may result in the observation of emerging theory and resulting recommendations. 
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II. REVIEWING THE LITERATURE 
The enormity of the information-sharing enterprise, newly emerged since 9/11, 
and its varied and complex aspects becomes overwhelming when considering the 
numerous levels of government departments, policies, and strategies at the federal level. 
The state, local, tribal and private aspect of the enterprise represent a similar degree of 
intricacy; however, when considered in tandem, they become a wicked problem in terms 
of sheer numbers of agencies, systems, policies, and strategies all focused on the same 
outcome, to share information in a way that protects American citizens. To uncover 
frameworks, theory, or doctrine in leading information-sharing initiatives, a preliminary 
review of literature related to government reform, leadership doctrine, as well as the 
author’s personal experience directly related to this effort, has been conducted. 
A. COMPLEXITY AND WICKED PROBLEMS  
1. What Is Complexity Science? 
To understand better the degree to which the literature would be helpful for 
homeland security leaders in creating solutions within complex adaptive environments, 
the author sought out literature that could provide a broader understanding of:  
1) complexity science and its properties, 2) the origins of complexity science, and 3) the 
degree to which leadership can be leveraged to navigate within complex domains. The 
literature in this section has provided a holistic view of complexity science, and in 
particular, wicked problems as they relate to understanding the differences between 
approaching problems through linear thinking versus shifting a person’s mindset to 
understanding complexity or non-linear thinking. It has helped to define the problems 
faced by today’s homeland security professionals as wicked or complex problems due to 
the wide array of interactions between multitudes of disciplines and jurisdictions. It 
demonstrates that the two problem-solving approaches (linear or non-linear [complex]) 
provide distinctly different outcomes; the top-down linear model of problem solving 
limits the problem solver’s capacity to address constant morphing and shifting problems 
as it relies upon the understanding of cause to effect, and it results in a stopping point; an 
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end to the problem signifies completion.36 Problem solvers who understand complexity 
are able to shift their thinking to adapt better to constantly flowing levels of order present 
in the current situation faced. In the complex domain, the problem solver may not be able 
to relate the problem to a particular cause and effect relationship until looking at it 
retrospectively; the problem does not reach an end, rather ever-evolving versions are 
created.37 The ability to analyze and synthesize complex problems can be enhanced 
through sensemaking tools, such as the Cynefin Framework.38 The literature has also 
drawn an analogy between critical non-linear thinking and leadership within the complex 
domain.  
Complexity can be described as that space that a social system (including an 
organization or group of organizations) occupies and that constantly moves between 
order and chaos. Due to the constant interaction and evolution among the elements, 
within a system, as well as interaction with the system itself, new stages of existence 
emerge.39 The study of complex adaptive systems within living systems has attempted to 
address the constant fluidity within these systems. Critical thinking emerging from theses 
studies has begun to apply complexity science to organizational behavior and the impact 
leadership has on dynamics of change within these systems.40  
The key concepts to be understood is that complexity is related to social systems 
(organizations, interrelationships between organizations, political agendas, competing 
interests, shifting priorities, and so forth), constantly morphing between chaos and 
predictability, continuously producing new levels of order, and requires new levels of 
critical thinking to recognize and interact within the complex domain.41 To illustrate, the 
                                                 
36 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin W. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973): 162.  
37 David F. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “Wise Executives Tailor their Approach to Fit the 
Complexity of the Circumstances They Face: A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review (November 2007): 3.  
38 David F. Snowden, The Cynefin Framework (Singapore: The Cognitive Edge, 2010), video 
recording. 
39 Keene, “Complexity Theory: The Changing Role of Leadership,” 15–18. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Snowden and Boone, “Wise Executives Tailor their Approach to Fit the Complexity of the 
Circumstances They Face: A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 3. 
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DHS is comprised of 22 legacy agencies all formerly well-established entities with 
unique missions, visions, and value systems. The IC is comprised of 17 massive federal 
agencies and 18,000 agencies represent state, local tribal and territorial law enforcement. 
The United States has approximately 2 million law enforcement and fire service first 
responders, and approximately 1 million private security personnel. Each plays a role in 
the information-sharing enterprise in the United States, and this context helps to define 
the complexity involved in implementing reform involving all elements described. 
Introducing the concept of complexity, and specifically wicked problems, brings 
with it an interesting paradox. On one hand, Rittel and Webber discuss in seeming 
prophetic fashion, the notion of complexity in the public sector dating back to 1973 when 
it would seem simpler world existed in which to operate.42 On the other hand, this 
ostensibly dated material may be more applicable today than ever before for leaders to 
grasp fully the implications complexity and wicked problems present in homeland 
security. As an example, a global debate, emerging daily, discusses the aspects of 
American informational collection for intelligence analysis, global due to the exposure of 
American collection of American, as well as foreign communication metadata. At the 
core of this argument, the National Security Agency (NSA), is defending its collection 
methods of, among other pools of data, U.S. personal data for potential analysis with   
suspected terrorists. Central to the dispute is the question of whether this policy, and 
therefore, techniques are in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments and whether 
the NSA is acting under proper statutory authority. As of December 2013, two opposing 
legal decisions have been created, both by federal judges, one affirming the 
constitutionality of NSA’s practices and one vehemently opposing the same. 
In an effort to define complexity as it relates to public and social policy, Rittel 
described wicked problems as the antithesis of what science focuses on, which is the 
clearly defined problem with an equally defined completion or solution to the problem. 
Wicked problems, by contrast, are convoluted due to their indefinable properties; they 
have neither a clearly defined problem nor solution.43 While this reference source may at 
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first glance appear passé, is it particularly germane to the 21st century environment 
because today’s homeland security project mirrors the epitome of characteristics 
associated with such complexity. 
Rittel and Webber’s assessment suggests it may be possible to extrapolate that the 
homeland security information sharing environment may be indicative of a wicked 
problem, one in which the formulation of the problem in and of itself becomes the 
problem.44 Solutions to wicked problems are unique to those few who are intimately 
involved in the problem set.45 Contrast this scenario with a benign or tame problem 
wherein the mission is clear and whether or not the problem is solved, is also clear.46 The 
question then becomes, who is part of the problem set and will those stakeholders remain 
consistent long enough to be of strategic value long term? As time has progressed since 
9/11, the push for a stronger understanding, and indeed, practical co-operation between 
the SLTTP and the federal services, namely the IC, has emerged. As will be a common 
theme in this thesis, while the two worlds have been divergent by historical design, an 
emerging requirement to look for ways in which the two should build cooperative 
policies and safeguards will be continuous throughout. Certainly, this kind of emergent 
thinking brings with it an enormous responsibility to respond to the criticisms of IC.  
Dr. Christopher Bellavita observes that for the homeland security community to 
get where it wants to be is analogous to driving at night; the destination is more or less 
known, but it is only possible to see as far as the car’s headlights, and therefore, the 
nuances of the road are only revealed as they are approached. He has further noted that 
the methods and strategies used effectively in known or knowable areas will not be 
effective in the unordered realm, unordered meaning somewhere between order and 
disorder. It is not the opposite of disordered and yet not the opposite of ordered.47 
Bellavita refers to the Cynefin Framework, a sensemaking structure designed to help 
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demystify the relationship between the known and knowable domains and those that are 
chaotic and complex. The Cynefin Framework as Snowden illustrates, as a sensemaking 
model, is distinct from a categorization model in that categorization models exist in a 
classic 2x2 matrix often used in business settings to assess sets of data quickly, categorize 
them, and make decisions based on these categories. Once the data is collected, it can be 
dropped into the appropriate box within the model and a business decision can be made 
based on the category in which it fits. This model is more effective for exploiting data 
than exploring nuances or differences within data.48  
In the Cynefin Framework, the data comes before the framework is applied. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the Cynefin framework is comprised of four quadrants with a 
noticeable space in the center. The ordered domains on the right are divided into two 
distinctions, complicated and simple. Each has a relationship of cause and effect with a 
subtle difference of being aware of those causes and effects as in the simple domain or 
not being aware as in the complicated domain. Chaos and complexity on the left do not 
have the same relationships of cause to effect. Chaos can be deliberate, which is viewed 
as innovation or accidental, which requires immediate stabilization of the environment. 
Complexity has no relationship to causality until it is viewed in retrospect; where 
emergent order occurs based on unpredictable evolving outcomes. In this domain, 
experimentation helps to determine solutions. Desirable outcomes are amplified and 
dampening is applied to what does not work. The result is often new ways of doing 
things, and novel and developing practices. In the center of the framework is disorder, 
which means people do not recognize the domain they are in; it is the domain in which 
people spend most of their time. The domain people find themselves in is then interpreted 
based on their preference for how they relate to and solve problems. The distinction 
between this framework and most other management-based frameworks is that each 
domain requires a different way of thinking as opposed to a one-size-fits-all model.49  
                                                 




Figure 1.  The Cynefin Framework50 
Unordered can be either complex or chaotic. Complex would be analogous to 
wicked problems. Those issues that “evolve in unpredictably interactive and 
incontrollable ways,”51 the salience of which can only be realized in retrospect. The 
information-sharing emphasis in America emerged unpredictably out of 9/11. The call for 
better and stronger methods (most of which were undefined at the time) by the 9/11 
Commission for information sharing at all levels of government emerged out of the 
retrospective (complex domain) review of the attacks. Only when this comprehensive 
analysis was performed did this nation, as a collective, fully understand the importance of 
effectively sharing information and the beginning of the embrace for understanding 
complexity in what was to become homeland security. See Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Cynefin Framework representation of pre- and post-9/11 relationship to 
complexity  
New threats and dilemmas have emerged that could not have been predicted or 
detected much, if at all, before they materialized. Examples, such as Najibullah Zazi who 
conspired to bomb the New York Subway system in 2009,52 Faisal Shahzad who 
attempted a bombing in Times Square in 2010,53 Nidal Malik Hasan who killed  
13 people in 2009 at Fort Hood Texas,54 and Naser Abdo who plotted a massacre in 2011 
much like Hasan’s.55 All are cases that have transpired since 2006, in the midst of 
bolstered homeland security improvements in airline safety, information sharing and 
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public education, to name a few. While additional attacks or attempted attacks have not 
surprised this nation, and certainly could have been predicted, where and when they are 
executed is a continued enigmatic challenge facing this country. In three of these cases, 
Zazi, Shahzad, and Abdo, systems put in place after 9/11, some as simple as alert citizens 
reporting suspicious behavior after being educated and urged to do so, resulted in 
disrupting the plots and may have saved many lives. 
However, the illusive and seemingly emergent threat still exists that has 
materialized many times in this country, and indeed across the globe, which has resulted 
consistently in mass casualties. The active lone shooter, who in most cases, is not deemed 
a terrorist by the letter of the law, and yet in many ways, is much more lethal, accurate, 
and sure. This type of threat has produced a pattern or patterns in which it may be 
possible to respond better but has this nation been imaginative enough to predict such an 
attack? Is this threat being considered as part of the homeland security, information 
sharing project? 
Upon delving into research of the complexity domain, the question arose as to 
whether the term wicked problem was simply a crafty academic notion to highlight the 
degree of difficulty certain problems presented. Is it a concept that applies in today’s 
context in which homeland security issues and problems emerge daily? Given the 
constant challenges of sharing information across various levels of government in a way 
that provides timely and actionable information, does using the concept of wicked 
problems provide relevancy to today’s homeland security leader? 
2. The Genesis of Complex Environments: Identifying the Wicked 
Problem 
In this section, the origin of the wicked problem and the criteria used to define it 
are explored. This portion of the research reveals that the term wicked problem resulted 
from a phrase coined in the 1970s by a local government planner who began to notice 
how social aspects grew more complex after basic city planning infrastructure was 
established. It demonstrated that complexity has been identified and analyzed since the 
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1970s. A wicked problem can be defined and problem set can be measured against ten 
criteria. 
It is helpful first to look at the evolutionary progression of complexity from the 
historical perspective of the public policy professional as it relates to early problem 
solving and how complexity began to emerge. Horst Rittel, an urban planner and 
designer, discovered in the 1970s that traditional linear thinking ill-prepared those in the 
field of city planning for the odd-structured problems of the day. It is from this 
perspective that a short detour is taken to understand the genesis of this kind of 
thinking.56  
In the past, the public professional’s job was to solve an array of problems, which 
were identifiable and understandable and which were deemed by the conventional 
wisdom of the time as issues to be addressed for the whole of the community. Examples, 
such as established infrastructure (i.e., schools, hospitals, roads, water, sewage, 
education), served as problems solved by public planners and organizational leaders. 
Once easier problems were solved, more complex and complicated issues demanded the 
attention of the public leader. Over time, as the increasingly pluralistic American society 
grew, it diffused value systems and introduced accompanying varied agendas. What was 
once a robust approach to problem solving based on “Newtonian, mechanistic physics”57 
became less and less effective as open systems in organizations, as well as society, 
became more complex. Due to the ever-evolving American cultural diversity, it fostered 
increasing difficulty to establish equity among the varied interests of cultural groups.58  
During the Industrial age, the importance of efficiency permeated efforts 
involving planning and professionalism. Accomplishing objectives with the least amount 
of resources quickly became the tradition. Today, the reliance on efficiency through the 
leverage of technological advances is resumed in many aspects of Western culture but 
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also in the sciences and engineering.59 Keeping in mind the nebulous characteristics of 
wicked problems, as well as the human urge to make sense of complexity, Rittel reduced 
his observation of the components of a wicked problem to 10 definable factors. These 
factors in and of themselves seem to represent somewhat of a paradox. While Rittel 
astutely grasped the concept of complexity within a wicked problem environment as 
constantly morphing and shifting, he still felt compelled to reduce its components to the 
simplest of terms, and consequently, solving the problem in the tradition sense with linear 
thinking, and thus, an easy-to-grasp list of characteristics. Further, Rittel’s context is from 
a public planner’s worldview. Notwithstanding, the 10 properties help to grapple with the 
tenuous features of such problems as they may relate to the homeland security project. 
 No definitive formulation of a wicked problem exists 
 Wicked problems have no stopping rule 
 Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false but good or bad  
 No immediate or ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem is 
available  
 Every solution to a wicked problem is a one-shot operation as no 
opportunity exists to learn by trial and error; every attempt counts 
significantly 
 Wicked problems do not have innumerable (or exhaustibly describable) 
set of potential solutions, nor does a well-described set of permissible 
operations exist that may be incorporated into the plan 
 Every wicked problem is essentially unique 
 Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another 
problem 
 The existence of discrepancy in describing a wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the 
nature of the problem’s resolution. 
 The planner has no right to be wrong 
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Given these criteria, how does a homeland security leader distinguish between 
problem solving models, how does a more traditional method of problem solving 
compare when dealing with wicked problems?  
“We can’t solve problems with the same thinking as when we created 
them.” 
–Albert Einstein 
3. Tame Problem Solving Technology: Suited for the Complex Domain? 
In this section, the distinction is made between how the wicked problem is solved 
versus how a more traditional or “tame” problem is solved. It begins to illustrate how a 
linear problem-solving model may be inadequate for the complex domain. In this case, 
the scanning, analysis, response and assessment (SARA) model is used as an example of 
a linear problem-solving model. 
Traditional problem solving models rely on an orderly, linear, top-down approach 
working from the problem to the solution.60 Rittel calls the types of problems addressed 
by this kind of thinking as “tame” problems.61 As an example, for many years in 
American policing, the SARA model of problem solving was the vanguard of Problem-
Oriented Policing. Beginning with Scanning the environment, officers were taught to do 
an appraisal of key contributing factors that result in creating the problem. The first step 
would be the establishment that a problem exists, and then key aspects, such as the 
degree of impact and frequency of the problem, should be weighed for their impact on the 
problem identification. Next, the Analysis of the problem required collection of pertinent 
data, understanding the underlying causal factors, and hypothesizing about why it is 
occurring. The Response phase next focuses on a desired intervention based on choices 
among alternative solutions. In this stage, clarity in identifying a plan, as well as 
responsible parties for executing the plan, is essential. Finally, the Assessment step 
determines whether the actions taken were effective, whether modifications should be 
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made, and what, if any, maintenance operations should be established.62 While creative 
and even resilient aspects are part of this model, it represents a linear approach to 
problem solving with a definable problem and outcome. See Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  SARA model  
According to Johnston, the intelligence cycle is a visual, easy-to-understand 
representation of a complex process. On its face, the intelligence cycle seems linear and 
top-down, as it does not consider the non-linear aspects related to the analysts’ biases, the 
fact that sources of information are from outside the analysts’ control, and a strong 
reliance on the analyst to produce and manage a final product. As practiced today, 
intelligence analysis is a combination of art, tradecraft, and science.63 See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  A deceptively simple representation of the intelligence cycle 
In the intelligence community, intelligence analysis tends to be approached in a 
more individual fashion of problem solving. Given that the IC is comprised of numerous 
agencies, disciplines, and organizational cultures, each with their own analytic 
methodology, this type of problem solving may not be surprising. While IC disciplines 
will employ analytical methods unique to their culture, when faced with an 
interdisciplinary analytical problem, a multi-method analysis may be used resulting in a 
“best-fit” synthesis.”64 In addition, Johnston identified at least 160 analytic methods, 
which remarkably has not led to a standardized central analytic doctrine.65  
In a comment on current analytical standards within the IC, Lowenthal alludes to 
the fact that intelligence analysis is more aligned with complexity than a linear approach 
to problem solving when he states: “Value is given to consistency, which can run counter 
to the desire for analytic insight and avoidance of groupthink.”66 Further, sound 
methodology may not equate to accuracy if accuracy is of the highest priority, and 
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“[may] run the risk of creating a very mechanistic approach to what is [ultimately] an 
intellectual process.”67 
Conklin notes that as this nation progresses into the new millennium, differing 
views and competing interests between divergent groups or organizations trying to 
accomplish a common goal seem to be intensifying; the bigger the disparity, the more 
likely they flounder, which essentially guarantees failure. Many managers lack a basic 
awareness about complex problems; principal among them is the realization that linear 
problem solving processes are ineffective with such problems.68 
It is clear that the IC and SLTTP represent two distinct and disparate realms 
within the United States, but if the SLTTP is to be integrated into the national security 
enterprise, as has been proffered in post-9/11 thinking, how will problem solving be 
approached when so many competing elements are involved? What can be learned from 
the dynamics that seem to cause a separation of essential features needed in a problem-
solving environment? 
4. How Fragmentation in Complexity Helps to Understand the 
Dichotomy between Levels of Government 
This section explores the phenomenon of fragmentation, and how it impacts 
complex systems or organizations with similar goals but differing perspectives from 
which conflict arises. Fragmentation within the context of complexity describes how 
stakeholders in a project, such as information sharing in the homeland security project (or 
fragmented elements in organizations, such as the 22 legacy agencies within the DHS), 
see that their perspective of the problem is the only one that matters. Fragmentation can 
be hidden from view when the stakeholders do not appreciate that different perspectives 
should be observed. The analogy is that the IC and SLTTP agencies had virtually no 
consciousness of the significance of the two different perspectives until post-9/11 reform 
forced the exploration of enlightened outlooks from both sides.69 
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The fragmentation between the IC and SLTTP may be viewed as a naturally 
occurring phenomenon based on historical evolution. The national intelligence 
establishment in the United States can draw its origins from 1940 when the coordinator of 
information (COI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were created under 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.70 During this period, the power struggles between the 
U.S. military and intelligence functions were the concern of the day; even at the earliest 
stages of development, the IC was focused on foreign threats or its relationship within the 
federal community at home. There was no mention found in the literature of any 
awareness, much less concern for the relationship between state and local first responders 
(what we know now as SLTTP) and the IC, could be found. During the Cold War era, the 
IC had its clearly defined problem of ensuring American interests primarily abroad were 
protected. The central concern was the Soviet threat; so much so that the bulk of 
American activities and processes were dominated by the focus on the Soviet Union. Two 
decades after the end of the Cold War, U.S. intelligence processes are still influenced by 
those developed during the Cold War focus on the Soviet Union.71  
The state and local intelligence or information-sharing function (formally or 
informally) was primarily focused on countering crime in the United States. For years 
pre-9/11, the predominant relationships between state and local first responders and the 
federal community was limited to the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATFE) based on mutual criminal 
case investigations.  
Wicked problems are one of the forces that exacerbates fragmentation, and it is 
imperative that those responsible for dealing with these complex problems understand the 
properties (as outlined previously) so as to mitigate the fragmenting effect wicked 
problems may pose.72 Due to the social dynamic of the wicked problem, it requires a 
social process to address the problem. The antidote for wicked problems according to 
Conklin is coherence. Coherence means shared understanding and a shared commitment 
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among agents within the system or stakeholders, especially in a situation in which 
collaboration will define success or failure. To achieve a commonly understood set of 
mission, vision, values, the goal to be achieved, the dynamics of wicked problems, as 
well as how to defragment them, must be understood by leaders. Coherence denotes a 
commitment to the project, its desired outcomes, and the processes necessary to achieve 
them.73 The presence of the strong and effective leadership would play an essential role 
in the creation of coherence, but is this possible? 
B. LEADERSHIP AND COMPLEXITY 
1. What Do the Experts Say About Leadership in the 21st Century? 
The discussion of leadership has been at the forefront of business and government 
shortfalls in recent times. The literature reviewed for this thesis was sought out to provide 
insight into what purported experts say about leadership in the 21st century, as well as 
how they address complexity in today’s multifaceted work environments. This concept is 
important given the context laid in the previous chapter regarding how complex the 
efforts in homeland security information sharing is when integrating the multitudes of 
government disciplines, jurisdictions, laws, policies, and political agendas. A wide array 
of material was available to review, more than could possibly be consumed in a 
reasonable timeframe. However, Kellerman brought to bear a compelling argument that 
the leadership industry has, for the past 40 years, shortchanged the world. This situation 
in and of itself would be of interest but the fact that Kellerman hails from the leadership 
industry herself draws extra attention from the reader.  
Kellerman’s essential messages are first; there is no empirical evidence that 
suggests that leadership training and education has resulted in advanced leadership skills 
among the world’s leaders. Such training has focused more on the power and status of 
leadership positions and revenue for leadership industry gurus than recognition of the 
value followers bring to an organization. In fact, she claims, if the failures of leaders 
within business or government are analyzed, the conclusion could easily be drawn that 
the leadership industry has become a dismal failure. Next, she asserts that the dynamic 
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between leader and follower has shifted, the leader has lost ground and the follower has 
gained influence. That leaders have historically forsaken followers in pursuit of their 
power and followers have now arisen by leveraging social media and other methods.74  
While the initial research was focused on the most recent and relevant resources 
on leadership within the 21st century, the research produced work from much earlier (the 
1990s and early 2000s) that countered not only Kellerman’s denunciation of the 
leadership industry but addressed complexity science as well. For example, Oakley and 
Krug discussed how leaders must tap in to the richness of the organization’s staff by 
creating an environment based on trust between the leader and follower, essential to 
organizational health say the authors. Their theme of powerful leadership is more from 
the intrinsic qualities needed by the leader to be effective than how the leader imposes 
influence over the follower.75  
Wheately, a physicist, in 1999, discussed the distinctions between Newtonian 
thinking in organizations and how field theory or quantum physics relate more effectively 
to organizations and organization leadership due to the complexity and social dynamics 
involved.76 Uhl-Bien et al. leveraged themes similar to Oakley, Krug, and Wheatley, and 
created Complexity Leadership Theory in an effort to narrow in on equipping leaders of 
the 21st century for leading in complex adaptive systems.77 Consistent with the literature 
reviewing complexity, non-linear critical thinking is indicated for leaders to be effective 
in complex adaptive systems, such as the homeland security enterprise.  
Hailes calls today’s environment the “Age of Surprise,”78 one in which America 
never expected, and therefore, has become involved in activities and relationships never 
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before imagined. This nation is involved in partnerships with nations considered enemies, 
such as U.S. support to Syria, perplexing relationships with Pakistan and Iran, and new 
technologies in low-tech weaponry, such as the plastic (and now metal) firearms 
produced on 3-D printers and improvised explosive devises.79 Information-sharing 
concerns related to this kind of evolution emerge as homeland security leaders endeavor 
to predict through a new way of thinking, what threats may surface, how relationships 
within the homeland can be leveraged, and whether foreign relationships should be 
strengthened to provide a more sustained level of not only security but prosperity as well. 
To add to the complexity of emerging threats, the threat to Americans as known 
today lies somewhere between a post-9/11 lexicon of hysteria steeped in an “‘existential 
threat’”80 based on this country’s collective memory—and the disgruntled high school 
student who open fires on classmates or teachers. As noted by Bellavita, Americans are 
constantly confronted by the evolution between what is known, knowable, or intended as 
a homeland security strategy, and what is emergent, or unpredictable;81 emergence being 
defined as “nonlinear suddenness that characterizes change in complex systems.”82 
Hailes claims that by 2035, those he refers to as super empowered individuals will have 
access to technology and weapons that would truly pose an existential threat to nation-
states. They will be virtually impossible to identify or isolate. While Mueller and Stewart 
raise concerns over how the United States may be exaggerating the danger faced, 
questioning whether a truly existential threat exists (including the ultimate damage 
caused by the 9/11 attacks),83 Hailes proposes the approaching possibility of such a threat 
reaching existential proportions. The challenge for the homeland security community 
including the military will be to leverage yet to be imagined technological systems to do 
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so.84 Further, it will become increasingly important that SLTTP responders become 
aware of and equipped for reporting on or intervening in such activity, which will require 
resilient systems adept at meeting emerging information-sharing demands as new threats 
emerge. Can leadership provide the proper environment for ensuring such shifting and 
evolving demands are met? 
Kellerman has doubts. In her book, The End of Leadership, she has begun a 
challenging debate on whether the “leadership industry” has lived up to what it has 
claimed for over 40 years, growing leaders and making one more efficient and effective. 
She discusses how many so-called leaders have fallen into disrepute and highlights the 
changing dynamic between leaders and followers, leaders losing power and followers 
gaining power. In a time when American culture clamors for authentic leadership, 
American government and business is suffering a near breakdown in the ability to effect 
policy and to work collaboratively to address this country’s most pressing problems.85  
Initially, in the American culture, and now globally, becoming a leader has 
become a mantra for three reasons says Kellerman: (1) an evolution toward weakening 
leaders and strengthening followers has occurred, (2) this shift following the 
sociopolitical turmoil of the late 1960s and early ‘70s has accelerated, and (3) the 
perceived decline of the United States in the 1970s and ‘80s as compared to Japan and 
China has advanced. To be a leader has signified culturally that an individual is destined 
to be of higher status than followers—is on the path of achieving power, influence, 
authority and money, and has achieved personal and professional fulfillment. This 
worldview is engrained so much so that $50 billion is spent on corporate leadership 
training and development annually with the expectation that leadership can be achieved 
by anyone over a period of weeks, months, or a weekend, that leaders drive outcomes and 
that followers, in comparison to leaders, are much less significant. This infatuation can 
negate the importance of focusing on excellence in essential organizational functions.86 
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The efficacy of the leadership industry itself invites skepticism when examining 
certain aspects as introduced by Kellerman. The field of leadership studies is not deemed 
a suitable subject for serious study by academia because it is neither rigorous nor 
replicable. It is “self-satisfied, self-perpetuating and poorly policed.”87 Leadership 
training and development is largely devoid of objective assessment, and when compared 
to the immensity of scandal and dissatisfaction with formal leaders, it falls on unsteady 
ground to say that it has lifted either corporate America or the U.S. government to levels 
an individual may aspire to as a leader. To illustrate, in 2011, Harvard’s Center for Public 
Leadership found that 77 percent of Americans “agree” or “strongly agree” that America 
has a leadership crisis, and that according to a Maritz Research poll in 2010, only seven 
percent of employees trust their employers, leaders, and managers, and workers generally 
do not consider their bosses to be either honest or capable.88  
Kellerman claims that approximately 1,500 definitions of leadership and another 
40 leadership theories exist.89 Presuming she is somewhat accurate in her assertion, it 
may be no wonder this nation struggles today in narrowing how to cause the best results 
as leaders in organizations, especially when considering the impact complicated 
environments have on the ability to lead effectively. The very existence of this inordinate 
number of ways in which leadership is defined, coupled with how it is applied through 
theory, suggests the high degree of complexity in today’s world and the eager attempt to 
demystify it. Kellerman observes that an unavoidable shift in the leadership industry is 
afoot; leaders are hungry for more insight and losing ground, and followers are edgy, 
disillusioned by their leaders’ inability to deliver, and yet emboldened by their newfound 
ability to expose leaders’ ineptitudes and establish their own power.90  
Evolutionary leadership theory posits that humans tend to live in groups; groups 
with leaders perform better than those without. Certainly, ancestral groups relied on the 
relationship between leader and follower for mere survival based on a social contract 
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between the two. This contract undertakes the notion that the leader is expected to control 
“while [the] followers are generally expected to go along.”91 This concept is helpful in 
understanding how and why certain attributes of leadership exist, such as a top-down 
premise of how the leader assumes all responsibility for the group. This dynamic lives 
sturdily in many homeland security environments. To be certain, law enforcement 
remains steeped in this kind of culture with a chief of police and descending levels of 
authority typically replicating a military rank structure to some degree or another referred 
to colloquially as paramilitary meaning a civilian organization acting as the military.  
The transference of the power from the leader to follower among other aspects of 
leading in the 21st century is occurring at warp speed, says Kellerman and if we [don’t] 
“get a grip, the prognosis is grim.”92 Therefore, it is that the leaders of today are not only 
facing the complexity of their industry, in this case, information sharing in homeland 
security, but the ever-changing complexity of the leadership realm itself. While the shift 
of power from leader to follower can be traced back to the late 1960s and early 70s, the 
focus on leadership never faded; rather, it morphed into the distinction between a 
manager, one who was a “bureaucratic bore”93 and a leader, or “swashbuckling hero.”94 
This shift in power, coupled with the speed at which information-sharing technology has 
evolved, puts the leaders of today on notice that they can be subjected to a firestorm of 
social network, mass media, or other form of mass communication from a group of 
disenchanted followers; thereby, weakening the leader. How? When leaders are exposed 
for their inequities, corruption, ineptitude, or other weaknesses, information regarding 
their frailties (accurate or not) is immediately received by the masses, the leader’s 
potency is immediately affected, and followers are emboldened. When considering the 
repercussion of social media mass communication as has been featured in recent 
governmental downfalls, such as Egypt, or government leaders being affected, such as 
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judges who must declare a mistrial when jurors transmit electronic messages counter to 
instructions, it is imposing to realize the power followers wield.95  
These implications may seem self-evident, and in many respects, they are, 
however, for the homeland security leader they may have an emerging impact. The use of 
these technologies by the young and savvy is standard fair wherein as recently as 2010, 
64 percent of American CEOs were not using social media of any kind to connect with 
employees, customers, or boards. This lack of use can have a more serious impact on 
government leaders than in business due to what is at stake. In Egypt’s and Tunisia’s 
case, their tech-savvy youth plotted and planned on social media outside the 
consciousness of the senior leadership of their countries.  
Closer to home, the DHS found itself in 2012 explaining in a bipartisan 
congressional hearing why only 37 percent of employees found their leaders motivating 
or that they were satisfied with their senior leaders’ policies and practices. As dismal as 
this rating may be, it rises above the Maritz Research poll in 2010 as cited above.96 
Touted as a colossal leadership failure, the response to a federal leadership survey 
indicated that DHS was ranked only 31st among 33 of the largest agencies within the best 
places to work in the federal government survey published by the Partnership for Public 
Service.97 While stronger leadership is indicated by observers, even stronger followership 
has raised the issues of the troublesome environment to the level of public ire; a concept 
lost on those in Congress who asked for representatives of the DHS to appear before 
them to aid in the understanding of the nature of the shortfalls and wholly dismissive of 
DHS employees’ perceptions of DHS problems as no rank-and-file-employees were 
apparently invited to testify at the hearings.98  
Kellerman poses the question, since the old justifications for leaders having power 
are no longer convincing, and followers are bolstered in their own capabilities, what then 
motivates a follower in the second decade of the 21st century to follow leaders? Only 
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two; go along because people believe they have to, or because they want to. The former 
says Kellerman is more related to the workplace due to the fear of losing a job, the latter 
more oriented to governance as a contract and is based on the leader’s merit between the 
leader and follower.99  
In the congressional hearings discussed previously regarding DHS’s morale woes, 
a variation of the adage “People don’t leave jobs they leave managers” was repeated.100 
Employees may at times feel disempowered, but as Kellerman is suggesting, they are 
leveraging their influence more and more. The merit Kellerman refers to is distilled 
surprisingly into two attributes, ethics and effectiveness—simply put, being corrupt or 
inept does not inspire followers. However, is it truly as simple as this? How do people 
lead and yet face the complexity outlined previously? Leaders are facing a collective 
status diminished from what it was; scarcer resources, power and authority plague the 
contemporary leader’s repertoire. The requisite to lead, however, has not faded; it is more 
necessary than ever before. Historically implied under the concept of leadership 
development,101 leaders simply learned about the catch-phrases or theories of the day and 
went back to work cured of any leadership ailments by which they may have been 
afflicted.  
It is curious to observe Kellerman’s take on how the leadership industry has 
become so devoid of the follower’s essential contribution to the leader/follower dynamic 
when the well-established social exchange theory and others has emphasized, at the least 
a symbiotic relationship between leader and follower, and at best, a referent rapport 
between the two based on mutual organizational needs.102 Oakley and Krug wrote about 
these very dynamics in the 1990s by placing the onus of being a leader squarely on the 
leader but with an obligation for the leader to place the follower in high regard for 
optimal effectiveness in the face of rapidly shifting priorities. In fact, they claimed no 
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organizational malady was beyond the reach of a powerful environment, which enabled 
or empowered followers to notice inefficiencies and bring them forward. Moreover, if the 
organizational dysfunction escaped an employee’s attention, the leader, if the proper 
environment had been created, need only ask pertinent questions of the follower to gain 
perspective on given problems. Effective questions asked of a sufficient number of 
employees, and the whole of the problem, and its solution is revealed—no need for an 
organizational consultant. In an apparent retreat from the leadership principals of the 
time, as well as from the past 40 years according to Kellerman, their message was that the 
leader must establish credibility through deep introspection and a willingness to lead 
one’s self before ever hoping to lead others.103  
LPO, an IACP initiative, is being implemented across the country within law 
enforcement, and the fire service. In a [behavioral] science-based program, the follower 
is viewed as an essential part of the organizational health. Parsed into four systems: the 
individual, the group, the leadership system, and the organization; the course encourages 
a holistic view of leadership.104  
The cornerstone of the LPO training centers on the leader thought process—a 
specific formula or model for evaluating relationships situations and issues. This process 
originally was developed at West Point by a working group involving Brigadier General 
Howard Prince and later Lieutenant Colonel John Halstead, who later collaborated with 
the IACP and an advisory group to refashion the program for the law enforcement 
community.105 The leader thought process teaches leaders to diagnose a given 
organizational challenge by taking the following approach: 1) understanding what is 
happening and identifying areas of interest to be analyzed, 2) identify a logical chain of 
events leading to the issue at hand, 3) account for what is going on by analyzing through 
theories and experiences, 4) identify the root cause(s) for the problem, 5) select a leader 
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strategy, and 6) apply the leader strategy.106 A strong point in this course is a focus on 
leading change using behavioral science and leadership theories oriented to help the 
leader succeed in the 21st century. In particular, after understanding group and 
organizational dynamics, the leader is armed to be able to know and understand what 
motivates individuals, groups, and organizations when leading new initiatives.  
In a world in which the context is fraught with complexity and constraint, the 
homeland security leader must be adept in understanding the context within a given 
situation. Contextual intelligence,107 or knowing and understanding the importance of the 
context under which individuals are leading, has moved from a lower priority to being of 
primary importance with vital consequences in Kellerman’s view. Key to this paradigm 
shift must include the intimate understanding of followership and how to follow.108 Joyce 
agrees; citing Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch, leadership changes as the context for it changes. 
Leadership is a blend of small impacts within the system embedded in context.109 This 
viewpoint has everything to do with leading in complex adaptive environments and 
moving deliberately and effectively within and between the various domains as illustrated 
in the Cynefin framework. Joyce says leading on the edge of chaos involves promoting 
networks, experimenting, and gathering information. To be effective, a leader is adept at 
sensemaking, story telling, and moving the collective whole into action.110 The edge of 
chaos as Joyce proposes may mean the context of being deliberate, or innovative, or it 
may mean operating within the complex domain as Snowden suggests.111 It is a way to 
energize new thinking, which results in novel outcomes. A leader who is extremely 
familiar with this domain can use story telling and sensemaking to help bring clarity or 
order those who struggle with an unordered environment.  
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2. Does Leadership Ontology Embrace Complexity Science? 
The question now, is it possible to learn to improve this nation’s ability to lead in 
environments of emerging complexity and constraint? One would think that Kellerman 
would have had a magic bullet given her background as founding executive director of 
the Kennedy’s School for Public Leadership and noted author within the very leadership 
industry she has seemingly forsaken. No, she says no magic bullet exists; rather, the 
challenge is to acknowledge the speed at which the world is changing; to awaken to the 
notion that second decade of the 21st century is more networked, interdependent, and 
transnational with leaders waning and less malleable followers. It is the obligation of 
leaders now to think bigger and faster than the leadership industry has done so far.112 
Mary Uhl-Bien et al. would agree with Kellerman in that leadership models of the 
last century “have been top-down bureaucratic paradigms,”113 ineffective in today’s 
complex environments. Uhl-Bien and her associates were so disenchanted with 
contemporary thinking in leadership that they created Complexity Leadership Theory 
stating, “Much of leadership thinking has failed to recognize that leadership is not merely 
the influential act of an individual or individuals but rather is embedded in a complex 
interplay of numerous interacting forces.”114 They further comment that these models 
have served well in economies based on production but are ill suited to deal with 
knowledge-based environments. The knowledge era is characterized as a new 
environment, competitive in nature, and distinguished by globalization, technology, 
deregulation, and democratization. It is in this new atmosphere that organizational 
success is dependent more upon social assets, corporate IQ, and learning capacity than 
physical resources.115  
Complexity Leadership Theory encompasses three broader types of leadership: 1) 
administrative, meaning the traditional hierarchical notion of alignment and control, 2) 
                                                 
112 Kellerman, The End of Leadership, 199. 
113 Uhl-Bien, Russ, and McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting Leadership from the 
Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” 298–318. 
114 Ibid., 302. 
115 Ibid. 
 43
leadership that structures and enables environments that support innovation in complex 
adaptive systems, referred to as enabling leadership by the authors, and 3) leadership 
viewed as something that engenders emergent change activities, termed by the authors as 
adaptive leadership.116 In complexity leadership theory, the authors distinguish 
leadership as a creative environment, which enables emergent interaction that results in 
productive outcomes and the leader as an individual who influences the dynamic, as well 
as the outcomes. These differences are comparable to Oakley’s and Krug’s distinction 
between management and leadership, or the hard and soft side of change, respectively.117 
Uhl Bien and her colleagues’ administrative leadership equates to Oakley’s and Krug’s 
concept of management, and adaptive leadership equates to Oakley’s and Krug’s concept 
of leadership or the soft side of change.118  
Similarly, Burns writes of the transactional and transformational leader, the 
former adept at producing exceptional outcomes, the latter known for engendering 
exceptional producers or followers. In an effort to draw a distinction between power and 
leadership, Burns discusses charismatic versus non-charismatic styles of leadership. For 
the complex adaptive system context, the transactional leader seems an ill-fitted option. 
The transactional leader, while maintaining a positive relationship to the follower, simply 
relies on the follower to accomplish outcomes as directed. Based in social exchange 
theory, the leader communicates a desired objective and the follower produces. Each 
receives an agreed upon promise of reward or outcome. This type of leadership, says 
Burns would not be effective when the focus is to inspire followers to participate in 
significant organizational change. As could be imagined, this type of relationship seems 
anchored in the simple domain wherein the environment is known, and the relationship 
between cause and effect, predictable.  
As has many a leadership theory or hypothesis posited, transactional leadership 
could be more identified with management than leadership. Transformational leadership, 
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however, provides an environment in which the follower thrives. This type of leadership 
does more than simply manage; it equips followers to deal with uncertainty.119 
Transformational leadership would be effective in any context but is most effective in the 
following conditions. 
 Crisis, change and instability 
 Mediocrity 
 Follower disenchantment 
 Future opportunity120 
Bass furthered Burns’ work by developing four key components referred to as the 
four I’s. 
 Idealized influence: the leader acts as an exemplary role model who is 
perceived by followers as competent and confident. 
 Inspirational motivation: the leader paints an inspiring vision, focuses on 
followers’ efforts and models appropriate behaviors to galvanize 
followers.  
 Intellectual stimulation: the leader encourages innovation through 
challenging status quo belief systems of a group or organization. In this 
manner, leaders promote critical thinking and problem solving among 
followers by helping them re-frame their perspective or relationship to the 
problem to be more effective. 
 Individualized consideration: the leader coaches and mentors followers by 
showing concern for their needs and well-being. The leader helps the 
follower develop by encouraging innovative thinking and building self-
confidence.121  
The urge to consider transformational leadership the panacea for leading in 
complex adaptive systems may soften when reminded of the fact that the literature is 
uncertain as to whether transformational leadership (or leadership at all) emanates from 
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innate personality traits or is learned behavior related to self efficacy, self-esteem, and 
emotional intelligence.122  
The dominant organizational theories thus far, based on archaic premises, aim to 
seek stability and avoid uncertainty. This premise is problematic in the unordered 
domain, in which the information-sharing enterprise is entrenched. It establishes a built-
in conflict between the bureaucratic worldview and that of the knowledge era in that the 
traditional paradigm of leadership theory is centered on the idea that leaders influence 
workers to meet defined organizational objectives, to produce efficiently and effectively 
while insisting on alignment and control within an organization. Contemporary 
leadership theory has not adequately addressed this contradiction, or an incongruity that 
should not ignore the virtues of bureaucratic organizational structure. Rather, Uhl-Bien et 
al. invite the possibility of creating leadership theory that leverages the benefits of 
historical best practices for accomplishing objectives. To better suit the needs of the 21st 
century, they generated a model of leadership grounded in the precepts of complexity.  
While Kellerman is clear in her work that not all leadership theorists have been 
misguided in terms of their lop-sided relationship of leaders to followers, Uhl-Bien and 
Marion seem to have had a grasp of this dynamic as early as 2001, some 10 years prior to 
Kellerman’s work, and as mentioned earlier, Krug and Oakley considered the centerpiece 
of what they believed important in leadership to be the richness found within the ranks of 
the staff—followers.123 Uhl-Bien and Marion realized then that complexity theory 
validates what may instinctively be known but “ignore in practice,”124 which is that the 
dynamics of complex environments, randomness, and interplay within the organizational 
among all components means leaders cannot predict or control outcomes. It was clear 
then that leadership in complex organizations required a new paradigm oriented more 
toward creating work environments, enabling followers to be innovative, or a deliberate 
entrance into the domain of chaos. Advancement would not result as a product of the 
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conferment of the leader or even the leader’s direct intervention with the followers; 
rather, the enabling atmosphere created by the leader and embraced by employees serves 
as the genesis for new thinking and resulting innovation.125 Kellerman may have missed 
an opportunity to find allies in her quest for the consummate leader. 
To understand better whether the authors’ later work resulting in Complexity 
Leadership Theory would apply to a given environment, the authors distinguished 
between complex adaptive systems versus merely complicated systems or organizations. 
In the former, the individual components and their interaction between each other, as well 
as the external environment are such that a description of each component is insufficient 
to understanding the whole. Further, three key principles of a complex adaptive system 
are, “order is emergent [rather than] predetermined; the system’s future is irreversible 
and; the system’s future is often unpredictable.” In the latter, understanding a given 
component (no matter how many exist within a system) brings with it an understanding 
of the whole system.126  
Uhl-Bien and her colleagues claimed in 2011 that per the law of requisite 
complexity, “it takes complexity to defeat complexity.”127 Certainly, in this modern age, 
complexity abounds in everyday life, and most certainly, in modern day government 
organizational existence. As such, the complexity of the information-sharing environment 
requires a unique relationship and understanding of complexity to identify and problem-
solve in a complex environment.  
Kellerman and Uhl-Bien et al. highlight the importance for leaders to develop an 
understanding of how context will affect the ability to create outcomes. Kellerman refers 
to contextual intelligence as being critical for future leaders to be able to decipher 
situations before applying resources to solve problems or create solutions.128 Uhl-Bien 
and her colleagues describe context as the “interactive ambience within which complex 
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dynamics occur.”129 This ever-shifting environment shapes the interaction between the 
agents or actors in an organizational situation and how ideas are created, how tension is 
addressed, the use of feedback loops and environmental demands and hierarchical 
dynamics, etc. Both complex adaptive systems and leadership are social constructs within 
this context and within which past patterns and history has a place. 
Bellavita discusses shaping patterns rather than programs; in essence, he suggests 
homeland security leaders, when developing strategy should expand their capacity for 
understanding newly emerging and unpredictable conditions related to and dealt with in a 
different leadership mindset than a prescribed, linear strategy based on predictably. This 
scenario is possible when relating to malleable and shifting conditions as something it is 
possible to influence with broader, less constricting boundaries; those emerging patterns 
that support the organizational objectives are then focused upon and encouraged, and by 
contrast, those patterns that do not are disrupted.130  
Similarly, Bell writes of the complexity of the DHS and how it may seem 
intuitive to apply formal leadership structure to a complex organization, such as the DHS 
and expect immediate compliance and continuity.131 Her observation with regard to the 
DHS’s complicated and fragmented organizational structure is that the organization does 
not possess cohesiveness, which should be of no surprise considering that 22 legacy 
agencies were brought together; each with its own historical cultural environment, much 
like a colossal corporate merger. She highlights a leadership framework entitled meta-
leadership, a phrase coined by Marcus et al., as a form of leadership connecting disparate 
organizations with similar missions by capitalizing on 10 core competencies. These, say 
the authors, connect multiagency organizations with a consistent message of mission, 
vision and values.132  
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 Courage—is courage enough to have an impact in the information-sharing 
realm, challenging the entrenched silo, fragmented mindset of SLTTP and 
IC members including those in leadership positions?  
 Curiosity—Fellowships, such as the former ITACG and current JCAT, 
generate curiosity among members of the SLTTP and the IC. How can this 
be formally leveraged and funneled into new initiatives when emerging 
ideas are generated from these unique experiences? 
 Imagination—Once curiosity has begun, are there systems, tools, 
processes or procedures to support innovation within the homeland 
security enterprise aimed at improving how information is shared between 
the IC and SLTTP? 
 Organizational sensibilities—How to ensure that the meta-leader 
recognizes the traditional Newtonian linear aspects of organizations and is 
able to compare and contrast these aspects with the dynamics of complex 
adaptive systems? Specifically, can the meta-leader grasp how complex 
adaptive systems create networks within the systems for improved 
communication and operation? Given that the cultural differences between 
the SLTTP and IC are vast, lexicon differences, classified vs. unclassified 
environments, criminal justice vs. national security aspects and so forth, 
how can leadership doctrine enable homeland security leaders to address 
these issues? 
 Persuasion—How important is being vigilant when faced with resistance 
to new relationships between the IC and SLTTP? A balance does exist, in 
spending too much time looking in the rear-view mirror at 9/11 as opposed 
to envisioning the future needs for information sharing. Crime and 
terrorism are more noticeably intertwined, and therefore, the argument to 
enhance information sharing across all levels of government begins to 
make more sense and has more of practical realistic feel to it. 
 Conflict management—The meta-leader is required to provide conflict 
management in two ways, first, as related to systemic, organizational 
conflict, such as budgetary issues, organizational hierarchy, etc., the leader 
must quell conflict. This type of leadership is characterized by Uhl-Bien et 
al. as administrative leadership in their Complex Leadership Theory 
model, and second, in a more intangible way, the meta-leader must be 
attuned to and adept at spotting dispute resolution between competing 
interests.  
 Crisis management—Using the military metaphor, the authors allude to 
reshaping emergency plans while in the heat of a catastrophic response. 
Public safety first responders are raised on this kind of thinking. The 
Aurora Police watch commander, who was in charge at the theater 
shootings in July 2012, with seconds to spare, directed that police officers 
transport as many as 19 wounded people to local trauma centers due to the 
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unavailable fire/emergency medical service (EMS) units. In this case, he 
introduced complexity to defeat complexity through the law of requisite 
complexity as suggested by Uhl-Bien and her associates.133 
 Emotional intelligence—These attributes are reflected in Uhl-Bien et al. 
Complexity Leadership Theory under the adaptive leadership aspect. Can 
these attributes help leaders drive new initiatives and support the 
uncertainty of operating outside normal and customary organizational 
constructs? Can the use of the five components of emotional intelligence: 
self-awareness; self-regulation; motivation; empathy and social skill, help 
to restore stability due to the unorder they have embarked upon? 
 Persistence—Meta-leadership requires that leaders remain focused and 
vigilant in their commitment. The introduction of innovative ideas 
represents chaos until stability is restored as demonstrated in the Cynefin 
Framework. Aspects of meta-leadership may be perceived as outside the 
leader’s job description, which can sometimes be perceived as being too 
slow in producing results, amounting to little or no recognition and 
abundant failure; meta-leaders must be durable if they are to embrace the 
innovation that may be needed to engender changes in the information 
sharing environment. 
 Meta-leadership as a valued effort—While formal structures linking 
disparate government and non-government entities exist, they cannot 
account for the unanticipated and broad range of intricacies that occur 
during an actual event. The personal relationships and interaction between 
meta-leaders in these organizations enable a higher degree of resiliency 
during the randomness of event scenarios. Meta-leaders who have an 
understanding of the SLTTP and IC environments may play a critical role 
in leading new initiatives coalescing the two environments.134  
Could meta-leadership be the antecedent for a joint doctrinal approach addressing 
complex adaptive systems among all levels of government for information sharing? 
Along with the 10 core competencies, Bell cites a number of recommendations for 
potentially improved performance within the leadership ranks of the DHS. The problem, 
however, may be that too few senior leaders are present for long enough within the DHS 
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to establish or maintain continuity, an essential ingredient needed to adapt to the 
complicated and complex aspects of the DHS.135 
Organizations are comprised of humans who ostensively represent ordered 
systems focused on creating specific outcomes says Margaret Wheatley. Everything on 
the planet including human beings is derived from sub-atomic particles. The universe 
contains more empty space than not—the space within an atom for example is 99.99 
percent empty. Newtonian physics has viewed this emptiness as a void inside which 
nothing occurs. In the organizational context, the typical leader/follower relationship has 
replicated a Newtonian approach to physics wherein to create a result, a cause and effect 
must occur, or force upon force within the space of what was empty. Without the 
emptiness or space, something does exist and that something in the organizational context 
is an action by the leader and a reaction by the follower.136  
Wheatley, in a perspective on organizational behavior, draws a comparison 
between organizational behavior and quantum physics. In Leadership and the New 
Science, the empty space is viewed through the lens of the new field theory, which 
suggests the empty space is simply a field of non-material influence, which cannot be 
seen but experienced nonetheless. Field theory “was developed…to explain action-at-a 
distance.”137 This concept could be analogous to the otherwise intangible effect leaders 
may have in creating environments that support teamwork and innovation. Other 
examples of fields exist, such as gravity, and magnetic fields demonstrated when metal 
shavings are placed near magnets.138  
Wheatley draws an analogy between the Newtonian approach to organizations 
and the quantum method. In a commentary on the Newtonian-lead organization, she notes 
the space referred to above can be viewed as an organizational collection of people, 
solutions, choices, and problems that travel aimlessly within an organization only to 
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haphazardly arrive at decisions or solutions. “This is a cynical but real view of life in a 
Newtonian organization, discreet pieces wandering about, colliding or avoiding collision, 
veering off in unexpected directions—organizational anarchy relieved by occasional 
moments of accidental coherence.”139 The correlation between this thinking and Bell’s 
observation of the DHS culture helps to understand her interpretation of a lack of central 
organizational identity or doctrine.  
Recalling that Wheately was writing within the context of 1999, she distinguishes 
the quantum-oriented organization or leadership style as recognizing the influence of this 
invisible field, it may be recognized in today’s environments as a familiar focus on 
organizational culture, vision, values, and purpose. This viewpoint, of course, offers no 
epiphany for today’s discussion of organizational leadership, but it does emphasize how 
the space is never empty; rather, it is filled with something, either with organizational 
harmony or with discord; the former is an attractor, something that is desired and 
amplified, the latter repels, and is something to be dampened.140 This idea advances the 
discussion into the analysis of wicked problems in homeland security. 
Bell’s observation of the DHS’s lack of cohesiveness may be indicative of 
neglecting the importance of a subtle but crucial aspect of current day organizational 
health particularly in organizations with a multitude of values, interests, goals, and 
missions, such as the DHS.141  
As an unanticipated possible companion to the meta-leadership principles in 
Bell’s thesis, authors and former Gallup Poll administrators, Buckingham and Coffman, 
created 12 questions synthesized from thousands of interviews in the private sector with 
effective organizational leaders. These questions as asked of a typical employee give 
leaders a temperature check of their effectiveness in the organization and are oriented 
more toward the leader’s relationship with the employee than the working conditions of 
employees. In an attempt to distill what successful leaders in particularly effective 
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organizations do to achieve success, the authors conducted an analysis of business data 
with 105,000 employees and 2,500 business units. Through their research, Buckingham 
and Coffman discovered the simple and unremarkable conclusion that the most effective 
organizations have highly performing employees. What makes employees high 
performers is not tied to their work conditions, equipment, or even salary; the biggest 
single determiner of employees’ ability to perform at high-levels, as well as remain in the 
organization, is the relationship they have with their leader. The following 12 questions 
to be asked of employees were synthesized from the multitudes of interviews and surveys 
to provide an understanding for leaders on what their employees are thinking about. 
These questions are oriented toward how the leader is viewed and provide a first step in 
shifting more toward the follower’s perspective.142 
 Do I know what is expected of me at work? 
 Do I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right? 
 At work, do I have the opportunity to do what I do best everyday? 
 In the last seven days, have I received recognition or praise for good 
work? 
 Does my supervisor or someone I know at work seem to care about me as 
person? 
 Is there someone at work who encourages my development? 
 At work, do my opinions seem to count? 
 Does the purpose of my company make me feel like my work is 
important? 
 Are my coworkers committed to doing quality work? 
 Do I have a best friend at work? 
 In the last six months, have I talked with someone about my progress? 
 At work, have I had opportunities to learn and grow?143 
Using Kellerman’s indictment on modern-day leadership principles as a reference 
point, Buckingham and Coffman’s enlightened follower-centered approach is anchored in 
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research, which ferrets out the salient doctrines successful leaders have relied upon to 
build and maintain effective workgroups predisposed for success. How did they do this? 
By understanding that everyone possesses talent; that people are more apt to fill gaps left 
by lack of experience by ensuring they take responsibility to educate or train themselves 
if it is within their realm of talent. They are intrinsically motivated to seek higher and 
better levels of knowledge without further requirement or nudging from any outside 
impetus knowing it will improve their performance. Leaders who know this concept 
intuitively or otherwise, see themselves as catalysts rather than controllers. The research 
seems to validate this viewpoint; they focus more on hiring for talent than experience, as 
they know that people do not learn talent, while everyone has talent in a given area, not 
everyone has the same talents. Therefore, leaders as discovered in this research, focus on 
four key aspects of creating an empowering environment: 1) Select the right person: hire 
for talent rather than simply experience, intelligence, or determination, 2) Set the 
expectations: define the outcomes and not the steps for the talented employees to take, let 
them define this method, 3) Motivate: focus on strengths not weaknesses, and 4) Develop 
the people: find the right fit for them in the organization rather than sending them to the 
next rung in the ladder.144  
By contrast, the problems plaguing DHS morale persist. In a November 2012 
Washington Post article, Davidson noted that morale problems persevere across many 
employee groups to include management and non-management groups. The DHS has 
been criticized for not having an effective metric for determining the root cause(s) of its 
morale problems but it has instituted a three-prong approach to improving morale. It 
includes instructing agency heads to prioritize employee engagement, working to 
improve communication, training, diversity, and employee recognition, and strengthening 
leadership skills and capacity.145 Such an environment would be counterproductive to 
innovative critical thinking if the focus were to transform new ways of sharing 
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information constantly in the face of rapidly emerging trends and threats requiring 
effective information sharing.  
Much of the literature dealing with leadership discusses how leaders affect others 
in typical leadership circumstances, such as a leader-subordinate relationship in an 
organization. Some approach the subject of leadership from an intrinsic perspective of the 
leader first. The Arbinger Institute’s message is how leaders often deceive themselves as 
to the reality of how effective they are or how they are perceived by others. Such self-
deception makes the leader ill equipped in creating effective relationships, which would 
allow for successful outcomes.146 In a consistent theme with the Arbinger Institute’s 
Leadership and Self Deception, Scott condenses a leader’s effectiveness to the value they 
bring to situations and organizations through authentic and precise conversations with 
employees, colleagues, and clients. Scott asks is an individual prepared to stop “dancing 
around the flower pot”147 to get to the heart of issues affecting poor performance? In 
Scott’s eyes, the conversation is not about the relationship between leader and others—
the conversation is the relationship.148  
As this inquiry has investigated what leadership principles have been shown to be 
effective particularly as they relate to complexity, what will the relationship to 
information sharing reveal? The following section probes how information sharing has 
evolved in the United States throughout this country’s history both from a SLTTP 
perspective and from a national perspective. 
C. AMERICAN INFORMATION SHARING 
1. Pre-9/11 Information Sharing 
To answer the question of what is to be learned about the relationship of 
information sharing, leadership, and complexity, it is helpful to provide a contextual 
foundation of the thought processes that existed within the IC and SLTTP about sharing 
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information prior to 9/11. This foundation provides not only a historic basis for the 
evolution in information sharing but illustrates the progress made and the gaps that still 
exist. From this standpoint, envision the potential for the future of information sharing in 
homeland security.  
For a valid review of post-9/11 American Government reform to be conducted, it 
is appropriate to first examine pre-9/11 information sharing and intelligence practices 
related to what is now understood as the homeland security project. In an April, 2000 
report to Congressional requestors, the General Accounting Office stressed the United 
States had spent approximately $10 billion to combat terrorism in FY 1999. With over 40 
federal departments, agencies, and bureaus responsible for countering terrorism in 
America, Congress grew concerned about the apparent lack of clarity over which agency 
was in charge of a terrorism event due to the numbers of agencies seemingly responsible, 
as well as the inordinate amounts of money spent on counterterrorism efforts. Key to this 
report, due to the confusion of congressional reviewers, five foreign countries’ 
counterterrorism procedures were examined. While the report stopped short of presenting 
a comprehensive comparison to U.S. counterterrorism and intelligence efforts, and 
offered no recommendations for improvement, it is telling that almost immediately prior 
to the 9/11 attacks, sufficient anxiety occurred among those in the intelligence oversight 
environment to ask pertinent questions and investigate how respective foreign countries 
approached counterterrorism.149 This situation may have set the tone for the 9/11 
Commission’s review.  
Nolan noted that the 9/11 Commission Report identified the following agencies as 
those within the IC that failed to share key “…information in a proper and timely 
manner.”150  
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
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 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA, part of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) 
 National Security Agency (NSA) 
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
 Department of the Treasury (DOT) 
 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
 Department of Energy 
 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
 Department of State (INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research]) 
 United States Army Intelligence 
 United States Navy Intelligence 
 United States Air Force Intelligence 
 United States Marine Corps Intelligence 
 United States Coast Guard Intelligence151 
Further, prior to 9/11, the intelligence community was presumed to have taken 
responsibility for sharing appropriately to achieve relevant mission and interagency 
communication. However, these agencies operated more independently than not, they 
were often isolated and hostile toward each other in many ways with the CIA and FBI 
being the most antagonistic.152 
State and local law enforcement agencies that had intelligence units pre-9/11, 
were focused primarily on pattern and organized crime, gangs, and narcotics. New York, 
which had had a terrorist attack in 1993, and Los Angeles, had officers assigned to 
counterterrorism functions both focused beyond crime reduction and toward terrorism.153 
In Aurora, Colorado, the police department, like many others across the nation, was 
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exploring ways in which to solve crime better. In the late 1980s and early ‘90s, 
community oriented policing (COP) was a burgeoning concept sweeping the country and 
the Aurora Police Department (APD) was one of the leading edge agencies. Then, Aurora 
Police Division Chief Ron Sloan collaborated with Robert Trojanowics of Michigan State 
University to conduct research and produce guiding documents on COP.154 The 
information-sharing efforts were largely focused on creating more robust relationships 
between city departments, other law enforcement agencies, and in a more formal 
approach, community members after creating a stronger rapport within the community.  
The essence of COP was a departure from the unintended counterproductive 
consequence of the professional model of policing, which resulted in a disconnect 
between police and community based on modern technological advances in radio 
communication and the mobility of police officers. This scenario inadvertently 
encouraged officers to remain in their police cars while patrolling the streets of their 
cities, waiting for the next call for service, which effectively detached officers from the 
need for or opportunity to interact with citizens in a proactive way. Community policing 
attempted to change this relationship and placed deliberate focus on officers’ nurturing 
relationships with community members to understand better the environments within a 
given community, which tended to support criminal activity. The officers were then 
challenged to collaborate with citizens by delving into the root causes of the problem to 
provide a long-term solution in decreasing criminal activity while also reducing fear 
among community members.  
While both the IC and SLTTP focused on terrorism in different ways, and to 
varying degrees, the two virtually never interacted nor did an impetus exist to do so. 
SLTTP responders were far more oriented toward crime reduction and had little or no 
consciousness of the IC. Likewise, the IC was focused on Soviet threats and paid little 
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attention to the state and local level. To what degree were these relationships altered post-
9/11? 
2. Post-9/11 Government Reform and Evolution 
In this section, the inquiry expands to show the massive post-9/11 reform 
accomplished by the United States, the shift in attention to the homeland and the 
emerging relationships between the IC and SLTTP forged from the immense overhaul of 
the U.S. government. It illustrates how the post-9/11 effort is focused on the improved 
information sharing among all levels of government. With this degree of reform 
accomplished based on the fear of additional attacks, can the necessary transformation be 
achieved  absent the fear of imminent threats? 
The degree and speed with which information sharing improvement has evolved 
in this country since 9/11 is astounding. Since the 9/11 commission’s findings were 
published, much of the government literature has focused on strengthening information 
sharing within various levels of government, as well as between the government and the 
private sector. Noticeably, national strategies and guiding documents stem from the state 
and local level, as well as the federal level. Most call for better cooperation and 
strengthened relationships.  
The 9/11 Commission’s infamous comment that the United States had a “failure 
of imagination” may ring true with respect to the U.S.’s intelligence community’s 
inability to prevent those attacks. The Commission subsequently urged “routinizing, even 
bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination.”155  
The following initiatives have emanated from a state and local, as well as federal 
government focus to create more effective interaction between the IC and SLTTP 
community. 
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a. American Homeland Security Accomplishments Since 9/11: Is the 9/11 
Commission Report Still Relevant? 
This section reviews the key examples of post-9/11 government reform at the 
federal, as well as SLTTP levels. While not an exhaustive review, it does capture the 
essence of post-9/11 efforts to address the gaps as brought forth by the 9/11 Commission. 
It seems no document in the literature referencing the 9/11 attacks failed to 
mention the accompanying 9/11 Commission Report and this thesis does not disappoint. 
The attacks do serve as the nonlinear suddenness that catapulted this country, and indeed, 
the world into a change within the complex adaptive system; in this nation’s case, that is 
the U.S. national security enterprise, or homeland security enterprise in today’s language. 
Subsequent to the 9/11 Commission Report was the Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act; or Public Law 110-53 also referred to as the Act, which 
formalized various recommendations of the 9/11 Commission through legislation. 
Thirteen years after the attacks, at the time of this writing, 11 years after the formation of 
the DHS and 10 years after the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, the question can 
be asked, does the 9/11 Commission Report still have pertinence? According to the most 
recent progress report of the 9/11 Commission implementations, significant progress has 
been made in a number of key areas and more still needs to be done. The items 
highlighted include the following.  
 Information sharing 
 The proliferation of fusion centers 
 Nationwide suspicious activity reporting initiative 
 National terrorism advisory system 
 The national If you see something say something campaign 
 A strengthened information sharing campaign with international 
partners 
 Enhanced travel security 
 Increased cyber security 
 Bolstered border security 
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 Ensuring strong privacy, civil rights and civil liberties protections exists156  
The report highlights efforts summarized as having made … “America stronger 
and more resilient as a result…”157 However, the 9/11 Commission states, “As presently 
configured, the national security institutions of the U.S. are still the institutions 
constructed to win the Cold War.”158 The theme that the American intelligence 
community has not graduated from the archaic constructs of the Cold War era pervades 
throughout the literature. Yet, while it has been discussed in numerous government 
documents, books, articles, and theses since the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, it 
lingers in 2014 as a chronic topic associated with the dysfunction of true intelligence 
reform. In spite of this seemingly limiting aspect, it may be useful to consider what has 
been delivered consistent with and supporting the 9/11 Commission recommendations 
and then observe what remains to be done. 
(1) Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. This piece of 
legislation has provided key elements of reform as identified in the 9/11 Commission 
Report: 1) the creation of the ODNI, 2) the shift within the FBI to an intelligence 
directorate oriented to address the domestic counterterrorism, 3) the creation of the 
National Counterterrorism center (NCTC), and 4) the creation of the information sharing 
environment (ISE).159  
(2) Executive Order 12333 (2008). This order coupled with the National 
Security Act of 1947 and the U.S. Attorney General Guidelines has given the FBI the 
authority and responsibility for domestic intelligence collection. The order also delineates 
roles and responsibilities of the agencies within the intelligence community, as well as 
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key entities, such as the DNI and the DHS. Further, in an important tone, the order 
recognizes the essential role of state and local community in national security.  
State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and 
defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United 
States and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into 
account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local, and tribal 
governments and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when undertaking 
the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect 
the United States.160 
(3) Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, Public Law 
110–53. Enacted on August 3, 2007, and considered one of the key pieces of legislation 
aimed at creating or addressing gaps in the following initiatives, this act has advanced 
many aspects of the homeland security enterprise. 
 Grant funding to secure training and equipment  
 First responder communication interoperability, emergency 
communications interoperability and modernization 
 Strengthening the incident command system 
 Improving intelligence and information sharing between SLTTP and the 
federal government 
 Congressional oversight of intelligence  
 Strengthening efforts to prevent terrorist travel 
 Privacy and civil liberties 
 Private sector preparedness 
 Improving critical infrastructure 
 Enhanced defenses against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
 Numerous titles in transportation security, aviation, maritime 
 Preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism 
 International cooperation on antiterrorism technologies  
 Advancing democratic values161 
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(4) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group and Joint 
Counterterrorism Assessment Team. The creation of the ITACG was one of the hallmark 
initiatives emanating from the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. Enacted by Public 
Law 110–53, Title V subtitle C in August of 2007, the ITACG was created under the 
auspices of the PM-ISE. Located at the NCTC in Washington, DC, this program was 
designed to build stronger alliances between the IC and SLTTP. The law prescribed that 
an advisory council represented by one-half federal intelligence community agencies and 
half state, local, and tribal agencies would guide the detail.  
State and local first responders worked within the federal IC to learn the IC’s 
analytical tradecraft and determined where gaps existed in the information-sharing 
processes. Those assigned as fellows or detailees were encouraged to identify areas in 
which national initiatives would address perceived flaws in the information-sharing 
relationship between the IC and SLTTP. In April 2013, as outlined in the law, the ITACG 
was no longer funded by Congress. The Directorate of Operational Support (DOS) within 
the NCTC committed to continuing the same effort under the new name: the JCAT. The 
ITACG in many ways serves as the impetus for this thesis is discussed in more detail in 
the author’s autoenthnographic section.  
(5) Director of National Intelligence. The creation of the ODNI represents the 
most significant change in the intelligence community since 1947.162 In the first attempt 
at centralizing coordination and authority for the intelligence community, this position 
was created. Due to this position, advances in information sharing have occurred within 
the federal IC since the implementation of the IRTPA of 2004. The IRTPA created the 
DNI, which superseded the DCI as the chief intelligence community official and the 
principal intelligence advisor to the president and NSC. The main thrust of the act was 
aimed at improving intelligence sharing between IC agencies particularly within the 
foreign-domestic intelligence rift.163 
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The IRTPA generated two shifts. First, it altered the definition of intelligence to 
that of national intelligence with subsets of foreign, domestic, and homeland security. 
Second, it broadened the DNI’s responsibility beyond that of the DCI’s, particularly in 
the domestic realm. While the DCI specifically represented the CIA, the DNI represents 
all 17 agencies comprising the IC. Thus, the DNI is not only in a position to have access 
to all intelligence but to ensure intelligence is shared appropriately across all IC agencies, 
while safeguarding intelligence sources and methods.164 Key to the generation of this 
position was the initial recognition that the SLTTP community has a role in both national 
security and homeland security. 
The ODNI has had four DNIs since its inception. All four have had differing 
views of how they see their role, as well as their effectiveness within the IC. James 
Clapper, the current DNI, has recognized the value of the IC having a role in domestic 
counterterrorism and transnational crime.165  
In a December 2013 panel interview at the Bi-Partisan Center, former NCTC 
Director Michael Leiter among others discussed the current state of intelligence reform. 
Leiter stated it is difficult to determine whether reform is successful in a vacuum. It takes 
time to determine the impact of a given initiative. He discussed that it would be difficult 
to speculate on whether creating a secretary of national intelligence early on would have 
had a particular effect as opposed to retaining the DCI. He has worked for all four DNIs, 
and all four have taken significantly different approaches to their jobs.166  
The fact is that an individual (DNI) may be more or less successful not because of 
the legislative construct but because of the personalities involved, the support or lack 
thereof from the White House, the congressional oversight or the pressures of the day. No 
clear answers remain about what good intelligence reform looks like; it is in part driven 
by the present circumstances largely determined by the personality of the players, the 
legislation in place, the will for implementation, and political support, etc. As an 
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example, Leiter commented on the personality issues between Leon Panetta vs. Dennis 
Blair when Blair tried to assert what was documented as his authority over the CIA. 
Panetta would not yield and they took the fight to the White House where Panetta’s 
leverage won out.167 
The DNI has done well in some areas; basic information sharing is improving. 
The DNI has not performed well in the area of the budget authority; each agency stills 
runs their own budget. The PM-ISE has not done much more than what would have 
happened naturally. Bush’s White House was vigilant on improvement of intelligence 
reform and the current administration has dropped the “backpack.”168  
(6) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC serves as the 
primary organization for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism 
with the exception of purely domestic terrorism. The NCTC also serves as the central 
knowledge bank on terrorism information and provides all-source intelligence support to 
government-wide counterterrorism activities. Its mission is essentially to “get the right 
counterterrorism information into the right hands of the right people” in the DHS, the 
FBI, the IC and, indirectly, the state and local community. The NCTC seeks to bring 
intelligence from across the federal government into one place to integrate and analyze it 
then disseminate the integrated intelligence to customers.169 
Established through statutory charter in 2004, by the IRTPA, the NCTC is 
comprised of analysts from across the IC with respective agency database access. It 
prepares a broad range of assessments, briefings, and intelligence products aimed at 
“establish[ing] and sustain[ing] effective channels for the exchange of counterterrorism-
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related information with federal agencies outside the intelligence community as well as 
with state and local authorities.”170 
It is further chartered to access, receive, and analyze all encompassing levels of 
information and intelligence from across all levels of government including law 
enforcement agencies of the federal government and state and local government agencies 
(including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities.171 
The attempted bombing of an airliner on December 25, 2009, (12/25), the Fort 
Hood attack and others has perpetuated concerns about post-9/11 laws, regulations, and 
organizational relationships. An Executive Branch assessment of the 12/25 attempted 
attacks indicated that while information sharing had been adequate, IC analysts still fell 
short of “connecting the dots.”172 
The NCTC is viewed as the mother of all fusion centers. In theory, it is meant to 
serve as the central clearing house for any terrorism related information received. In the 
preceding, it is indicated that the NCTC and its analytical cadre is achieving the 
objectives of accessing and receiving appropriate information, where it seems to fail may 
emanate from within the culture of the NCTC.  
 An ethnographic view of the NCTC from within 
In a purported first-ever ethnographic review of the NCTC’s culture, former CIA 
analyst Nolan documents her experiences within NCTC’s environment in a 2013 PhD 
dissertation from The University of Pennsylvania. Nolan discusses the mission of an 
analyst in the NCTC is to research and write intelligence products on terrorism trends 
tactics, and procedures. The dissertation paints a picture of the cultural challenges of an 
analyst entering the IC and then trying to navigate while subjected to the pressures of 
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producing intelligence products within the complexity of multiple layers of social 
dynamics between the numerous IC agencies co-located within the NCTC.173  
Beginning with the difficulty of a new analyst learning the internal IC lexicon, she 
describes this special language as having unique qualities for each IC agency, and yet, a 
separate and distinct vocabulary for the NCTC. Most NCTC analysts are not full time 
NCTC cadre; rather, they are detailees from respective IC agencies for short durations. 
This tenuous environment she says does not support establishing social or professional 
networks from which to build stability, as just when an analyst starts to gain confidence 
in the knowledge gained, everything changes, which creates a dissonance between the 
expectation of being perfect and the reality of the chaotic environment.174  
This rapid-fire environment would provide unique challenges for those in 
leadership positions as well. While Nolan uses the term chaos, chaos as defined in the 
Cynefin Framework means either innovation through deliberate means or an accidental 
entry into chaos, which requires immediate stability, or failure, will ensue.  
While NCTC houses most of the participating agency databases, they generally 
are not compatible says Nolan. The term “stove piping” was alluded to regarding pre-
9/11 databases both at the federal, as well as the state and local levels of government, and 
has been one of the key focuses of post-9/11 reform. Analysts detailed to the NCTC for a 
little as one year could wait for weeks or months to regain access to their own system.175 
One analyst interviewed by Nolan believed the lack of interoperability to be by design as 
a compartmentalized feature, and cited the billions of dollars it took to build the systems 
to be impenetrable; to make them interoperable would defeat the purpose said the 
analyst.176  
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The NCTC’s culture was viewed by many as lacking a common understanding of 
a sense of direction and a lack of knowledge ranging from small matters to larger issues. 
She attributes the possible cause in that the NCTC simply assimilated the CIA’s culture 
and bureaucratic procedures. This environment was confusing for those who did not 
come from the CIA’s culture but also for CIA employees as they were sometimes 
confused as to which agency, the NCTC or the CIA, was responsible for certain issues. 
They also felt that managers would use this lack of clarity as an excuse not to fund 
training or travel when it was convenient to do so.177  
A notable parallel to the DHS analogy as observed by Bell may provide 
context.178 In the case of the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC), the 
Colorado State Patrol (CSP) stood the center up in 2005. The CSP’s culture and 
bureaucratic procedures dominate the environment. At times, it has been necessary to 
deal with personnel issues associated with employees from other agencies working within 
the CIAC. This issue has the potential of not only disconcerting employees in their day-
to-day objectives but also clouding organizational objectives and confusing disciplinary 
proceedings should they be needed. An effectively written memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) or intergovernmental agreement (IGA) can provide some relief but 
may not address the intangible effects of distinct organizational cultures.  
Nolan describes a few coping mechanism for IC analysts based on the rigors of 
their pressure-filled environment. One such coping strategy termed emotion work, 
describes how analysts manage their feelings to display a public face or bodily 
expression. She notes that two of the highest compliments that can be paid to an IC 
analyst are to call them “a machine” or “made of Teflon.”179  
The author writes of the social and professional caste system within the IC but 
which is amplified within the NCTC. The CIA is deemed a “greedy institution,” one in 
                                                 
177 Nolan, “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Community: An 
Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center,” 31.  
178 Bell, “The State of Leadership in DHS, Is There a Model for Leading?,” 1–179. 
179 Nolan, “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Community: An 
Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center,” 1–206. 
 68
which exclusivity and undivided loyalty is demanded of a member of the organization. 
Starting from the CIA, also known as “the CIA mafia,” “the mob,” “the mother ship,” or 
the “Borg,” (a Star Trek fictional character that forces a mind-meld and repels any 
resistance), members of the NSA, FBI, DHS, DIA and various other IC agencies descend 
in the social order, and therefore, credibility and performance as well due to varying 
degrees of working relationships.180 
In an intriguing analysis of the dynamics of the CIA’s ability to create such strong 
affinity amongst its members, Nolan discusses the following characteristics. 
 Domination: Commonly associated with the military and sports teams, the 
organization and its leaders claim dominion over the member, stripping 
away, to a certain extent, individualization and replacing it with 
organizational values.  
 Identification: The individual’s identification to the organization is no 
more intense than in the CIA. This identity quickly overshadows any other 
components of ‘an individual’s life.  
 Commitment: The employee signs on as part of the team. In the sports 
analogy, it may mean a commitment to the strong tradition, or to a 
scholarship. With the CIA, certainly part of the commitment is the oath to 
support and defend the Constitution of the United Sates, and the life-long 
pledge to non-disclosure. 
 Integration: A process whereby formerly detached colleagues become 
socialized, and ultimately, congeal into cohesive groups. 
 Sponsorship: In this final step of integration, older more seasoned 
members reach out to the newer members, which is often unexpected by 
the receiving employee and overwhelmingly welcomed.181  
While these aspects of organizational control represent power, control, and 
perhaps manipulation, they do seem to generate intense loyalty. The leadership style most 
effective in this situation is an autocratic or transactional style as may be recalled in 
Chapter II, B, 2, prefaced on a quid pro quo or social contract.  
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Surprisingly, in Nolan’s research, NCTC’s culture was not distinct, rather an 
amalgam of the contributing agencies, and still developing. Perhaps similar to Bell’s 
observation of the DHS in which the culture lacks the above criteria, and therefore, the 
resulting perception of cohesiveness or loyalty.182 The NCTC and CIA are at odds due to 
the CIA’s perception that NCTC is doing the Counterterrorism Center’s (CTC) work.  
To create some level of cohesion in such an environment, in which co-location 
exists between differing organizations and cultures, Nolan cites four key conditions that 
must exist to ensure success: a) equal status among groups, b) common goals, c) a lack of 
competition between groups, and d) authority sanction for the contact. 
In NCTC’s case, no equal status occurs among certain groups and competition 
can be fierce. The same could be said for DHS components. While not always co-located, 
many of the DHS legacy agencies resent having lost their identity to “big DHS,” and to 
have to compete for budgetary funding, as well as status among other agencies. The 
author states that the very characteristics that make individual intelligence agencies 
strong also interfere with effective information sharing. This author would agree not only 
on the level of what is discussed unique to IC agencies but for state and local agencies as 
well. To broaden this viewpoint, 18,000 law enforcement agencies are in existence, most 
of which are not integrally involved in information sharing at the level that larger 
agencies are; each enjoys autonomy within its own environment.  
Nolan contemplates whether having IC agencies co-located within the NCTC has 
exacerbated existing squabbles, which may have added another layer to the wicked 
problem that may not have existed otherwise. This point of view seems consistent with 
Rittel’s assertion in his 8th condition of wicked problems, every wicked problem can be 
considered to be a symptom of another problem.183  
Her conclusions are that the NCTC is not meeting its mission, and to some, may 
be in the wrong mission based on her research because many felt that better information 
sharing or more integration was not the answer to better intelligence. Many of her 
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interviewees were with CIA personnel, which can account for some biases (including 
hers) but almost every opinion was short of favorable of what the NCTC has 
accomplished. Nolan offered ways in which the current competitive game between 
analysts could be transformed into a healthier environment. Currently, analysts are 
plagued by the age-old adage that it is necessary to publish or perish. Pressure on one 
hand encourages this notion to include joint products between two analysts but the reality 
is a zero sum atmosphere wherein one analyst beats the other to the punch, and thereby, 
gains a win for themselves and loss for anyone else not quick enough or aggressive 
enough to have accomplished the same feat.. She discussed leadership approaches 
reducing the conflict between publishing and cutting a colleague out of the loop.184 
While the NCTC serves as a central clearinghouse for counterterrorism as defined in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the ISE provides oversight for the 
emerging world of information sharing.  
(7) Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). The 
ISE is an overarching term for a very broad-based compilation of personnel, projects, 
systems, and agencies that enable responsible information sharing for national security. 
The ISE incorporates a wide variety of communities to include law enforcement, public 
safety, homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs. The people in these 
communities may work for federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial governments. They 
may also need to collaborate and share national security information with each other, 
private sector partners, or U.S. foreign allies. All the partners in the ISE derive from a 
multitude of agencies, disciplines, and jurisdictions, but all rely on time, actionable 
information, and intelligence.  
Charged with developing and coordinating the overall network of the ISE, the role 
of the program manager for the ISE (PM-ISE) is to focus on standards and architecture, 
security and access, associated privacy protections, and best practices. The PM-ISE is 
relied upon to create an environment supporting innovation and discovery in providing 
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ideas, tools, and resources to mission partners who then apply them to their own agencies 
or communities. 
Under the auspices of IRTPA, the position of program manager… 
“[is]responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government.” Consistent with 
the direction and policies issued by the President, the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the PM-ISE 
has the authority to release government-wide procedures, guidelines, instructions, and 
functional standards, as appropriate, for the management, development, and proper 
operation of the ISE. The PM-ISE has staff with experience in counterterrorism, 
homeland security, information sharing, technology, and policy at all levels of 
government.”185 How has the SLTTP been represented among new information sharing 
initiatives? 
(8) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Global Intelligence Working 
Group, Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. This section demonstrates key 
initiatives and crucial outcomes emanating from the 9/11 attacks. Today, the GIWG and 
CICC are powerful entities that have grown, matured, and shaped post-9/11 information 
sharing in broad and significant ways.  
For the SLTTP community, the IACP annual meeting held in Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada in October 2001, six weeks after the 9/11 attacks, serves as the landmark event in 
which most efforts aimed at information sharing at the state and local level have been 
generated. During the IACP annual meeting, an intelligence summit was scheduled for 
March, 2002. The summit resulted in the intelligence-led policing initiative.186 
Already in existence to create processes and standards for SLTTP agencies to 
share criminal information, the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (GLOBAL) 
created a new subgroup, the GIWG. Charged with executing the summit’s 
recommendations, the GIWG was created. The first GIWG product was the NCISP. The 
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NCISP outlined processes, procedures, and standards under which state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement would share criminal information. This product was the first post-9/11 
attempt at providing a national level awareness of the importance for effective 
information sharing and criminal intelligence coordination among state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement. It not only attempted to address the issues discussed regarding 
counterterrorism, but also offered law enforcement agencies guidance for developing 
multijurisdictional intelligence capabilities.187 
The NCISP provided the vision in recognizing the importance of state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) agencies as a key ingredient in the nation’s intelligence 
process. SLTLE entities were considered part of the national security enterprise. To 
ensure all these linkages were created, facilitated, and sustained, the CICC was created in 
May 2004, which was the first significant attempt at connecting all levels of government 
to improve intelligence and information sharing. Major entities involved in criminal 
intelligence at all levels of government are represented on this council. These members 
serve as advocates for state and local law enforcement and support their efforts to 
develop and share criminal intelligence through the tenets of the NCISP. The CICC 
serves as the voice for all levels of law enforcement agencies by advising the U.S. 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security on the best use of criminal 
intelligence, as well as the capabilities and limitations of SLTLE agencies related to 
information sharing.188 The NCISP addressed the following criteria. 
 Leadership 
Beginning in 2004, when the first version of the NCISP was completed, the U.S. 
Attorney General, as well as top leaders in the law enforcement and homeland security, 
met and held a signing event as a demonstrations of commitment and solidarity. Since 
that time, the CICC has provided guidance, leadership, and products that have been 
instrumental to law enforcement agencies across the country in fortifying their policies 
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and strengthening their operational capabilities.189 As an entity, the CICC has acted in a 
meta-leadership capacity in that it has assembled essential thought-leaders in the 
homeland security realm to envision innovative ways for all levels of government to 
coordinate a broad range of activities.  
 Partnerships 
One of the first products published and supported by the CICC and GIWG was 
the Fusion Center Guidelines, in 2006. Early in the evolution of fusion centers, this 
document served as a guide for those states in the process of standing up a center. Later, 
these guidelines were expanded to include fusion center interaction with public safety and 
private sector agencies. Next, a focus on improving analytical tradecraft at the state and 
local level began to gain momentum. In an effort to promote professional development of 
criminal analysts, the CICC supported the development of Law Enforcement Analysts 
Certification Standards.190 
 Privacy 
Of paramount importance when expanding an intelligence architecture, privacy 
and civil rights must be adhered to, as well as anticipated and protected in a proactive 
sense given advancements in technology. Over the years, the CICC, GIWG, as well as 
GLOBAL, have supported the production of guides, standards, and training videos for 
first responders in an effort to provide cutting-edge guidance for an evolving dynamic of 
civil rights/civil liberties and privacy. Elements of privacy issues first appeared in the 
Fusion Center Guidelines. Subsequent publications, such as Baseline Capabilities for 
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers and Fusion Center Privacy Policy 
Development: Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Policy Template, to name a few, 
have continued to advance since the inception of these organizations.191 
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 Policies, Plans and Procedures 
An essential element in state and local criminal intelligence is the adherence to 28 
Code of Federal Regulations Part 23. The initial NCISP heavily emphasized the 
importance of observing of the standards within 28 CFR Part 23 criminal intelligence 
collection and storage. The CICC and GIWG have contributed to a model policy created 
by the IACP, as well as resources for the law enforcement chief executive in building 
model policy for criminal intelligence collection, analysis, production, distribution, and 
feedback.192 
 Intelligence Process 
After the release of the NICSP, the CICC produced guiding documents on 
elements of the SLTTP on how to implement aspects of the NCISP. They collaborated 
with the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) to help 
agencies formalize and standardize aspects of the NCISP. The CICC focused on 
supporting material for agencies adopting the intelligence-led policing (ILP) framework, 
as well as the analysis function through suggested standards, training, and tools for 
analysis.193 
 Training 
The Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards was first released in 2004 
and then again in 2007 with an updated version to address core criminal intelligence 
standards as identified in the NCISP. As a companion for criminal analysts, the Common 
Competencies for Sate, Local and Tribal Intelligence Analysts was released in 2010.194 
 Security and Safeguarding 
The CICC has been active in discussions surrounding security clearance reform, 
which has been a troubling issue as state and locals become more aware of the existence 
and benefits of information in the classified realm. The CICC has been actively 
participating in the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) initiative. This project will 
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coalesce the various markings currently used by the state, local, and tribal agencies, such 
as For Official Use Only, Law Enforcement Sensitive and Sensitive But Unclassified.195  
 Technology and Standards 
The CICC has endeavored to provide current and relevant guidance to agencies 
regarding computer-aided dispatch, records management system, social media as used in 
criminal intelligence, the National Information Exchange Model, national portals, such as 
the Homeland Security Information Network, Law Enforcement Online, and other 
technologies. The CICC has collaborated with the PM-ISE and the DHS to develop 
standards for such technologies.196 
 Sustainability 
The CICC has partnered with the Global Advisory Committee (GAC), DHS, and 
DOJ to fund initiatives that will sustain important elements of the NCISP, such as the 
following. 
 Law Enforcement Analytic Standards 
 Analyst Toolbox  
 Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards  
 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers  
 Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 
Support and Implementation Project  
 Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Gang Intelligence Units and 
Task Forces197 
(9) Criminal Intelligence Enterprise. The CIE is a national initiative led by the 
Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA). It is composed of two key objectives, (1) 
increase the connectivity among local intelligence units, and (2) institutionalize a 
standardized assessment process that enables each agency to identify and measure its 
priority threat groups better, establish actionable information needs, and develop more 
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focused intelligence collection plans.198 It is an important model from which a bottom-up 
intelligence method could be developed emanating from local jurisdictions. As no 
formalized bottom-up intelligence collection architecture exists from which 
counterterrorism or criminal intelligence can be coalesced on a national level, it would be 
useful to analyze such a system that has been in existence for a long period of time to 
ascertain what could be learned and applied in the United States. 
b. How the British Collect Intelligence 
To help understand how a more comprehensive counterterrorism and criminal 
collection design could be instituted to blend with the existing architecture in the United 
States, the British system was analyzed for those aspects that may be leveraged or 
adopted for the American system.  
Since the attacks of 9/11 the United States, as well as the rest of the world, has 
studied and modified its information-sharing methodology to ensure more timely and 
actionable information is shared with partners who need it. In the United States, 
information sharing has improved but is still ineffective due in large part to the top-down 
structure between the national intelligence architecture and the SLTTP first responder 
community. In addition, evidence is mounting that the lines between crime and terrorism 
are blurring. This convergence necessarily means that a more robust relationship between 
the federal IC and the SLTTP communities must be created. Without this relationship, 
Americans will miss the opportunity to expose future terrorist plots being conducted 
planned and executed in the United States. 
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has drawn powerful lessons and implemented 
subsequent reform based on their counterterrorism experiences with both the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and Al-Qaeda. An essential component is the direct connectivity 
between the British Police Service and the counterterrorism intelligence function of the 
British Security Service. From the U.K.’s example, America can learn to understand 
better the connection between domestic, transnational and international crime, and 
terrorism. Addressing this connection requires a stronger relationship between state and 
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local first responders and the IC. From a pragmatic approach, many of the guiding 
documents created both in America, and in this case, the United Kingdom, could be 
exploited to build a new better-connected and streamlined information-sharing 
architecture.  
An analysis of the U.K.’s intelligence design shows its effective relationship 
between the British security service and British police, and how the United States could 
implement a similar mechanism. The United Kingdom has specifically designated 
counterterrorism “Special Branch”199 officers within each of its 56 police forces across 
the country. This design ensures 1) these officers have the expertise to identify terrorism 
trends, tactics, and techniques, and 2) they have a direct and vigorous connection to the 
intelligence function.  
The al Qaeda attacks on London’s subway system on July 7, 2005 resulted in a 
milestone for Great Britain’s response to terrorists’ threats. It exposed that the former, 
more centralized deployment of counterterrorism officers assigned to London based on 
the response to the IRA threat proved ineffective when investigations led them across the 
United Kingdom and the world. This situation forced the British to redefine how to 
engage the local police. First, a more decentralized deployment of police resources was 
necessary to meet the demands of fast-paced, dynamic investigations. Second, the 
realization that criminal investigators, previously brought into an investigation well after 
the intelligence service had begun its work created information gaps. (This structure was 
done deliberately in the past to avoid concerns of disclosing certain criminal case 
evidence and exposing intelligence sources). Third, the British learned that not only were 
terrorism cases being planned in the United Kingdom, but also that British citizens were 
targets as well for terrorist recruitment and radicalization to violence.200 
 Leadership Direction and Commitment 
The U.K.’s Cross Government Counterterrorism Strategy commonly referred to 
as CONTEST was published in 2011 and shows clear leadership, direction, and 
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commitment from the government in countering terrorism. Three key components that 
ensure productive outcomes are defined and met. The first is a well-defined threat. The 
second is the government’s clearly delineated strategy to counter that threat. Finally, the 
specific direction for implementation is laid squarely on the police and intelligence 
service.201 To ensure successful cooperation, a national doctrine at all levels within the 
government encompasses the four Ps: prevent, protect, prepare, and pursue. The police 
and MI5, through the CONTEST board, are responsible for executing these four strategic 
objectives as they investigate acts of terrorism.202 Recognition of the value local law 
enforcement brings to the whole of government approach to counterterrorism is unique as 
compared to the American IC attitude.  
As a result, while the United Kingdom has 56 police forces, each has a special 
branch and clear connection to Britain’s domestic intelligence service, MI5, which 
equates to approximately 600 special branch officers currently in the United Kingdom.203 
This model offers a centralized coordination of counterterrorism cases with recognition 
and strategy for intelligence and criminal case preparation while combining resources 
between the police, security, and intelligence services. Further, nationally based 
structures ensure coordination of the counterterrorism investigative process from the local 
to the national level. For example, intelligence at the national level is managed through 
MI5. The Counterterrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police coordinates the national 
response to counterterrorism intelligence and supervises the evidence collection needs. 
The Crown Prosecution Service provides specialized prosecutorial resources. A National 
Coordinator has an office that oversees terrorism investigations. Finally, an Executive 
Liaison Group (ELG) is responsible for managing all operational aspects of these 
investigations.204  
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c. How DNI Is Supporting Domestic Approach to National Intelligence 
In an intelligence system comprised of colossal organizations most of which were 
formed between 1940 and 1960, and are still primarily reflective of the institutions of that 
era, a progressive tenor is coming from the halls at Liberty Crossing in Northern Virginia. 
DNI James Clapper has embraced the precepts of the emergence of new thinking and 
operating within the national IC. In the 2010 State of Domestic Intelligence Reform panel 
discussion underwritten by the Bipartisan Policy Center, Clapper conceded the realities of 
globalization and its attendant properties; the blurring lines between terrorism and 
transnational crime, foreign, and domestic matters. Based on this situation, he urged 
holistic thinking concerning intelligence while remaining vigilant in protecting U.S. civil 
liberties and privacies.205 Clapper adroitly highlights the efforts of the FBI and its 
relationships through the 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces to other federal agencies, as 
well as SLTTP entities. In addition, he brings to light the information-sharing partnership 
between the DHS, and at the time, the 72 fusion centers across the country. These 
relationships he says are essential now more than ever due to the three attempted attacks 
during the preceding year, two in New York and one on a flight over Detroit.206  
d. What Is Missing? 
Carabin noted in 2011 that barriers existed to effective information sharing from 
the IC to the SLTTP. He acknowledged that fusion center leaders and the IC leadership 
had yet to accomplish a cooperative relationship that would streamline the process.207 As 
of this writing, while more frequent and robust conversations have occurred around this 
issue, this relationship has not improved to any significant degree. The fragmentation 
between the IC and SLTTP discussed earlier remains entrenched.  
Four categories can cause effective reform for information sharing to fail and also 
represent current gaps. 
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First, no central guiding doctrine exists for how information sharing will be 
prioritized, collected, analyzed, or acted upon. Numerous strategies, policies, Executive 
Orders, programs, and entities address intelligence and information sharing but no single 
central doctrine exists to provide guidance for all of these. 
Second, information and intelligence sharing is a top-down construct largely 
driven by personality rather than structure. Whether discussing the federal environment 
or state, local, or tribal relationships, being effective means having a positive and 
constructive relationship. If a chief or sheriff does not trust the other, their departments 
do not operate in a way conducive to producing any positive results. Likewise, if a chief 
or sheriff has a positive relationship with the special agent in charge of their FBI field 
office, positive results are more likely.  
Third, the fire service struggles with the notion of being considered collectors of 
intelligence for fear of alienating their constituency. The fire service is a crucial 
component of the emerging information-sharing system as it represents 1.2 million first 
responders summoned to American homes everyday. While its mission is not to collect 
intelligence, it is accustomed to reporting indicators of criminal conduct when it 
inadvertently encounters such activity. It must reconcile within its discipline the role for 
it to play as the information-sharing enterprise evolves.  
Fourth, a disparate understanding exists among state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement of what intelligence is. ILP has been adopted into the lexicon post-9/11 but 
it is not universally understood. Likewise, some in the federal law enforcement realm are 
challenged with truly understanding state, local, and tribal law enforcement’s relationship 
to intelligence. The excerpts from Gomez provides an example. 
The primary question of this thesis—whether or not state, local and tribal 
law enforcement should be involved in the collection and sharing of 
classified national security intelligence in support of national 
counterterrorism efforts—is difficult to answer in an empirically valid 
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sense…the implicit objective of this thesis was, however, to answer the 
abstract question—whether or not cops should be spies.208  
Gomez acknowledges that his question is more argumentative than practical but 
that it is at the center of American democratic policing. While the most logical entity for 
a comprehensive oversight of all initiatives across all levels of government would be the 
ISE, no indication appears in the literature that oversight or management of these 
simultaneous initiatives exists to ensure they are leveraged and coordinated for optimum 
impact and continuity.  
This situation invites the question, have these efforts at reform truly resulted in 
transformation to the degree that homeland security, and in particular, homeland security 
information sharing is as durable as it needs to be? Hailes says no; in fact, the entire 
national security architecture is still reflective of the genesis upon which it was built, a 
World War II era world; a world that simply does not exist anymore. While the breadth 
and depth of massive change in American national security since 9/11 cannot be argued, 
Hailes purports that these changes have not fully addressed salient issues and stated, “the 
entire national security system of the United States is out of date.”209 It has not addressed 
how international terrorism has become a major concern not only for the United States, 
but the world, the fact that the United States has engaged in a decade-long intervention in 
the Middle East and West Asia to confront it, not the explosive growth of the World 
Wide Web and all its attendant issues, such as smart phone technology or “ubiquitous 
precision [of]…Google Earth,”210 used to empower the masses, the same power used by 
dissidents focused on government-toppling strategies across the globe, or the shifting 
economies and the ascent of China’s power.211 
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Dougherty and Erwin extol the virtues of interagency cooperation through the 
whole of government doctrine.212 While it is understood that the book in which their 
paper is included is oriented toward the military (which must be recognized as 
representing legitimate limitations, such as the Posse Comitatus Act213), still 13 pages are 
devoted to discussing the need for futuristic thinking, addressing Changing Mindsets to 
Transform Security: Leader Development for an Unpredictable and Complex World. The 
authors discuss leveraging newly created, as well as established legislation, to ensure 
effective relationships exist for U.S. national security. Heavy emphasis is appropriately 
placed on interagency education; real-world training and acculturation dominate the 
paper. They draw upon an informative historical American background coupled with a 
reference to the British example of effective interagency relationships to feature the 
possibility of what could be accomplished, which they say includes not only the military, 
but also their federal partners; however, state, local, tribal, territorial, or private entities 
are not mentioned. Not to be construed as an indictment of Dougherty and Erwin, it does 
illustrate the degree to which this nation is still very much fragmented concerning the 
perspective of not only what national security and homeland security is but what the 
solutions to its limitations are.214 
If it is claimed that the future of homeland security in America is a complex, 
wicked, unordered, or even chaotic, problem, before any progress can be made in 
persuading others, this nation must be willing to disrupt its own thinking first. This 
disruption requires a unique level of 1) awareness of differing perspectives based on 
uncommon introspection, 2) willingness to take action in the face of obscurity of what 
lies ahead and obstinacy of those who fear the same, and 3) a commitment to take action 
when expanded levels of knowledge or awareness are achieved that will advance the 
homeland security project. The following section endeavors to bring about this 
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disruption. The author has had the unique combined experience of a 34-year law 
enforcement career spanning from the line level functions of an officer to the executive 
position in one of America’s more mature fusion centers. This experience has not only 
brought him a new and expanded perspective of the IC and its relationship with the state, 
local, tribal, and private sector first responders, but it has awakened him to the obligation 
he has in leveraging his experience to help advance information sharing in America.  
The next segment chronicles this experience with the invitation for readers to 
relate their unique experiences to how they might contribute to the advancement of the 
homeland security enterprise.  
D. THE AUTHOR’S EXPERIENCE 
1. What Draws People to This Kind of Work? Lesson Learned. 
Part of the method for this thesis includes the autoethnographic approach to 
research and writing, which is a combination of autobiographic and ethnographic styles. 
In an autobiographic account, a retrospective description of an individual’s experiences 
focused on new learning is provided, or in some cases epiphanies, that may have been 
gained from an experience. An ethnographic form of research is more an analysis from a 
cultural perspective that provides insight into a particular culture for both the “cultural 
members” and “cultural strangers.”215 The cultures to be considered in this evaluation 
include the first responder community comprised of law enforcement, emergency 
management, fire and public health, with an obvious bias toward law enforcement and 
the IC. In addition, the IC is examined from the authethnographic perspective. All these 
methods are viewed through the contextual lens of leadership and complexity science.  
As a 34-year law enforcement veteran, I have been indelibly marked by the 
culture of law enforcement. While I my career spans multiple generations of policing, I 
have been influenced, which may result in my unavoidable biases related to the law 
enforcement ethos of confronting inefficiencies, and aggressively implementing 
solutions. While my biases will undoubtedly reveal themselves, I strive to set them aside 
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as I realize it is the unique opportunity I have had to understand both worlds, the IC and 
SLTTP that inspires and qualifies me to write about the gaps I see and the possibilities for 
creating ways in which the gaps can be closed or modified to suit future information-
sharing needs. Few exist who have had the exclusive opportunity to experience both the 
IC and SLTTP domain to the degree that current complexity becomes evident, and 
emerging and complex solutions, apparent. Given the historic evolutionary trend and the 
approaching emergence of the two environments, it almost becomes incumbent upon one 
who possesses this outlook to contribute to the literature in a way that offers new ways to 
approach the American information-sharing enterprise. As such, given the obligation I 
feel toward the homeland security enterprise my background has suggested, coupled with 
the research in this thesis, it is from this standpoint that I will approach the next section. 
It is in this domain of the unknown, how the SLTTP and federal services, including the 
IC can better co-operate, that provides a platform for the possibility of future 
relationships of these two realms. 
A paradox seems to exist between the thought process arriving at what the U.S. 
government has accomplished since 9/11 in terms of restructuring government agencies, 
creating new legislation, beginning to shift the national paradigm from silo thinking to 
shared resources compared with the expectation that problems are definitively described 
and solutions equally conclusively arrived at. The former serves as an example of 
recognizing the emergent quality of the problems and moving decisively (in the 
government context) to improve them. The latter seems an abandonment of the 
recognition of complex adaptive system dynamics and a return to a linear, Newtonian, 
archaic relationships to problems. 
I have had the good fortune of serving as a police officer since 1980, for nearly 35 
years, plus the experience of working within the IC, which provides a unique context, by 
now a concept that has been emphasized throughout the literature as being essential for 
an increased ability to lead in complex environments. Both Kellerman and Uhl-Bien et al. 
highlight the importance for leaders to develop an understanding of how context will 
affect the ability to create outcomes. Kellerman refers to contextual intelligence as being 
critical for future leaders to be able to decipher situations before applying resources to 
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solve problems or create solutions.216 Uhl-Bien and her colleagues describe context as 
the “interactive ambience within which complex dynamics occur.”217 This context is the 
ever-shifting environment that shapes the interaction between the agents or actors in an 
organizational situation and how ideas are created, how tension is addressed, the use of 
feedback loops and environmental demands, hierarchical dynamics, etc. Both complex 
adaptive systems and leadership are social constructs within this context and within 
which past patterns and history have a place. For me, upon reflection, the contextual 
aspects of my collective experiences within the SLTTP and IC worlds have awakened me 
to the vastness of not only what chasms exist but also what possibilities exist to address 
them. 
The motivation that serves as the genesis for many in the public safety realm may 
be fairly consistent and predicable. To be of service, to arrest criminals, to protect those 
who cannot protect themselves all resonate as guiding principles inspiring me to have 
entered the law enforcement field in 1980 at an early age. Having come from a 
tumultuous childhood, I became familiar with the local police who, on occasion would 
visit my home to quell arguments between my parents. As a ten-year-old boy, I could 
have been exposed to more heavy-handed techniques of the day, which may have given 
me another experience and sent me on an alternative life path. Instead I was struck, on 
one particular occasion by the ability of a responding officer to create an environment of 
control and still make me feel safe. While innocuous to the officer, this encounter appears 
to be the breakthrough moment that anchored in my desire to be of the same ilk as he 
was. Oakley and Krug emphasized the subtle but powerful concept of focusing more on 
what an individual wants to create than what a person wants to avoid.218 While I was not 
aware of, until much later, how powerful these principles are, I realize in retrospect how 
the choice I made no matter how subtle it seemed at the time, transformed my experience 
from one of being a victim to focusing on how I could contribute to others in the way that 
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young officer did for me. As Oakley and Krug claim, this ability to focus on results can 
radically transform the outcomes produced in a given situation.219 
Throughout my early career, I have been particularly drawn to assignments 
requiring innovation and creativity. Comparing this to the various domains within the 
Cynefin Framework, has made me aware that I prefer to operate within the unordered 
domains, with a desire to take complex environments, analyze problems and shift from 
complexity to one of the ordered domains while producing results.220 As I became a 
supervisor and later a command officer, I gained experience in leading progressively 
larger or more complicated initiatives. In 2007, the chief of police appointed me to 
conjoin disparate emergency management and homeland security functions within the 
police department under one command. At the time, I had no background in this field, 
which concerned me. While many of the functions, to be referred to as homeland security 
functions, had been historically assigned to different command officers, the duties were 
ancillary to their primary duties, which made it difficult for any of these functions to 
receive the attention they deserved. This situation occurred at a time in Colorado, and 
indeed, across the country, when post-9/11 initiatives began to develop, which 
represented emerging patterns that resulted in new relationships between levels of 
government, as well as agencies both within the government and non-governmental 
agencies.  
A new emphasis on creating relationships with the private sector materialized as it 
related to critical infrastructure, a term new to me and most law enforcement officers. 
The urban area security initiatives (UASI) and various homeland security regions within 
states were being constructed to help funnel homeland security grant funding for training 
and equipment to respective state and local agencies based on grant requests to meet 
newly mandated initiatives. Major urban area and state fusion centers were in their 
infancy; the CIAC was two years old at the time.  
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The chief recognized these emerging patterns and wanted to ensure the 
department was prepared to plan and coordinate properly with the agencies by merging 
all prior related functions, as well as newly created ones under one command, which had 
never been done in our organization. My task was to create new relationships between the 
Aurora Police Department and other organizations within the city, as well as external 
relationships with numerous state, local, and federal agency partners to generate better 
coordination with all partner agencies, and therefore, service to the citizens.  
As I became immersed in the new relationships between the Aurora Police 
Department and the emerging homeland security entities, I saw how eager many agency 
representatives were to contribute but I also saw a fierceness among these people to 
ensure their discipline or agency received its share of the impending homeland security 
grant dollars. A particular rift occurred between the law enforcement and fire disciplines 
as they competed for precious grant funding; the fire service viewed as having been 
entrenched in the process from the inception of homeland security grants being available, 
and law enforcement viewed as inserting its presence so as to ensure its share of the pot.  
In Colorado, an urgency to prepare for the budget cycle every year arose based on 
grant guidance from the DHS that defined types of target capabilities and planning 
scenarios that would be viewed more favorably, rather than relying on a guiding doctrine 
to determine strategic priorities. In retrospect, Conklin’s concept of fragmentation 
between the competing elements became evident. As time progressed, efforts to 
defragment these competing interests manifested in constant evolution in the grant review 
process; efforts to bring what Conklin calls coherence or common understanding and 
alignment for regional objectives began to gain support.221  
Every experience I had provided a new context for me, which resulted in a 
different understanding of how public safety as a whole, and the city of Aurora 
specifically, was interacting with numerous levels of federal, state, and local levels of 
government. Whether it was to function as the department’s first respiratory protection 
administrator and developing a departmental respiratory protection policy, or serving on 
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Colorado’s North Central Homeland Security Region’s Board of Directors, the 
realization of blended relationships and focused coordination between jurisdictions and 
disciplines materialized for the first time in my career. The North Central Region of 
Colorado represents a 10 county region comprising the bulk of the Denver-metro area. 
Standing committees reflect target capability categories, such as planning, training and 
exercising, interoperable communication, and information sharing. A need existed to 
stand up the first Information Sharing Committee and I was asked to chair it. Thus, began 
my plunging into the post-9/11 information sharing world and my concurrent experience 
of learning the lexicon, and emergence of information sharing technologies while 
focusing on coordinating information sharing initiatives across the region, state and 
nation. As I reflected on my experience as compared to the research, it has occurred to 
me that the bulk of the efforts to solve homeland security problems have been from the 
misdiagnosed context that this nation’s problems are “tame” or linear.222 Americans tend 
to see each problem as a unique problem that must be solved to its conclusion. They then 
see additional problems as separate and distinct; they attempt to apply formerly 
successful remedies, which may or may not be successful. This situation differs from the 
wicked problem in that the problem itself morphs while the individual is immersed in it; 
it does not have an ending point and people tend to learn more about the problem while 
interacting directly with it. 
As an example, when the homeland security grant funding began to flow, each 
agency advocated for its urgent equipment and training needs. This urgency represents a 
linear, myopic view of the problem; once funds were received and the training or 
equipment was purchased, the problem was solved until the next grant cycle; no broader 
awareness or concern arose about how their particular piece of equipment or training 
would support the region as a whole or beyond. After a few years of fierce competition 
for these dollars, the North Central Region of Colorado evolved into a more coherent 
approach that all grant awards had to solve a regional problem for the bulk of the 
stakeholders. For example, incident command system training became a priority and 
homeland security grant funding was used to fund overtime and back-fill to ensure first 
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responders were adequately trained. It seemed initially that law enforcement, fire, EMS, 
and emergency management would be the most appropriate disciplines for the training. 
However, other disciplines emerged claiming they also needed the training. As board 
members of the North Central Region, we struggled to determine whether emerging 
disciplines truly needed the training due to emerging relationships within the region or 
whether they were only attracted to the overtime funding.  
At times, emotions ran deep; some groups became resigned and cynical when 
they were determined to not to be eligible for the training. As patterns such as these 
emerged, the board attempted to stabilize them by establishing boundaries. While it 
would be nice to say it was done deliberately knowing the dynamics of complexity, the 
reality is that they did so intuitively, and reached successful outcomes sometimes and 
unsuccessful outcomes on other occasions. I now can view “retrospective coherence as an 
organic property of complexity [rather than] an anomaly or flaw to be corrected.”223 
Conklin asserts that these fragmenting dynamics, the social and technical complexity that 
surround these kinds of projects and their potential failed outcomes are more a function 
of the “physics” of projects rather than “incompetence, poor management or any human 
failing.”224  
This is not to say that leadership cannot improve results when dealing with the 
complexity of wicked problems. Rather, it is the understanding of the fragmenting 
conditions of the wicked problem that will enable leaders and followers alike to unlock 
the mystery of such problems that will inspire a renewed commitment for the broader 
objectives allowing for compassion and new energy.225  
2. Life As Learning Leader 
As discussed earlier, much of the literature discusses soft skills related to 
transformational leadership theory and others, which are difficult to measure, and yet, can 
provide the most effective environment for employee productivity. As an example, 
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transformational leadership provides an environment for the follower to thrive in. This 
type of leadership does more than simply manage; it equips followers to deal with 
uncertainty.226 Throughout my career, I have sought out opportunities to confront status 
quo thinking and to challenge myself and those around me to learn and grow while 
practicing leadership tools and principles. Each of these experiences has provided an 
irreversible and immeasurable increase in my capacity to lead; I was more successful in 
some circumstances than others, but I learned from them all. In almost every experience, 
I came away with a new level of understanding and ability for the next challenge. Over 
time, I became more comfortable with being uncomfortable; I allowed myself to shift my 
thinking and acting to meet the context of a given situation. Snowden and Boone say 
adept leaders who lead in complexity will not only recognize the context within which 
they are operating, they will be able to adapt their behavior to meet the demands within 
the context.227 The research in this thesis has demonstrated that complexity is much more 
predominant in the business world than most leaders realize; as such, it requires leaders 
to provide different and sometimes counterintuitive responses.228 The following accounts 
provide illustration of my experiences within the complex domain and associated lessons 
learned.    
3. The Democratic National Convention, 2008 
Complexity or wicked problems require more of a new way of thinking than a 
mechanized strategy. It involves large numbers of interacting elements. These 
interactions are non-linear and the outcomes cannot be predicted to illustrate a few of the 
characteristics.229 The Democratic National Convention (DNC) required the assistance of 
virtually every law enforcement agency in the state of Colorado, as well as many from 
neighboring states. It involved hundreds of agencies at the federal, state, and local level, 
and multitudes of disciplines. The host agency, the Denver Police Department (DPD), 
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was forced from the comfort of the ordered domains within its customary self-sufficient 
status, into the complex domain of interacting with innumerable other agencies (some 
unknown to the DPD with no prior relationship).  
In 2007, the 2008 Democratic National Convention was awarded to the City of 
Denver, Colorado and with it came $50 million to fund the event. Designated a national 
special security event (NSSE), coordinated by the U.S. Secret Service, an intensive 
planning project was begun, the magnitude of which the Denver-metro area had not seen 
in terms of the sheer numbers of government and non-government agencies involved. 
The Aurora Police Department contributed 50 percent of its staff. I was assigned as a 
planner by virtue of my position as the Police Emergency Services Coordinator. The 
magnitude of this event for the Aurora Police Department was beyond the experience of 
most of his colleagues, including the author.  
My co-planner was an effective logistician who easily produced personnel rosters, 
salary charts and scheduled training events. Since my strengths lay elsewhere, I watched 
and listened as he produced schedules, graphs and charts with an ease and confidence. I 
coordinated the department’s interaction with the U.S. Secret Service, and other agencies 
to define our roles, costs, agreements, etc. I diffused disagreements, misunderstandings or 
philosophical conflicts between our agency and others. I wrote the operational plan and 
after-action report for APD’s deployment. I tracked all expenditures in the planning 
process so that our agency would be properly reimbursed. In this capacity my skills were 
tested in a number of areas. The planning took over a year during which it was necessary 
to negotiate and execute an intergovernmental agreement, secure uniforms and equipment 
for 300 officers who were to be predominantly utilized for crowd management, schedule 
training for crowd management tactical issues, first amendment issues and other training 
needs, secure air purifying respirators (gas masks) for affected officers, ensure they were 
medically screened to wear these masks and that they were fit-tested so that their masks 
were certified to function and filter out toxins.  
An important facet of this experience was the extreme pressure placed upon the 
chief of police based on his commitment to the DPD for assigning 300 officers, half of 
the authorized strength for Aurora Police. The DNC was hosted by the City of Denver. 
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The APD was the biggest contributor to the event outside of the DPD. Aurora’s chief 
faced public scrutiny and intense political pressure at the time from those who did not 
support the expenditure of Aurora resources for the Denver event. He persevered as he 
felt it very important that APD officers be afforded this once in a lifetime opportunity.  
As a planner, the enormous pressure on the chief to provide public safety to the 
citizens of Aurora while also supporting Denver felt tangible. While the massive 
responsibility of training, equipping, and motivating 300 officers assigned to the DNC 
was critical, so too was planning the at-home deployment and keeping those officers 
focused. The public pressure affected the attitudes of some regarding training and 
relationships with other contributing agencies. To ensure unity, supervisory officers with 
strong leadership skills and positive attitudes were identified to lead certain aspects of 
preparation. Heavy emphasis was placed on the importance of cohesion and teamwork in 
the face of the obstinate position of some city leaders. In doing so, the selected leaders 
instilled credibility in the process, as well as the proper level of discipline to accomplish 
the necessary tasks. It also broadened their skill level as none had faced this kind of 
internal conflict with an important mission to complete.  
To complicate matters, while we understood that Denver wanted to use us 
primarily for crowd management, their planning process took longer than anticipated to 
solidify what their needs were, as well as other agencies identified to meet those needs, 
which amplified the pressure within the APD as it felt as though the planning was in 
limbo. Department members looked to those on the planning team for answers to their 
legitimate questions. Concern and confusion among Aurora personnel increased as time 
progressed and the clarity that would alleviate those concerns simply was not available. 
Issues, such as proper training for crowd management, unlawful assembly, first 
amendment expression, receiving effective equipment, overtime funding, and scheduling 
weighed heavily on the minds of not only the officers but also the chief and command 
staff. As the event drew nearer with no clear mission, the pressure mounted, as essential 
training and equipment needs remained unaddressed.  
The APD also was used as the first agency to negotiate the intergovernmental 
agreement, the model of which would be used for all other contributing agencies, in 
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outlining indemnification, as well as the issues mentioned above. The indispensable item 
to be negotiated was for Aurora officers to be indemnified for any legal ramifications 
resulting form their deployment in another city. It became contentious and played out in 
the media, appearing to the community that the government “could not get its act 
together.”230  
One of the aspects of leading in complexity is that it is unpredictable and while 
some or all the problem may seem familiar; applying past practices fail due to the 
emergence of unforeseen properties.231 For example, while we were told unofficially that 
the Aurora Police Department was to provide crowd management duties, we were not 
officially notified until closer to the event than we were comfortable with as Aurora was 
the first to negotiate the intergovernmental agreement and nothing could go forward until 
the legal aspects of the event were solidified. Given that we would be sending officers to 
perform this kind of assignment we knew we needed to train them, equip them and 
indemnify them. Most of these conditions were out of our control and yet we knew what 
needed to be done to meet anticipated demands associated with these assignments.  
In an ordered system, the system constrains the agents within the system. In 
complexity as in this case, the agents and the system constrain each other. In this case, we 
began to train officers in crowd management tactics for fear that we would run out of 
time. Other departments would contribute officers to the crowd management role and 
they should have all trained together to ensure continuity among all the forces during the 
event. We applied best practices by beginning our training premature to the other 
agencies’ involvement. Eventually the official relationships were established through 
intergovernmental agreements and the metro-wide training was conducted. As the agents 
within this system, our actions may have caused some confusion and overlap before it 
was eventually coordinated (stabilized).  
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In retrospect, it essentially meant that we as planners moved from the simple 
quadrant of the Cynefin Framework232 (Figure 1) where we knew exactly what the 
relationship of cause (proper and consistent training among all crowd management 
officers) and effect (continuity, unity of command, uniformity) was, to chaos, where we 
were delayed and uninformed to the point we felt an extreme urgency that taking any 
action was best even though we were out of sync with all the other agencies. We then 
shifted to complexity as we began to understand our relationship to the rest of the metro 
area; that once the intergovernmental agreements were signed, all agencies would be 
involved in common training and that we would receive equipment to support the 
mission. The speed in which these developments occurred, the gaps in communication, 
and the impulse for leaders to act, created these conditions.  
Each experience within the planning phase seemed on one hand to be somewhat 
predictable based on committees organized around 17 capability areas, and on the other 
hand, emergent due to the novelty of virtually every aspect of the event planning, which 
is consistent with the notion that hindsight does not equate to foresight due to the 
constant changing of external conditions and systems. Even though members of the 
Denver planning team consulted with planners of the prior DNC in Boston, it only served 
to a limited degree; relevant to the prior event. In other words, best practices mean past 
practices and given the constant emergence of new aspects of a problem, past practices 
may not serve future needs.233 It is when the leader is challenged to be decisive when 
facing an emerging problem that this person is required to think differently than in the 
past; not an easy task but essential for the complex environment.234 
 The Threat Against Candidate Obama 
On the early morning hours of Sunday, August 24, 2008, at approximately 1:30 
am, an Aurora Police sergeant noticed and stopped a vehicle driving erratically. The 
driver was arrested for traffic violations. Incident to that arrest, officers discovered two 
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high-powered rifles, one of which was later determined as stolen, camouflage gear, 
ballistic vests, walkie-talkies, and methamphetamine. The driver’s arrest led to the arrests 
of two additional parties, one of whom jumped from a 6th story window in a Glendale 
Colorado Motel to avoid capture. Investigators re-contacted the person who disclosed that 
two others were planning to shoot Barack Obama on Thursday, August 28, at INVESCO 
Field during his nomination acceptance speech.  
On Monday, August 25, the investigation was in full swing and was assigned to 
the Joint Operations Center (JOC) at the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC). The Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, (JTTF) was assigned as the lead investigative body.  
 Chaos—Resiliency—Stability 
The incident command system, another 9/11 Commission byproduct, was utilized 
in the DNC planning to the extent that a Joint Information Center (JIC) was included. All 
media inquiries were to be coordinated through the JIC, which would ensure that a 
unified message was delivered regarding all operations of the DNC. The onslaught of 
world media attention caused the handling of the media regarding this arrest to be a high 
priority. Vigorous discussions occurred surrounding the best approach in response to 
endless and forceful media inquiries. Some simply had strong opinions that no response 
should be made to the media’s inquires. After much debate, it was determined that the 
APD would disclose, at a minimum, the official record of action for the arrestee, as per 
Colorado state law. Eventually, it was decided that the APD would conduct a press 
release disclosing the basic information for all three arrestees.  
Approximately 15,000 members of the world’s media were in the Denver metro 
area for the convention. Some members of the media were in the same hotel as the 
fugitive who jumped from his window. Exercising their abilities to uncover information 
by exploiting endless resources, the media soon began to learn more about the arrests and 
plot to shoot Obama.  
Senior U.S. government leaders in Denver and Washington, DC, were informed  
that per Colorado law, if someone is arrested, the arresting agency must provide the 
official record of action, which amounts to basic biographic information, such as name, 
address, age, photo, and charges. If the charges were all going to be handled in the federal 
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courts, the state obligation to disclose the arrestees could be avoided. However, not all 
the charges could be filed in federal court, and therefore, the conundrum persisted. It was 
necessary to educate some of the government partners not accustomed to dealing with the 
media at the local level so that they realized the media was doing its own investigation, 
talking to neighbors, hotel staff, witnesses, etc. The story was going to be broadcast 
whether we cooperated or not, much like Keene’s assertion that “complexity theory tells 
us that the desired order we seek through control is in fact the very outcome of change 
and uncertainty and will come to pass irrespective of our efforts to control and direct.”235 
It would be much better if we had a voice in the story. After much debate, the 
plan resulted in Aurora doing a preliminary press conference on the evening of Monday, 
August 25 to discuss only the local arrests and portion of the case relevant only to the 
state case while informing the media that the U.S. Attorney would be commenting then 
next day on Tuesday to discuss the federal charges and conspiracy. In this way, the 
pressure from the media was dampened and re-directed for the next day’s press 
conference.  
In that press conference, the U.S. Attorney in Denver stated, “The alleged threats, 
hateful and bigoted though they were, involved a group of… methamphetamine abusers, 
all of whom were impaired at the time,” he said. “The evidence involving the alleged 
threats does not warrant federal charges now. I must tell you though that the investigation 
is still ongoing and we are all keeping an open mind,” he added. “From a legal 
standpoint, the law recognizes a difference between what we call a ‘true threat’—that’s 
one that can actually be carried out—and the recorded racist ranting’s of drug abusers.” 
The suspects were referred to as “meth heads” who, because of their drug addiction, were 
likely not capable of executing a plan to hurt Obama. Their alleged plot to harm Obama 
was apparently fueled by racism and was more “aspirational than operational.”236 
This experience illustrates the fragmenting elements of a massive project. While 
specific plans were enacted that carefully spelled out roles and responsibilities within the 
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JIC, the arrest of these potential assassins and the resulting, rapid development of the 
circumstances, could not have been predicted. It was clear; for example, that the JIC 
outlined that the U.S. Secret Service was in charge of any media release to ensure a 
unified message was conveyed. The plan accounted for emerging threat information but it 
did not anticipate the impact of public pressure that emerged during this incident. When 
the enormous external pressure from the world media caused the existing plans to be 
reconsidered, the morphing problem was addressed by conducting a press conference in 
Aurora, and setting up a more comprehensive press conference for the Attorney General 
the next day. In retrospect, the stakeholders reached a new level of coherence by re-
aligning the goals and objectives to address the threat against Obama, while maintaining 
the overall mission of the DNC.237 
The transition in this case from a simple domain in which the plan fit the 
predictable scenarios, to an unanticipated event, back to an ordered domain, demonstrates 
the usefulness of Snowden and Boone’s Cynefin Framework in the following way. First, 
the DNC represents a complex adaptive system as it involved “neural-like networks of 
interactive, interdependent agents” bonded together by a common goal with “changeable 
structures [and]multiple, overlapping hierarchies…linked through a dynamic interactive 
network.”238 Next, the existing plans provided for identifying threats and ensuring 
information was disseminated appropriately to address the needs associated. If it involved 
public information, the JIC was designated as having that responsibility. Those involved 
felt comfortable in relating cause and effect of threats to information sharing within the 
ordered domain as defined by the plan. Once the unanticipated dynamics of the threat 
emerged, the plan relying on the JIC was insufficient to meet the emerging external 
pressures of the media. This situation placed the operation in the unordered domain of 
chaos for a short period, complexity, and then back to the ordered domain, where the 
newly created media strategy addressed the problem.239  
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The next section draws an analogy of how complexity becomes apparent and is 
interwoven in planning a large full-scale exercise.  
4. Planning Full-Scale Exercises 
The planning of full-scale exercises has provided me irrevocable experience in 
learning how to apply complexity leadership theory without realizing so consciously at 
the time. As I have conducted research for this thesis and compared what I am learning at 
the academic level to my experiences throughout my career, I have realized that we in 
America are much more prepared and adaptive than I had understood. As I entered the 
new realm of homeland security with its attendant categories of emergency management 
and information sharing, capable people who had been practicing in the field shared their 
wisdom with me. It is not until now that I have come to fully appreciate how much they 
knew cognitively and how many of the principles of resiliency and what we now call 
complex science have been embraced. While my experience with the DNC was not an 
exercise by definition, it brought forward the combination of training, education and real-
world application that has better prepared me for operating more effectively in 
complexity. The following case studies regarding the planning of full-scale exercises 
provide another dimension of learning for me coupled with an introspective of the factors 
discussed in this thesis: leadership, information sharing and complexity.  
 Vigilant Front Range Full-Scale Exercise 
The chief’s sharp and pointed retort in his infamous New York accent sparked a 
familiar response for me: “Uh oh here comes another big project!” I thought to myself. 
During a monthly North Central Region (Colorado Homeland Security) Board of 
Directors meeting in 2008, the coordinator for the region gave his financial report on the 
status of the homeland security grant expenditures that included active fiscal periods for 
which funds had been awarded; some of which had not been fully spent or which were 
eligible for reallocation.  
The coordinator reported a significant amount of training money was available, 
which had a relatively short period of performance remaining (time frame in which the 
funds had to be expended). My boss, the chief of police, quickly declared that the city of 
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Aurora would host a full-scale exercise and that Lt. McGhee would cheerfully coordinate 
the planning and execution.  
My head spun and my heart raced; my impulse was to pretend as though I 
miraculously had not heard the conversation or perhaps to sneak out of the room quietly 
without being noticed. Instead, I grinned and nodded; surrendering to what I knew in the 
end would be an epiphany for me. Instantly I felt calm and confident; the blood must 
have drained from my face because people approached me with sympathetic but relieved 
(that they were not volunteered) expressions during a break and began to offer their 
support and assistance.240 The opportunity to be a chief planner for what would be one of 
the most significant exercises in Colorado made me realize I had an obligation to build an 
exercise that would make an important difference for all first responders. Instantly I was 
driven to succeed in the face of overwhelm and potential failure.241 
Our first job was to establish an executive planning team representing the major 
institutions that would lead the event. It was important that while some of these 
appointments were politically driven by respective agencies, those of us on the executive 
planning team began to communicate with each other immediately about the vision of the 
results we were to create. We then selected key people for team leadership positions 
below the executive planning level based on their talent. Those chosen for each position 
had specific abilities in vital areas. Since talent is innate, it is a predictor of commitment, 
high energy, and performance.242 By doing so, we established a common understanding 
of what our vision for the outcomes of the exercise would be, an otherwise ambiguous 
goal initially when considering the vastness and intricacy of the project.243 It was 
apparent that a few agencies applied undue pressure through their assignees in an effort to 
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accomplish specific agendas inconsistent with the overall objective. We were successful 
in allaying these attempts through constant, open, and frank dialogue.244 As we refined 
the exercise setting, the planning team agreed to run the exercise as a real-time scenario 
for 24 hours to test as many capabilities, agencies, and jurisdictions as possible, which 
established the primary incident as a terrorist attack on a military base.  
In a bold move to take the exercise to new heights, the planning group decided the 
exercise would imitate a terrorist attack on a nearby National Guard base and that it 
would also include a military installation in Colorado Springs 60 miles away. As the 
planning evolved with every passing, creative minute, the exercise grew eventually to be 
one of the largest in Colorado’s history. 
The scenario simulated an initial and secondary terrorist bombing attack on base 
housing at Buckley Air National Guard Base during a wedding party. The Aurora Police 
Department and military police shared joint jurisdiction at the time on this segmented 
part of the base. The initial response and entry onto the base would be tested for the first 
time and would undoubtedly be complicated due to the obvious security concerns on a 
military installation whether in real world or exercise situations.  
As the exercise scenario planning advanced throughout the ensuing year, many 
dynamics emerged that revealed the enormity and complexity of what we had embarked 
upon. Over 200 volunteers would be used to portray dead and wounded victims among 
the wedding party. Both military and civilian helicopters would be used to transport 
casualties to participating local hospitals to simulate mass casualty surge. We created an 
intelligence pre-inject trail introduced 30 days prior to the start of the exercise. The 
intelligence injects continued throughout the exercise to test the fusion center’s ability to 
receive, synthesize, and disseminate information effectively to those who needed it. We 
carefully and meticulously created investigative leads including live volunteer suspects so 
that investigators could follow up on the criminal investigation in cooperation with the 
FBI’s JTTF once the exercise was set in motion. In addition to the Aurora scenario, a 
military transport carrying high-ranking military personnel was shot down by a surface to 
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air missile near Colorado Springs. Ultimately, 40 agencies and 500 participants (in 
addition to the 200 volunteers) would be involved, which required the painstaking 
coordination of numerous organizational operating plans, policies, and procedures. 
At times, I grew frustrated when team members failed to complete assigned 
deadlines; planning leaders allowed conflicts to interfere with the progress of the project 
or when motivation among colleagues waned. It seemed as though the exercise involved 
too many organizations, and the objectives to be accomplished were too broad. In such 
moments, I bolstered my courage and curiosity about how effective this exercise could be 
if we pulled it off. I imagined a far more resilient and effective collective ability to deal 
with a massive terrorist attack; it also dawned on me that it would make us more efficient 
and effective in everyday operations.245 I often shared these thoughts with my colleagues 
on the planning team and found they had many of the same concerns but were not willing 
to say anything for fear of being criticized. I learned that if I had done nothing else when 
facing these trials, by my modeling of being open and honest, they felt they had been 
given permission to raise important concerns, thus creating a collaborative environment 
from which we shaped a powerful synergy.246 
As the operations chief, I found myself organizing and directing processes and 
resources from the majority of agencies to ensure the overall vision of the exercise was 
carried out. This situation was new ground for everyone involved and it showed at times 
when individual and agency agendas interfered with the broader mission. Being involved 
at this level was clearly beyond the purview of my prior experience and very 
uncomfortable for me but necessary nonetheless.247  
Finally, after nearly a year in the planning stages, we began the exercise. Law 
enforcement and fire department first responders arrived at the scene of the first bombing 
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on the base with some difficulty at the entry gate; however, in an unanticipated outcome 
and to our horror, the responders refused to enter the inner perimeter to contact the 
victims. I felt the gripping pressure of failure and embarrassment rising in my chest. 
“Why aren’t they going to the victims”? I asked. “They are begging for help”! From the 
planning perspective, we had felt it important to test the responders’ entry onto the base 
but did not imagine testing what we thought would be well within their skill sets, the 
tactical approach to an explosion with hundreds of injured victims. After two frustrating 
hours, we injected updates to move the scenario forward. Our first reaction was that the 
responders had performed poorly. We realized, however, that even though our first 
responders had traditionally been trained to suspect a secondary device whenever an 
explosion occurred, they had not trained on mass casualty scenarios where a secondary 
device was suspected. In this exercise, a secondary device in fact did exist and it was 
detonated and killed numerous first responders after we artificially escalated the 
scenario…redemption! 
In the days and weeks following the exercise in May 2009, we identified 
numerous opportunities for improvement in the after action report to include the need to 
train on specific development areas, such as mass casualties in an active and unstable 
environment. Since then, I have noticed a shift in the way in which police and fire 
responders talk about active environments that indicate a better awareness of how 
unpredictable events can be and how we should be more willing to think dynamically in 
such situations. The Aurora Police Department now routinely includes active shooter 
situation training scenarios in our annual in-service training for officers.  
Someone once told me theory without application is simply theory.248 In a perfect 
display of applied theory, three years later, the way in which officers chose to respond to 
the Aurora Theater shooting in July 2012, demonstrated an anecdotal illustration of an 
adaptation during a chaotic event. Officers who responded displayed a combination of 
individual unilateral decision making initially and a more top-down organized 
coordinated response later in the event exemplified by officers who self-directed when 
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they encountered critically wounded victims and then transported them immediately 
(within eight minutes) to local hospitals when it became apparent that emergency medical 
services could not do so as quickly. They tailored their operations later by coordinating a 
more organized and deliberate response effort when additional resources began to arrive, 
which stabilized the scene somewhat.  
As noted earlier by Uhl-Bien et al., per the law of requisite complexity, “it takes 
complexity to defeat complexity.”249 While empirical evidence may not [yet] be available 
that those who responded consciously thought and acted in a more complex adaptive 
manner, the outcome is difficult to ignore and tends to validate the merits of the exercise 
in 2009, as well as other exercises since then which have introduced dynamic complex 
situations. Perhaps even more powerful is the notion that the organization, by virtue of its 
various agent relationships within the system, simply acted as necessary in the emerging 
situation(s); as a result, many lives were saved.250  
For me, the reward is in the shift (albeit three years later) in the officers’ 
willingness to act decisively when faced with a new (and dire) experience as compared to 
the paralysis by analysis exhibited during the exercise in 2009.251 This situation brought 
forward what I now recognize as the shortcoming of Newtonian (linear) thinking in 
leadership, and particularly within me. I found throughout this experience, I altered from, 
at times, linear thinking to a more strategic or Meta-Leadership model focused on 
building the capacity of the organization as a whole, which encompassed numerous 
differing organizational cultures.252  
An example of the more Newtonian thought would be when the responders did 
not react as predicted during the exercise, I (and others) believed it to be a “sign of 
trouble,” then, and upon reflection, it simply exposed a need for a straightforward 
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conversation and subsequent training.253 Further, I realized and appreciated that the 
weakness in how we respond to these events was exposed during an exercise rather than a 
real world event, which of course, is the preferred method of learning when lives are at 
stake. Moreover, it is a leader’s job to “inject tension” (as in exercises) within 
organizations to produce emergence.254 It also illustrated the importance of recognizing 
that our world is comprised of a series of relationships, interconnected rather than 
disparate.255 In other words, when I am or am not open to the possibilities that 
complexity invites in terms of growth and learning, the approach I choose will define my 
experience, which in turn, will affect my ability to lead others. Similarly, others will 
observe me as a leader, and because of the interrelationship between all of us, an 
ineffective choice on my part may have an adverse or limiting effect on their resilience or 
openness to learn. 
5. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Global Intelligence 
Working Group Criminal Intelligence Coordination Council 
The genesis of the GIWG and CICC are described in Chapter II, C, a. In this 
section, I describe further the importance of these bodies and my good fortune to have 
been involved since 2007. As a reminder, these bodies are national level policy advisory 
groups to the DHS Secretary and the U.S. Attorney General’s office for post-9/11 
criminal intelligence and information sharing efforts.  
In 2007, I began serving the CICC as the chief’s proxy. The CICC and GIWG 
have produced innumerable products since 9/11 to provide guidance and expertise on 
subjects as they have emerged in the American information-sharing realm. These groups 
have embraced the notion of complexity from its inception by embracing budding issues 
and anticipating future considerations for emerging trends. They have produced a long 
list of guiding products ranging from fusion center guidelines and associated issues, to 
addressing privacy, civil rights/civil liberties in association with emerging information 
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sharing technologies and initiatives. Since that time, I have had the opportunity to 
contribute to such national products as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
version 2.0, Minimum Standards for Intermediate-Level Analytical Training Courses and 
the Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Gang Intelligence Units and Task 
Forces.256 The GIWG and CICC have emerged as a guiding body comprised of a broad-
based representation of key stakeholders at all levels of government in a complex 
environment in which each stakeholder has viewed the overall mission of improving 
information sharing as the highest priority. Few governmental bodies in my experience 
have accomplished the collaborative efficiency that these organizations have.  
6. The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
In the view of this sub-committee, we need to make state; local and tribal 
sector information needs the driver of federal information sharing efforts, 
not the other way around.257  
–Congresswoman Jane Harmon, 2007 
The 9/11 Commission Report undertook a number of issues throughout the U.S. 
government deemed to have added to the failure in how information was shared prior to 
the attacks. A key observation and resulting recommendation was the groundbreaking 
effort to enhance the awareness and communication between the SLTTP and IC.  
The ITACG was born from the 2007, 9/11 Commission Recommendations, and 
became a congressionally mandated detail resulting from Public Law 110–53.258 Located 
within the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), ITACG members were imbedded 
within the intelligence community (IC) with the expectation that they review both 
classified and unclassified federal level intelligence information and finished products to 
ensure the information has value for SLTTP first responders. Their mission entailed four 
primary aspects: 1) The expectation that they review classified federal level intelligence 
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information and finished products to ensure the information had value for state, local, 
tribal, territorial and private sector (SLTTP) first responders, 2) provide SLTTP context 
for IC analysts who had no awareness of SLTTP resources, needs, concerns, or the nexus 
between SLTTP and the IC to terrorism and transnational crime, 3) attend national 
conferences and provide the same advocacy for the IC to SLTTP audiences, 4) through 
this emerging perspective, recognize opportunities for improvement in the interaction 
between the IC and SLTTP through recommended national programs, policies, and 
projects. The ITACG was comprised of police officers, fire fighters, and public health 
professionals from the three primary disciplines represented at the ITACG. Each member 
was required to obtain a top secret sensitive compartmentalized information (TS/SCI) 
clearance and undergo the same employment process to which any intelligence 
community employee would be subjected. In February 2011, I began a yearlong 
fellowship in Washington, DC, with the ITACG. 
While the mission may sound simple, the reality is that a steep learning curve 
exists for first responders who, by their nature, are operationally oriented. To provide the 
necessary value, an ITACG member needed to become adept at accessing the numerous 
intelligence portals and reading intelligence cables with an eye toward pieces of 
information exposing a new or otherwise unnoticed trend, tactic, or procedure used by 
terrorists overseas that would be useful and practical for first responders in this country. 
Additionally, members of this detail provided training and outreach to federal IC 
members on the importance of meeting the intelligence needs of SLTTP partners.  
The typical day started with a secured video teleconference (SVTC) that 
interconnects IC agencies reporting on the overnight activity across the world. Next, upon 
retuning to the office, a read-book would be completed by an analyst within the group. 
These summaries encapsulated reporting from the prior day from which an ITACG 
member would key in on certain item(s) that may be of interest to the state, local tribal or 
territorial SLTT community. If an item was of interest, often the group would come 
together to discuss the potential of introducing it into an intelligence product to be 
disseminated to SLTT agencies. On-board analysts from the NCTC and FBI were crucial 
for those of us who came from the SLTT world. If we found a piece of intelligence 
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worthy of attention, we then had to convince our analyst that it could be downgraded 
preferably to unclassified level.  
The analyst researched the intelligence to determine who the author was, as well 
as which agency they represented. They would also evaluate it to see if it could be 
downgraded to the point that sources and methods were removed and were still relevant 
to our needs. It is important to understand that the access we had to the classified 
systems, or the “high side” information, was vast. A typical Internet surfing session with 
an endless array of websites and articles provides a sense of what is available on the high 
side with sites, articles, and other reporting to an IC analyst.  
The group was also responsible for reviewing finished intelligence produced by 
DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and FBI joint intelligence bulletins (JIBS). 
Referred to as the gang of six, the ITACG was part of a group of six workgroups 
responsible for the review of content. As an example, it was crucial to ensure each 
product was reviewed for aspects related to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
(CRCL), one group was responsible for completing this task. The ITACG’s responsibility 
was to provide context, which would make sense for first responders, as well as to decode 
the IC lexicon so that the information was understood. 
Part of our jobs included guest speaking at various intelligence training venues to 
new young analysts, which was particularly rewarding as these analysts had no 
consciousness of what law enforcement, fire, or public health first responders do for a 
living, and more importantly what resources we offer and how important it is to 
disseminate key information to them. This part of the job was a key experience for me as 
it became clear how crucial it would be for SLTT and IC analysts to become much more 
familiar with each other and to cross-train, to the degree possible, as the IC works 
primarily within the classified environment, and of course, SLTT responders do not.  
Conversely, we worked to provide education for the SLTTP community about the 
IC environment by attending national conferences and sitting on discussion panels. 
Central to the mission is the ability of ITACG members to serve as change agents 
in the unfamiliar monolith that is the IC. With the responsibility of identifying processes 
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within the intelligence-sharing environment that are ineffective for the state and local first 
responder community, ITACG members must learn to navigate through autocratic pitfalls 
while accomplishing real reform. 
Upon my arrival in February 2011, I became aware of a particular daily classified 
product produced by the staff in the operations center in the NCTC. The repeated 
message to me and other colleagues was that the intelligence product was designed for 
daily distribution for intelligence analysts including the state and local first responder 
community, and further, that it was well distributed and had received high praise. These 
assertions remained with me as I traveled to various conferences and training venues to 
discuss the nuances between the state and local vs. intelligence communities. I often 
asked first responders about the value they saw in this particular intelligence product and 
typically received one of two responses: a) they were not aware of the product’s existence 
or b) they knew of the product and appreciated its value but commented on the difficulty 
of a classified product effectively informing the first responder community due to limited 
access.  
The latter group also suggested the addition of an unclassified version of the 
product. It is understandable that certain segments of the first responder community are 
not exposed to this product due to issues of classification. I was subsequently astonished 
upon hearing the feedback during two guest presentations at the Fusion Center Leaders 
Program in Monterey, CA at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, when 
discussing the ITACG’s mission. In classes of nearly 30 fusion center directors and 
deputy directors, the reaction was surprisingly consistent with those polled in other 
homeland security conference environments or other informal queries, most were not 
aware of the product’s existence, or were aware but urged that an unclassified version be 
produced.  
It should not be a surprise that intelligence products produced for state and local 
consumption, which are classified, would narrow the available audience. Even for those 
few SLTT, who are granted security clearances, it would be required to respond to a 
secure room, usually at a local fusion center, to gain access to the product. Thus, the 
challenge became clear, work to create a companion intelligence product similar to the 
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classified version so that state and local first responders are adequately informed at the 
same vital level of intelligence from which the classified product originates. 
a. Holding the Line 
With each trip to a conference or guest lecture where I received comments 
regarding this particular product, I completed obligatory trip reports outlining the 
predicament, as well as the prescribed solution. While the mission seemed clear, the path 
to success was fraught with entrenched resistance to the notion of creating a new 
unclassified product. What seemed to be a predictable outcome of acceptance by all 
stakeholders based on a clearly explained problem and equally reasonable solution, 
turned wicked. I had not anticipated the complexity of the varying structures and 
hierarchies within DHS and NCTC and how these intricacies might play out.259 The more 
I brought up the concept, the more perceptible I felt the resistance became. I learned that 
similar suggestions had been made in the past three years wherein the reticence from 
select officials effectively thwarted any effort to move an unclassified version forward. 
Since the hesitancy in this case constricted effective and sometimes-critical information 
sharing, it required a strong commitment to confront this intimidating environment 
ultimately to move the initiative forward.  
Given that the product is produced by the NCTC, it seemed natural that if anyone 
would resist new thinking, it would be NCTC, which was not the case; the stonewall 
came from the DHS. In discussing this situation further, I discovered that the NCTC 
authors of the classified product had a more altruistic view; to produce a product focused 
on the client’s needs, particularly when the client has a keen vision of the needs. 
In late 2011 and early 2012, the issue was again raised at a key meeting at the 
DHS explaining the rationale for the new product. This time it resulted with the invitation 
to create a mock-up version of an unclassified product to then circulate for review 
throughout the NCTC and DHS senior leaders for critical buy-in to move the initiative 
forward. Members of ITACG and NCTC pooled resources to conceptualize the new 
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product with the following agreed upon criteria: a) it must not be repetitive to or 
overlapping of other products adding to the perception of “spam” to state and locals, b) it 
must be a combined product containing downgraded classified counterterrorism 
information and corroborating open source information. When a counterterrorism vs. 
criminal nexus exists, it should be exploited as well, c) it must be new and innovative, 
and d) contributions from our nation’s fusion centers’ local products should be drawn 
upon to connect disparate local current events with national trends. 
b. Light at the End of the Tunnel 
Throughout 2012, a substantive draft of an unclassified companion version was 
developed. It was circulated through key senior leadership at the NCTC with very 
stringent but positive scrutiny. It was distributed on a tour of review among DHS 
counterparts after which it was distributed among selected fusion centers, (Colorado’s 
among them), across the country representing distinct regions. In this key phase, specific 
and pertinent questions were asked of fusion center personnel to ensure that appropriate 
qualities were present in the document. The ultimate goal would be that the unclassified 
version be circulated through key partners, such as the Criminal Intelligence 
Coordinating Council, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major City 
Chiefs and the International Association of Fire Chiefs and others. 
In February 2012, I completed my detail and returned to Colorado. One of my 
colleagues in ITACG continued to work on the project to maintain the pressure in 
producing the companion product, the Terrorism Wrap Up. It is unknown now if this 
initiative will survive but it does serve as an example of what is possible when a will 
exists to bring good ideas to fruition in the face of resistance. In today’s homeland 
security environment, it is more critical now than ever that effective and powerful 
leadership from the state and local levels have an impact to provide broader and more 
diverse ideas within the federal culture. Each degree of success can serve as permission 
to those reluctant about being at the forefront. Further, it is essential that future 
fellowships (JCAT and others) create a mechanism for ensuring continuity in seeing such 
projects to their conclusion when the originator leaves the leadership role.  
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While there, I faced a challenging learning curve to become familiar with the 
intricacies of the IC while focusing on the relationship between the national level 
intelligence and information-sharing efforts, and the state and local environment. This 
opportunity has provided me with unique insights that few people in this country have; 
the in-depth experience at the state and local level coupled with practical application in 
the federal IC. Along with this experience, I have broadened my awareness of areas in 
information sharing where products, processes, or practices are still limiting effective 
information sharing at the national level.  
While working at the NCTC, I experienced the “drinking from the fire hose” 
effect and attributed it to the fact that I was a law enforcement operator (as opposed to 
analyst) from the local level of government and simply did not understand the unique IC 
culture. One analyst as described in Nolan’s dissertation characterized the experience as 
“like falling down the March Hare’s hole.”260 The following quote from a 10-year IC 
veteran is subsequent to her description of struggling to decipher which of the 3,000 
cables should she prioritize? Her comment provides context. 
I think we set up unrealistic expectations between us and the public. We 
have to be right all the time, but they only have to be right once. It’s a 
pressure cooker. 
And no one wants to be the analyst that went home and tried to have a normal life, 
or have a normal weekend, and then come in on Monday and find out it was your 
account that literally blew up.261 
Central to the mission was the ability of ITACG members to serve as change 
agents in the unfamiliar IC. With the responsibility of identifying ineffective processes 
within the intelligence-sharing environment for the state and local first responder 
community, ITACG members must learn to navigate through autocratic pitfalls while 
accomplishing real reform. 
As an example, ITACG members faced subtle but clear underlying defiance at 
times when offering new ideas or suggestions for improvement. Considering the 
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dysfunctional dynamics between the agencies within the IC as outlined by Nolan,262 it is 
not difficult to imagine the attitude of some IC members toward those of us from the state 
and local community. After returning from the NCTC and becoming the deputy director 
for the CIAC, I attended meetings with key officials about an innovative project to 
regionalize federal intelligence across the country. The Joint Regional Intelligence Group 
(JRIG) was an initiative aimed at shifting from a more centralized (and clinical) method 
of producing intelligence to a more localized and connected, and therefore, effective and 
timely approach to be deployed as a pilot in a number of FBI field offices across the 
country and Denver was to be one of them.  
Notwithstanding the sensitivities of intelligence collection based on current events 
with NSA leaks that would have to be addressed, intelligence collected at a regional level 
should involve state and local entities through fusion center interaction to add the 
essential element of the bottom-up fed intelligence property to the top-down aspect. It 
was clear to me in more than one meeting that if a state or local official were in the room 
during meetings with IC officials, some would simply get up and leave the room. This 
situation illustrates the existence and challenge of status quo thinking; combined with the 
mêlées the IC is experiencing within its own ranks, it also invites the need for a national 
information-sharing doctrine that discusses and addresses strong leadership in moving 
key initiatives forward and the impacts such deficits produce. Realizing Nolan’s 
dissertation was focused on her experience as a CIA analyst within the NCTC, it was a 
notable characteristic of her work that no mention was made of the emerging 
relationships between the IC and SLTTP. 
In conducting the literature review for this thesis, ample material was available 
from which to gain insight into this program. While it does not appear that actual ITACG 
fellows wrote a first-hand account of their experience of the  ITACG program, Carrabin’s 
thesis in particular referenced an active member’s perception of aspects of the fellowship. 
One of the areas of emphasis for those assigned as ITACG fellows was to, through their 
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new perspective of the IC, identify opportunities to address gaps in information sharing 
and recommend or create national initiatives that would minimize these gap(s).  
The following summarizes key elements brought forward by Carabin as many 
shortfalls have still not been addressed. He includes eight recommendations in his thesis, 
all of which this author supports and finds plausible and applicable.263 A few of these are 
discussed later in the conclusions.  
c. UBL Doc-Ex Workgroup; Evidence of What Is Possible in the Future 
On May 1, 2011, Usama bin-Laden was killed in Abottabad Pakistan by U.S. 
operatives. Subsequent to the raid, volumes of material were seized to be translated and 
analyzed for intelligence value. The ITACG was staffed with seven local law 
enforcement, fire, and public health first responders at the time. When the material in the 
compound was translated into English, those of us in the ITACG were immediately 
assigned as part of the Usama bin Laden Document Exploitation (UBL Doc-ex) task 
team. Consistent with our overall mission to review classified material and find the 
relevancy for SLTTP, we were tasked with reviewing the material from bin Laden’s 
compound and looking for those items that indicated a high level of threat and which 
could be downgraded to an unclassified level to be included in bulletins or other 
intelligence products for first responders. After reviewing hundreds documents, some key 
threat information was, in fact, reduced to lower levels of classification or non-
classification and distributed as intelligence products.  
This kind of interaction between the IC and state and local first responders was 
the first of its kind at this level with this degree of intimate interaction of which I am 
aware. The NCTC director at the time, Michael Leiter, paved the way for this 
collaboration to occur seamlessly and this kind of advanced meta-leadership thinking 
should remain in the collective consciousness of all who are and will be working for 
future reform in the national security realm. It not only served as a symbolic 
advancement in these relationships and what can be created in the future, but its practical 
                                                 
263 Carabin, “An Intelligence-Sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. 
Counterterrorism Efforts,” 1–153. 
 114
outcome would never have occurred without the direct interaction of state, local, and 
tribal officials, which provided our context so that the most important information would 
be disseminated to those who most needed it.  
7. Colorado Information Analysis Center Deputy Director 
“Why do we need a fusion center? Fusion centers embody the core function of 
collaboration, and as demands increase and resources decrease, fusion centers serve as an 
effective tool to maximize available resources and build trusted relationships. What 
distinguishes fusion centers from intelligence units within local law enforcement agencies 
is that fusion centers synthesize data gathered from multiple sources and disciplines.”264 
In other words, they become the central clearinghouse for these levels of multi-discipline, 
multi-jurisdictional synthesis of information.  
At the conclusion of my yearlong assignment at the NCTC, I returned to Colorado 
and was appointed as the Deputy Executive Director of Colorado’s Fusion Center, the 
CIAC. Capitalizing on unique opportunities based on my career progression and extended 
fellowship in Washington, DC, serves as no better transition to fulfill what I consider an 
obligation to my local, state and federal community. 
My strategic objective was to help create a stronger relevancy from which the 
CIAC could offer the local first responder community a central clearinghouse 
environment for pattern crimes plaguing multiple jurisdictions, or specialized analytical 
support for struggling law enforcement agencies. Local relevancy is a concept many 
fusion centers across the country strain to create or maintain. This achievement came to 
fruition during the summer of 2012 as the CIAC became, for the first time in its history, 
significantly involved in supporting agencies tasked with response to Colorado’s most 
destructive fire season. Deploying a mobile analytical team, the CIAC supported a rural 
county in investigating numerous wildland arsons. Further, the CIAC has supported 
criminal investigations, such as the Aurora, CO, theater shooting, the assassination of 
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Colorado’s corrections chief, Tom Clements, as well as other high profile critical 
incidents. 
a. Colorado’s Record-Setting Wildfires–2012 
Beginning in March 2012, one of most costly and deadly wildland fire seasons in 
Colorado left its mark in many ways. Key shifts in Colorado’s government, structure, and 
the consequential responsibility that fell to the CIAC, were among the outcomes of this 
fire season. The Lower North Fork wild fire grew out of control on March 26, 2012, from 
embers in a prescribed burn by the Colorado State Forest Service. Three people were 
killed and nearly two dozen homes were destroyed.265 The governor proposed shifting all 
wildland fire fighting and emergency management functions under the Department of 
Public Safety. The CIAC resides within the Division of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management, both of which are housed within the Department of Public 
Safety.  
As the fire season progressed, the CIAC’s responsibilities shifted and evolved. 
The CIAC was relied upon to assign personnel to the state emergency operations center 
in a function beyond the law enforcement emergency support function (ESF) 13 function. 
The CIAC was responsible for creating and disseminating key updated information of fire 
status, resource allocation, damage, injuries, and fire prognostication. This function 
served as a precursor to an intelligence branch within the state EOC. While CIAC 
personnel were not fire fighters, they were well informed by firefighting personnel so that 
they could be accurate and timely with updates to state executive personnel.  
b. CIAC Evolution Continues 
In June 2012, a rural sheriff’s department located within the foothills near 
Colorado Springs was experiencing small but repetitive arson cases within a localized 
area within their jurisdiction. The environment was heavily forested but the fires were 
reported before they grew out of control. The CIAC was asked to assist in their 
investigation. Members of the analytical and leadership teams contacted members of the 
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sheriff’s department well versed in the cases. The CIAC analysts were briefed and then 
offered support based on potential analyses if provided the pertinent information. 
Ultimately, CIAC analysts produced geo-spatial mapping showing activity trends based 
on times of day, days of the week, and locations as associated with over 6,000 license 
plate reader entries. The product was given to the investigators who successfully 
followed up on the arson case. This case took the CIAC to a level of involvement with a 
client agency never reached before and demonstrated the possibility of overcoming 
typical trust issues between agencies or the concern for who would receive credit for a 
given outcome. The CIAC’s philosophy was simply to provide support, share results, and 
step away as the host agency conducted the necessary follow-up that resulted in positive 
outcomes.  
c. Aurora Theater Shooting 
Comment: at the time of this writing, a court order prohibits those involved in this 
case from disclosing pre-trial publicity. This account is limited to ancillary support to the 
Aurora Police Department from the CIAC describing information sharing support 
methods. It does not discuss any information of evidentiary value.  
On the early morning hours of Friday, July 20, 2012, I received a call that a mass 
casualty shooting had occurred at an Aurora theater. While in the midst of one of the 
worst fire seasons in Colorado’s history, and just after assisting in a number of them, the 
CIAC had adapted to providing an emergency management framework in delivering its 
services for information sharing. At approximately 2 am on July 20, the CIAC stood up a 
department operations center (DOC). Various CIAC analysts responded to the CIAC and 
were assigned to collect and analyze leads in coordination with the JTTF and APD.  
The CIAC maintained a 24-hour presence with Aurora PD, the JTTF, and other 
fusion centers across the country until Monday, July 23, which was a new relationship for 
the CIAC in that it actively coordinated types of data collection as requested, conducted 
analyses, produced intelligence products, or coordinated sharing between various entities. 
As an example, the CIAC assigned sergeants from the center to shadow Aurora Police 
Department operational sergeants to coordinate follow-up leads and assigned tasks on the 
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Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO). In this manner, all leads were accounted for, overlap 
between the agencies involved was avoided, and no gaps in essential tasks remained. 
Further, a key member of the terrorism liaison officer (TLO) program who represented a 
national association of shopping malls and theaters across the country assisted in the 
production of a national bulletin addressing situational awareness considerations and 
countermeasures as known at the time regarding the theater shooting. 
During the first few days, an intense level of inquires came from law enforcement 
and fusion centers from across the country. These inquiries were coordinated with the PD 
and the JTTF, but were also somewhat unwieldy for CIAC staff to handle given their 
mission of serving the needs of this particular event. Of note post-event, was the degree 
to which CIAC staff was requested to respond to a large number of repetitive situational 
awareness type questions from partner agencies, which distracted from their ability to 
concentrate on assignments, to analyze data, or produce intelligence products or bulletins.  
d.  Order Emerges from Chaos: The HSIN CONNECT Solution 
Something positive emerged from this tragic event combined with similar 
challenges in subsequent events, such as the Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, the Clackamas 
Mall in Oregon, and the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut. The national 
network of fusion centers produced a national situational awareness communication 
discussion board on the Homeland Security Information Sharing Network (HSIN). 
Residing on a secure portal, fusion center representatives are now able to post key 
information based on predictable requests for updates, connections to other parts of the 
country, or requests for information (RFIs) from the host fusion center during a critical 
event that has affected the country to reduce the need for responding to individual 
requests for information. In addition, each fusion center has adopted a sister fusion 
center, typically one located in close enough proximity that regional relationships exists, 
on which they rely for producing joint intelligence bulletins (JIBs). This adoption has 
proven to be very productive by creating a more effective and simplified way for fusion 
canters to coordinate information and activities during national level critical events. This 
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effort will continue to evolve to better coalesce physical support between fusion centers 
should it be necessary for them to share analysts during an event.  
e. Tom Cements Assassination 
As suggested by Bellavita, the national network of fusion centers represent an 
emerging pattern,266 one in which the center itself, the respective community it serves, 
and the national security enterprise endeavor to describe first, what its purpose is, second, 
how it is meeting that expectation, and third, what does it offer in the future given 
emerging trends in threats. Newly created fusion centers in the mid-2000s and since have 
struggled and continue to struggle with these criteria. Upon considering the Cynefin 
Framework, fusion centers are often residing in the unordered domains of complexity and 
chaos. Reflective of any discipline in the public safety, fusion centers are responders to 
events and creators of emergence, not responders in the sense of physically responding 
but in the sense of providing information sharing in response to an event. However, 
fusion centers are also creators in emergent ways in which information can be shared. 
The term information sharing can seem undervalued or clinical at times.  
The following case study illustrates how fully embracing emergent ways of 
thinking and acting can produce extraordinary results.  
On the evening of March 19, 2013, State of Colorado Department of Corrections 
Chief, Tom Clements, was shot and killed as he opened the door of his home. Two days 
prior, Nathan Leon, a Domino’s® Pizza delivery employee, was murdered. On March 21, 
2013, Evan Ebel was stopped by a Montague County Texas Sheriff’s Deputy wherein 
Ebel shot the deputy three times and fled. Ebel was killed in the ensuing vehicle pursuit 
and subsequent gunfight.  
For the succeeding 15 days, the CIAC was immersed in an exercise in leading the 
navigation of chaos, complexity, and stability. The homicides of Leon and Clements 
occurred in different jurisdictions, Denver, and El Paso County Colorado, respectively. 
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Clements was a member of the governor’s cabinet and his murder sent shock waves 
throughout the state system of government.  
The media began to speculate on the involvement of Homaidan al-Turki who was 
serving a 28-years-to-life prison term after being convicted of unlawful sexual contact by 
use of force, theft, and extortion based on a 2006 Aurora, Colorado case.267 The CIAC 
was directed by the governor’s office to produce a comprehensive threat assessment to 
determine if a broader threat existed, as well as any additional potential targets.  
The link between Leon, Clements, and Ebel began to emerge.268 To accomplish 
this task of conducting a comprehensive threat assessment required intimate knowledge 
of both homicide cases. To gain that kind of access into the most sensitive kind of police 
investigation without alienating the lead agencies would be daunting. Even Ebel had ties 
to the 211 Crew prison gang and it was crucial to learn more about the dynamics of this 
group, and what, if any ties existed to the other players known so far. To achieve this 
task, it was necessary that the CIAC fashion itself as the central clearinghouse for the 
various entities that would be able to provide expertise or investigative resources. 
Teams of investigators segmented into four groups focused on money flow, phone 
activity, 211 Crew, and al-Turki. With each advancing day, the CIAC fostered confidence 
in those who participated in the massive investigation without violating trust or giving the 
impression of imposing upon the lead agencies or other government agencies that 
assisted, which only happened due to the willingness of CIAC members to be open and 
receptive to advice from the agencies involved in the criminal aspect. The Colorado 
Bureau of Investigation took the lead criminal role for any charges that might result on 
the state level. The FBI, Colorado Department of Corrections, and many local agencies 
with gang investigators all played a key role in bringing this investigation to its fruition. 
In the end, 24 agencies and 60 investigators responded to the CIAC to contribute to the 
effort. Investigators, CBI, and CIAC analysts spent hundreds of man-hours poring over 
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volumes of material to produce what amounted to an exhaustive threat assessment that 
provided a clear picture of not only what occurred leading up to the murders but an 
overall ethnographic analysis of the 211 Crew prison gang. In this case, the CIAC and its 
staff readily adapted to the dynamics of complexity. While all stakeholders were 
committed to the commonly agreed upon goal of producing a comprehensive threat 
assessment and the required in depth understanding the facts, numerous interdependent 
agencies were involved. While each agency had its respective organizational structure, 
the combined and complex structures among the agencies was changeable due to the 
developments as the investigation progressed and the need for a given agency’s expertise. 
This introduction of overlapping hierarchies presented the dynamic of a complex 
adaptive system.269  
The outcome of this produced new relationships with many agencies, improved 
strained relationships with others, and placed the CIAC in a new, favorable light in the 
minds of those who participated. While this result may not have been as momentous at 
more mature fusion centers in the country—it was a victory for the CIAC. As is the 
challenge for all fusion centers, the CIAC struggles to provide value to its partner 
agencies. No opportunity can be lost in the fusion center world of pending chaos. As 
Keene has noted, one of the deep-rooted aspects of leadership has been the need to be in 
control and to predict and direct the nature of change. Moreover, a paradox exists 
wherein the very control we seek will come to pass regardless of our intervention, and 
yet, the act of controlling stifles innovation, and reduces or eliminates the breadth and 
depth of available options.270  
The CIAC’s leadership team knew intuitively from the outset that we needed to 
become the central point of coordination for the investigation, that we did not want to 
push too hard for agencies to come in and participate, and yet, create a sense of urgency 
so that key agencies would buy in to the goal and feel their participation would make a 
difference. Some agencies needed to see the progress before they joined. Each day, we 
                                                 
269 Uhl-Bien, Russ, and McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting Leadership from the 
Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” 298–318. 
270 Keene, “Complexity Theory: The Changing Role of Leadership,” 15–18. 
 121
concluded with a debrief from the four team leads in what had been learned and what was 
the next set of objectives to be learned or accomplished. At the conclusion, the next day’s 
objectives were determined, much like an operational period’s objectives in the incident 
command vernacular. We conducted two to three daily update secured telephone 
conference briefs for agency heads and state executives. This environment provided an 
opportunity for brainstorming and advice from experts. A very conscious effort was made 
to communicate incessantly with leaders not on site but who had assigned investigator or 
other resources. CIAC analysts assigned to write the assessment were apprised of the 
totality of progress several times per day of all investigative teams to ensure they had a 
holistic vision of the investigation, as well as a running narrative for the assessment. In 
retrospect, the discomfort of being in an ever-evolving and dynamic environment proved 
to provide powerful results. As leaders of the CIAC, we often bounced ideas off of each 
other certainly in the briefings but also as we passed in the hallway. Great ideas were 
born by engaging the followership, the people who knew these gangs well, or the subtle 
cultural dynamics involved. They were encouraged to follow the evidence but also to 
provide expert opinions, which sometimes lead to fruitful offshoots where a valuable 
investigative aspect would emerge.  
The threat assessment is not included in this thesis due to the sensitivity of the 
investigation.  
In the preceding sections, it has been demonstrated that the evolution of 
information sharing in the United States has shifted from a pre-9/11 relationship between 
the IC and SLTTP for which the IC has been predominantly focused on the Cold War 
concerns related to the former Soviet Union. The SLTTP by contrast was primarily 
focused on reducing crime and the fear of crime. Both produced supporting structures, 
procedures, laws, and policies to support their missions. Each segment (IC and SLTTP) 
of the current-day homeland security project was virtually unconscious of the other’s 
presence, and certainly, each other’s equities.  
Post-9/11 reform has forced a shift from the pre-9/11 relationship to one in which 
the two massive disciplines not only must become aware of each other but to form new 
relationships and resulting government structures to support the newly emerging 
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relationship. While innumerable strategies, policies, executive orders, laws, and guiding 
documents have called for improved collaboration across all segments of government, no 
central doctrine exists from which the information-sharing stakeholders, deemed critical 
to each other in post-9/11 lexicon, can use as a central guidance for information sharing 
while meeting the unique demands of local jurisdictions. The research has explored how 
leadership doctrine and complexity science interact and how they might play a role in the 
future of information sharing in the United States.  
In the following chapter, the information gleaned in this research is analyzed and 
synthesized. Options are raised to help meet the gaps that still exist and to augment the 
efforts in place or underway.  
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III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. LEADING AND COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SHIFTING 
THE MINDSET 
The term leadership means many things to many people who have their own 
image of what the word signifies. It is an intangible concept, and yet, if thought about, 
very tangible results either by the presence of leadership or by its absence ostensibly 
occur. The very contemplation of individuals’ leadership abilities implores people to look 
within themselves and ascertain what impact they have on the world. This thesis has 
provided an opportunity for introspection for the author and proposes the same for the 
reader. Based on the literature and autoethnographic analysis, it discusses the many faces 
of what today’s homeland security leader must consider to be effective in producing 
powerful outcomes in the contemporary global economy of emerging threats, evolving 
intergovernmental relationships, and unpredictable challenges. 
21st century leaders in all disciplines and industries are faced with uncommon 
levels of complexity, and leaders in homeland security are no exception. This time in 
history could well be construed as a renaissance period for those in the business of 
protecting this country because state and local first responders, national intelligence 
community members, and private security professionals, are feeling the push toward 
creating new, never-before-experienced relationships between jurisdictions, disciplines, 
and organizations in an effort to share information and better coordinate resources. These 
arising relationships, coupled with the emergence of new technology and the use of big 
data, has catapulted the world and those responsible to lead into the realm of identifying, 
assessing, and addressing problems while in the midst of discovering them; all the while 
being mindful of the pace at which technology offers solutions, as well as dangers in 
potentially abridged liberties. 
Today’s leaders are being challenged not only by everyday workplace issues but 
their very credibility rests in being able to navigate today’s environments. Kellerman has 
claimed that leaders across the globe represent the façade of leadership in the training 
industry over the past 40 years. Her criticism includes the irrefutable evidence of the 
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leadership failures both in business and government. She cites many examples that 
illustrate the dismal performance of some who previously were held out to be shining 
examples of effective leadership. She purports three central themes: first, the anecdotal 
failure of the leadership of the leadership industry, second, the lack of empirical evidence 
to show that leadership training is effective, and third, followers have been gaining 
momentum resulting in a phase shift between leader power and follower power. 
Her claims continue as she carefully stops short of impeaching every leadership 
guru or theory as being fraudulent. It is certain that failing to recognize the essential 
component in leadership, the follower, employee or subordinate, is to ensure a 
breakdown. Kellerman lays out a well constructed argument for ensuring followers are 
not left in the dust as they not only are essential for organizational outcomes but they 
increasingly wield enough power to, in the case of the Arab Spring, topple governments, 
or in a more routine sense, in the United States, embarrass or humiliate a boss, and 
perhaps, get that person fired.  
One of Kellerman’s conclusions is that due to the celebrated failures of leaders 
from government and business, it can be concluded that the leadership “industry” has 
therefore failed largely due to the lack of empirical evidence to support or show a link 
that training equals better leadership. However, would not the same lack of empirical 
evidence also demonstrate that no link exists at all whether good or bad? 
It may be that certain leaders simply were unethical, unwilling to adapt to 
emerging conditions or unaware of the speed at which complexity and chaos occurs. If 
such a conclusion can be drawn, it seems just as plausible that no direct link of the 
failures implicates the leadership industry. If not investigated further, the reader may be 
left with the impression that no one realizes the follower is truly the linchpin of any 
organization. As Kellerman claims, over 40 leadership theories and 1,500 leadership 
definitions exist. This thesis did not locate or explore all of these in the research but did 
produce evidence that other theories and authors have recognized the importance of the 
follower as far back as the 1990s. Others have explored complexity science in its 
relationship to leadership. 
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Kellerman poses the following question. Since the old justifications for leaders 
having power are no longer convincing, and followers are bolstered in their own 
capabilities, what then motivates a follower in the second decade of the 21st century to 
follow leaders? Only two, go along because they believe it is required, or because the 
followers want to. The former says Kellerman is more related to the workplace due to the 
fear individuals have of losing their jobs; the latter is more oriented to governance as a 
social contract based on the leader’s merit from the follower’s perspective.271  
It is the author’s view that in both examples, followers have the prerogative to 
follow or not (whether they realize it or not); however, both settings require that the 
leader provide, and the follower, in turn, acknowledge the leader’s merit for the leader to 
achieve credibility. 
The threat to Americans as known today lies somewhere between a post-9/11 
lexicon of hysteria steeped in an “‘existential threat’”272 based on this nation’s collective 
memory—and the disgruntled high school student who open fires on classmates or 
teachers. As noted by Bellavita, people are constantly confronted by the evolution 
between what is known, knowable, or intended as a homeland security strategy and what 
is emergent, or unpredictable;273 emergence being defined as “nonlinear suddenness that 
characterizes change in complex systems.”274 Hailes claims that by 2035, those he refers 
to as super empowered individuals will have access to technology and weapons that 
would truly pose an existential threat to nation-states. They will be virtually impossible to 
identify or isolate. While Mueller and Stewart raise concerns over how the United States 
may be exaggerating the danger it faces, questioning whether a truly existential threat 
exists (including the ultimate damage caused by the 9/11 attacks),275 Hailes proposes the 
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approaching possibility of such a threat reaching existential proportions. The challenge 
for the homeland security community including the military will be to leverage yet to be 
imagined technological systems to do so.276 Further, it will become increasingly 
important that SLTTP responders become aware of and equipped for reporting on or 
intervening in such activity, which will require resilient systems adept at meeting 
emerging information-sharing demands as new threats emerge.  
How does the homeland security leader adapt to these conditions in such a way as 
to provide meaningful leadership not only on the scene of an event but in the preceding 
period when planning, training and exercising would provide effective preparation? How 
does this nation balance the urge to think about the worse case scenario even though its 
eventuation is unlikely or improbable when compared to more common risks, such as 
slipping in the bathtub or being hurled through a windshield in an automobile accident as 
suggested by Mueller and Stewart?277 It may be necessary to be willing to replace belief 
systems regarding leadership, built to address predictable environments, with those that 
may be better served to address the budding circumstances in homeland security yet to be 
revealed.  
The Arbinger Institute, Margaret Wheatley, Krug and Oakley, Uhl-Bien et al., 
Marcus et al., Snowden and Boone, Conklin, and many others, have highlighted the 
importance of the leader/follower relationship to effective organizational performance. 
All also relate leadership to complexity science whether explicitly or otherwise. Some of 
the theses included in the research have tackled the thorny issue of leadership in 
homeland security. While all the literature produced in this research dealing with 
homeland security have approached the unique challenges of leadership in homeland 
security admirably, none has arrived at a panacea. One of the conclusions the author has 
reached is that all the literature had salient thoughts to be recognized, and many had 
recommendations that could revolutionize facets of homeland security. While these 
works have added to the literature as will this piece, at some point, action must be taken 
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to implement ideas resulting from the research, analysis, and synthesis of thought 
involved. 
Bell highlighted meta-leadership as a way to help coalesce multiple and disparate 
organizational cultures so that a common sense of purpose could be created that would 
strengthen the lacking cohesiveness in the DHS.278 Joyce explored complexity and 
leadership illuminating emerging thought for homeland security leaders. Advocating an 
almost fierce quality of introducing new ideas, being action-oriented and forward 
focused; Joyce welcomes the notion of embracing emergence in inclusive and 
enlightening ways through story telling and sensemaking.279 Uhl-Bien and her colleagues 
clearly deciphered elements of complexity science, organizational leadership, and feeling 
as though no theory or doctrine was addressing the gaps, and created Complexity 
Leadership Theory.280  
1. What Has Emerged as the Leadership Doctrine for Homeland 
Security? 
Notwithstanding Kellerman’s denunciation of the leadership industry, two distinct 
doctrines emerge as possessing qualities aimed at bringing out the best in followers while 
formally addressing the complexity of the 21st century, complexity leadership theory and 
meta-leadership. Combined they represent the strongest arguments for not only individual 
leadership skills for the 21st century but for acknowledging emerging organizational 
patterns. Homeland security information sharing is in a transformational stage; strong 
remnants of the Cold War Era are hanging on for life while emerging thought is 
recognizing the characteristics of a renaissance period, 1) new relationships forged out of 
the thrust for innovation, creativity, adaptability, and necessity, and 2) emerging 
technology at lightning speeds. 
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a. Complexity Leadership Theory 
Uhl-Bien et al. have claimed that everyone resides in the knowledge era, that the 
predominant leadership theories, doctrines, and frameworks at play today still service the 
top-down hierarchical, bureaucratic organizational structures. They urge the development 
of three types of leadership together referred to as complexity leadership theory, 
adoptive, enabling, and administrative. These types of leadership differ within an 
organization determined by where they occur. This theory is attractive as a model for 
homeland security in that it is custom-framed based on complex adaptive systems. It 
includes the nomenclature of complexity and challenges the shift in thinking from a top-
down bureaucratic oriented mindset to a more adaptive and receptive approach that 
recognizes complexity in the process. The beauty of this model is that it recognizes the 
reality of the bureaucratic organizational aspects of every organization and yet provides 
for a leadership buffer of enabling leadership between the bureaucracy and the adaptive 
properties of an organization, termed the administrative—adaptive interface.281 
b. Meta-Leadership Framework 
Introduced circa 2005, the authors couch the concept as a “newly identified 
practice and a freshly introduced concept…”282 The 10 core competencies of the meta-
leadership framework provide an inspiring paradigm for recognizing the need for 
multiple organizational cultures, jurisdictions, and disciplines to work in tandem not only 
for planning but during responses. In fact, since this piece was written, numerous 
incidents, natural and man-made, have occurred requiring multi-jurisdictional responses. 
To a large degree, much has improved; however, the silo worldview is very much alive 
whether at the federal or SLTTP level. The author has been intimately involved in the 
homeland security enterprise at the federal, state, and local level since 2007. The bulk of 
the interests and focus today is cooperating within these silos but not to challenge 
individual domains. 
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Much is centered in funding; state homeland security funding is still a competitive 
process whereby disciplines and jurisdictions compete for the grant dollar based on the 
DHS grant guidelines for that application year. In Colorado, for example, signs of 
improvement are appearing in the effort to regionalize grant requests based on a state-
level homeland security regional need. Assets are requested, funded, and deployed based 
on an overarching regional need with the resources, while maintained by a local 
jurisdiction, being available to any jurisdiction within the respective region. The 
Colorado Information Sharing Consortium (CISC) is another example in which aspects of 
meta-leadership emerged to address the gaps left by disparate records manage systems in 
law enforcement agencies across the state. Seven core partners agreed to fund nearly $2 
million enterprise software license collectively for a product that provided 
interconnectivity between partner agencies to share criminal justice data. The license was 
purchased with, at the time, yet to be identified future partners in mind. Today, over 100 
Colorado agencies participate in this consortium. Crimes that may have taken officers 
hours or days to solve are now being solved in minutes due to the instantaneous and mass 
access to partner agency criminal justice files. If not for the willingness of leaders to 
think and act beyond their traditional jurisdictional interests, this savings in time never 
would have happened. 
2. What Is to Be Learned from the National Strategic Narrative? 
If the reader accepts the invitation, the National Strategic Narrative summons 
leaders to explore the possibly of how the world can be starting with an internal shift 
within American collective mindset. 
Readers are reminded by the authors of the core principles and values upon which 
this country was predicated and how it is essential to shift from a worldview of 
containment to a sustainment perspective.283 The rift between the SLTTP and IC may 
replicate this situation. Does it follow that cooperating with each other internally will be 
seen as a weakness? It may be that pre-9/11, this nation did not have enough of an 
impetus to know that sharing should occur more effectively between SLTTP and the 
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federal services, and perhaps until the attacks, it was not really necessary. As wicked 
problems (complexity) demonstrate, being in the heart of a problem may not be realized 
until individuals are in the midst of it. Only those who have enough expertise truly 
recognize it for what it is. Now, in retrospect, the problem is known. Also, now that is 
known, is it necessary to still look at the silos of information sharing as containment? Is 
this nation willing to shift to a worldview of sustainment? 
What would happen if Americans collectively looked into the mirror? Porter and 
Mykleby have suggested that this nation is still wedged in the Cold War era mindset, 
which was based largely on a myopically American posture of power and control within 
the world.284 The research in this thesis validates the notion that, in the case of 
information sharing, Americans are stuck in the Cold War temperament. This kind of 
thinking views the world through the lens of a closed system; one in which America was 
responsible for managing its interests at home and abroad to achieve security and 
prosperity. Anything counter to that objective has been considered a threat to the United 
States to be managed or neutralized.285  
America has occupied a position as an anchor to the global economy since 1944. 
However, in the past 15 years, globalization has provided for the convergence of cultural, 
intellectual, and social aspects of peoples from all continents and walks of life.286 It could 
certainly be argued that Americans view many other countries, cultures, and peoples with 
a jaundiced eye as evidenced by the cultural rifts surrounding ethnic communities, and 
certainly, the Muslim society, as this nation grapples with its fear of other cultures. By 
contrast, U.S. foreign policy regarding Iraq post-9/11, as well as recent developments 
with intelligence intrusions of allied nations, to name a few examples, has raised the ire 
of the world. It is not a conducive global environment for security or prosperity.  
America’s relationship to the global economy has been one based on a zero sum 
game with only one winner and many losers. This relationship, the authors say, cannot be 
                                                 




sustained and America will lose its credibility. Some would say that has already occurred. 
This nation somehow has confused fair trade, open competition, collaboration, and 
interdependence with weakness.  
How can it be related to the U.S. internal struggle with sharing information 
among the many levels of government within this country? The author once heard the 
saying that if an orange is squeezed, orange juice comes out, not apple juice or pear juice. 
It does not matter in what context the orange is squeezed, it still produces orange juice 
because it is the internal basis upon which an orange is formed. As well, if the U.S. 
worldview toward the global community is as the authors say, it must first emanate from 
deep within. It is not necessary to look further than to see the dysfunction Kellerman 
discusses in leaders across the spectrum of business, as well as government to observe 
objectively that this nation is self absorbed and without direction. By extension, while 
numerous post-9/11 documents have called for a more coordinated information-sharing 
architecture across all levels of government, this country still suffers from remnants of 
pre-9/11 silo mentality. 
The narrative, as it will be called, implores the reader to embrace the notion that 
Americans have a huge stake, and as importantly, an influence on how the world is 
impacted. However, it must start at home. While this nation has improved many aspects 
of how information is shared at all levels of government, Americans sometimes replicate 
the arrogance displayed to the world in that they still operate within silos of containment. 
Is this country willing to challenge its way of thinking in terms of breaking down archaic 
business models in collecting and sharing information while redefining relationships 
between the SLTTP and federal government? Is it open to adapting models used by 
foreign partners, such as Great Britain? 
3. The Challenge for Leaders Right Now 
As the literature has suggested dating back to the 1990s, leadership doctrine 
steeped in industrial-age, linear, Newtonian precepts is ill equipped to deal with 
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complexity. Termed the Knowledge Era,287 this current period in history is enmeshed in 
social systems with interrelated agents and organizations. Leaders who view the world 
through the Newtonian perspective see fluctuations and disturbances as signs of trouble; 
their antidote is to exert control to replace what is perceived as something harmful.288  
While it has been shown that the United States has attempted to bridge the gaps 
identified by the 9/11 Commission, the research has also shown how problems exist in 
assimilating to new environments within the new cultures designed especially to bridge 
the 9/11 gaps. Nolan has demonstrated how fissures occur between agencies within the 
IC, which are amplified within the culture of the NCTC. The resistance the author and 
others have experienced from within the DHS, and other IC members while attempting to 
provide the feedback from the state and local perspective as designed in the ITACG, 
represents the difficulty some leaders have had in understanding emerging relationships 
within complex environments. 
While the homeland security leader of today is receiving encouraging news in that 
academia is recognizing the value of exploring aspects of leading in complexity and 
creating theories to support new thought, in the author’s professional experience, few 
practitioners are among those in academia. Attention must be drawn to connecting 
homeland security practitioners who know and understand complexity science to those 
who are actively leading in homeland security environments; much like the model at the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security. As an example, until recently, no universal 
training regime is available for law enforcement addressing a comprehensive behavioral 
science-based curriculum. Today, LPO is a nationally adopted curriculum based on a 
West Point model and is being delivered across the country by active officers who are 
practicing leaders in law enforcement organizations. 
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B. HOW DOES THE WICKED PROBLEM RELATE TO HOMELAND 
SECURITY? 
Does the homeland security project or enterprise represent a wicked problem? For 
this question to be answered effectively, at least an attempt must be made to define the 
homeland security project. What entities comprise this enterprise? In any post-9/11 
document regarding homeland security or information sharing, it would be recognized 
that commonly referenced responsible entities or partnerships include the federal law 
enforcement agencies (DOJ), federal IC, all agencies encompassed by the DHS, 
Congress, SLTTP first responders including police, fire, emergency management and 
public health professionals, and perhaps, state and local legislatures.  
Using the definition of a complex adaptive system versus a purely complicated 
system as outlined earlier in Chapter II, B, 2, no argument would be made that thousands 
of agencies at all levels of government are comprised within this enterprise. Next, if the 
whole homeland security project could be adequately defined based on the understanding 
of any one or two of the constituent components, a merely complicated system would 
result. If not, this country may be enmeshed in a complex adaptive system.289 Change in 
complex adaptive systems occurs in non-linear and unexpected paces, in which ideas and 
events seem to bump in to each other in unpredictable fashion; when this change occurs, 
it cannot be reversed.290  
When the United States was attacked on 9/11, the inertia emanating from the 
explosions felt across the planet served as the genesis of an emergent and nonlinear 
blistering pace of change not only in U.S. governmental structure and many other 
governments’ structures and approaches to terrorism, but in U.S. national identity as well. 
The fear from terrorism is amplified as compared to the fear of other threats because it 
emanates from human effort with deliberate purpose of hurting innocent people. This fear 
is usually associated with ethnic groups that then are vilified as evil both possibly prior to 
but unquestionably after the attacks. This fear has manifested across U.S. culture in a few 
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ways, some of which have affected the way in which law enforcement has conducted 
contacts with suspicious people. Some police departments, such as the New York Police 
Department (NYPD), have been criticized for conducting stop and frisk operations 
amounting to what critics believe to be racial profiling.291 Some Americans have 
overlooked the basic tenets upon which this country was built over two 200 years ago, as 
a sharp rise in hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims (or those thought to be Arabs or 
Muslims) occurred in the months following September 2001.292 While this new identity 
and structure continues to morph and evolve, it may be that it can never be reversed. 
To declare categorically that the United States has not advanced far enough or 
quickly enough may be more enigmatic than certain given the discussion so far in this 
thesis. As Americans, this nation jests about its insistence on immediate gratification but 
is not amused when things do not progress quickly enough. If this country is to take to 
heart the notion that wicked problems have unique characteristics, the 10 principles of a 
wicked problem could be revisited and compared to the progress of information sharing 
in homeland security. In the following review of these principles, as developed by Rittel 
and expounded upon by Conklin, providing an analysis may help in understanding the 
homeland security project as a complex problem, and in that light, the thinking applied, 
as well as the outcomes, produced. 
1. There Is No Definitive Formulation of a Wicked Problem 
Simply put, it is not possible to understand the problem fully until immersed in 
the problem and a solution has been applied. As the problem is engaged, it reveals further 
aspects of the problem, which then must be addressed, which sounds counterintuitive.293 
Since 9/11, the United States has been involved in massive change in how 
Americans think; what and who it is afraid of and how to protect against not only al-
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Qaida but enumerable other terrorist enemies and threats. Once people think they have 
figured out how to solve what is believed to be the problem, it morphs and this nation is 
then faced with what has emerged.  
Two notable and recent examples can be cited. The first is the case of the NSA, 
which instituted its data collection programs to aid in identifying foreign or U.S. persons 
who may be associated with known or suspected terrorists (KSTs). In a predictably 
unpredictable event, the program was exposed to the world through a leak resulting in a 
torrent of released information and far-reaching impacts, such as massive public outcry, 
calls for ceasing the programs, lawsuits, and a growing mistrust of the government, both 
within the United States and other countries. Technological advances in big data and 
other areas have raced forward; terrorists and national security programs have recognized 
this advancement, and both seek to leverage the advantages new technology offers. The 
U.S. government sought to improve its ability to identify KSTs in an obscure data pool. 
The issue was raised in 2006 with little or no public outcry. However, after a classified 
leak in 2012, the NSA’s program has come under intense scrutiny, which has spilled over 
into foreign relations with allied countries. In this case, the solution applied has now 
morphed and the NSA will be forced to be innovative in meeting the challenges of 
exposing KSTs while meeting the demands of the U.S. citizenry.  
Second, as of this writing, 13 years after the 9/11 attacks, Americans still fear 
Muslims but the problem has mutated from a fear of Islamic terrorists to Muslim 
neighbors. Recent unrest related to the suggested establishment of an Islamic Mosque 
near the 9/11 ground zero suggests the lingering resentment of Muslims years after the 
attacks. The NYPD instituted a stop and frisk program that has been criticized as a 
racially based opportunity to identify and unlawfully detain those thought to be of Middle 
Eastern descent. This issue may run deeper in American cultural history than being 
narrowly linked to the 9/11 attacks.  
In each of these cases, the problem may have appeared in such as way as to offer 
a prescribed solution, but after the solution was put into motion, the problem morphed 
and became another problem, which required another solution. It is not until interaction 
with the problem has begun and resolutions produced that the problem is comprehended. 
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For the information-sharing realm, much has been done to modify the way in 
which various levels of government communicate or share information. The SLTTP 
community has developed strong alliances with new and merging technologies that 
connect disparate criminal justice systems. Some visionary thinkers see the evolving 
trends in relationships between crime and terrorism, and the need to better coalesce the 
federal levels of government with SLTTP, but doubters still remain who distrust, and 
therefore, resist novel thinking.  
2. Wicked Problems Have No Stopping Rule 
Since no traditional definition for the problem is available, a definitive solution 
cannot logically be derived. The problem solving effort ends when resources, such as 
time, money and energy are diminished, rather than an end-game conclusion.294  
It could be said that the information sharing “problem” is a malleable problem, 
defined differently depending upon who is asked to describe it. As mentioned earlier, 
fragmentation also plays a role; those representing respective levels of government, 
disciplines, or agencies, will have distinct perceptions of the problem; they may not even 
be aware of certain aspects of the problem that others from different perspectives have.  
As an example, a fusion center director would say that fusion centers represent a 
model to be nurtured and matured, and which serves as the central clearinghouse for 
information important to its state-level constituency, as well as national security 
missions. Others would say fusion centers have mission-crept into JTTF mission space, 
and therefore, are redundant and wasteful. 
The author has worked in the IC and was exposed to how robust information 
sharing in America could be if certain aspects of the homeland security enterprise were 
coordinated better. While working at the National Counterterrorism Center, part of his 
job was to help educate members of the IC who had no awareness of what SLTTP first 
responders do or what resources they could provide to the IC’s mission. While many in 
the IC were enamored with the prospect of what would be possible if SLTTP and the IC 
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worked more closely, others either had no consciousness of SLTTP’s missions while 
others felt IC members and SLTTP first responders had no business interacting with each 
other, which is reminiscent of the Cold War mentality.  
When adding the complexity of how big data is being used and current concerns 
regarding the NSA’s information collection controversy, the diversity of the problem 
identification loses any constraints that can be imagined. As a result, any solution would 
be difficult at best to apply much less determine when or if the problem were to be 
solved.  
A touchstone concept for today’s homeland security official is privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties. Yet, no absolute is given in this regard. While attempting to 
place definitive, objective standards for such protections, this nation is reliant on 
Congress to enact laws that protect U.S. privacy while balancing the obligation of law 
enforcement and intelligence officials to create policy consistent with gaining the proper 
information that exposes criminals and terrorists, courts to interpret these laws so that 
emerging trends and conditions are addressed through case law, and finally, the 
practitioners who must operate within these confines. All these domains rely on 
subjectively determining if the problem is stopped or not, and if not, applying the next 
level of solution. This subjectivity, of course, is unending as evidenced by current public 
debates over government intrusion and security versus privacy. Constitutionalists would 
have to acknowledge that various amendments over U.S. history have been efforts at 
addressing the emerging cultural shifts and challenges to the original document and 
concepts.  
3. Solutions to Wicked Problems Are Not Right or Wrong 
Rather, they are “better,” “worse,” “good enough” or “not good enough.”295 In 
the homeland security information-sharing context, certain aspects, such a privacy (P), 
civil rights (CR), and civil liberties (CL), P and CRCL are essential elements, and 
therefore, “better” or “good enough,” would not be well received as good enough. 
However, if this topic is analyzed further, it becomes evident that as much as Americans 
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strive for excellence in objective standards in this area, it is still relegated to subjective 
evaluation by reviewing authorities, such as the “gang of six” in the IC who represents 
aspects of legal principal, CRCL standards, and peer review or privacy officers in fusion 
centers. Standards by which these reviewing authorities use as a reference will shift and 
change due to case law precedent, social contexts, and legislation. Consequently, “better” 
or “good enough” appears in a different context.  
Law enforcement officials would cringe at the prospect of telling members of 
their community that the efforts made were good enough. Although it might be said that 
everyone did as well as possible. The point is that when faced with emerging or pattern 
crime trends, people are largely reacting only after the crime or patterns are committed or 
exposed. Individuals sometimes are faster at identifying the patterns to the point that the 
offenders can be identified before they cause more harm, but the pattern must still be 
allowed to develop to a sufficient degree that it is possible to identify it and intervene. 
This scenario applies to not only the identity of the criminal but also the legal standard of 
probable cause necessary for an arrest to be made.  
The information-sharing context might appear similarly if the objective is to share 
that which others will find essential or useful to take action. The colloquial term applied 
over time has been to produce “timely and actionable” intelligence. Still, Americans are 
reactionary to the emerging patterns of crime or terrorism. Until these patterns emerge, 
they do not know what to share or who to share it with or why. To be predictive in 
policing or counterterrorism is the desired goal, and anything less may have to be good 
enough. The post-9/11 recognition that SLTTP represents 3 million practitioners, who 
patrol America’s streets, and are more likely to discover and intervene in a terrorist plot, 
has been written about ad nauseam. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention 
Act, as well as the 9/11 Recommendations Act, have called for reform and spawned 
numerous guiding documents addressing the need for more and better coordination 
between the federal and SLTTP information-sharing domains. Yet, as the world evolves 
into a more globalized society, and technology advances, information sharing is 
improved; whether it is good enough is subject to interpretation.  
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4. No Immediate or Ultimate Test of a Solution to a Wicked Problem Is 
Available 
Recalling that as the problem is understood and solutions applied, the problem 
shifts and changes into yet another problem. It makes sense then that it would be 
unreasonable to expect to know whether the solution has an immediate or ultimate effect. 
This viewpoint brings into perspective the notion that a given approach might simply be 
“better.” As mentioned in the law enforcement context, it is difficult to accept “better” or 
“good enough;” however, given the nature of crime and criminal trends, it begins to 
resonate. Pattern crimes emerge with a single offender or a group of criminals, and when 
they are arrested, their particular regime is stopped. However, in society, another criminal 
trend will fill the void, and it will be slightly different in how it emerges. 
If systems theory is applied to this scenario, it is then understood that information 
sharing within the social network context represents a scale-free network, one in which 
no immediate or directly noticeable impact would occur when one node or aspect of the 
network is affected. A similar analysis could be applied to community policing. If a tactic 
or response to a problem is applied, it may be never be clear, or a delay may result in 
knowing what the outcome is.  
For example, if an intelligence bulletin released after the arrest of Najubullah Zazi 
warning local law enforcement of the potential of hydrogen peroxide and acetone used as 
precursors for triacetone triperoxide (TATP)—the same kind of explosive used in the 7/7 
attacks in London and attempted by shoe bomber Richard Reid—extra vigilance by 
beauty supply shop owners may be apparent and discourage a would-be terrorist or lone 
offender from attempting to obtain such materials. It would be a measureable outcome if 
an attempted attack were thwarted but it would not be possible to know if an attack were 
discouraged prior to the attacker taking overt action.  
Similarly, community oriented policing encourages officers to perform crime 
prevention through environmental design, or CPTED, a diagnosis of environmental 
aspects that attract criminal behavior. In this example, officers would consult with a local 
7–Eleven storeowner to help them reconfigure storefront advertisements to allow for easy 
visibility from a passing patrol car into the store to discourage robberies. If a certain 
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robbery rate existed prior to the redesign, an objective measurement for outcome would 
be the reduction in robbery rates. However, it is not possible to know whatsoever if a 
robber were to arrive at the 7-Eleven and be dissuaded from robbing the clerk due to the 
higher probability of being detected.  
5. Every Solution to a Wicked Problem Is a One-Shot Operation; 
Because No Opportunity Exists to Learn by Trial and Error, Every 
Attempt Counts Significantly 
In each case, a relationship exists between the solution and outcome, but the result 
may be impossible or difficult to detect. Finally, the determination of whether the 
solution is effective is only observable by those familiar with the problem space.296  
Herein lies the task; in the homeland security world, many solutions are 
expensive, tied to new policy, legislation, or subject to intense public scrutiny, and every 
attempt at a novel solution has consequences.297 Balancing these factors against the 
realities of emergence in information sharing and other aspects of homeland security is 
and will continue to put leaders in the industry on notice to resolve these issues. As is 
being discovered in this thesis, leadership theory does recognize these dynamics but still 
struggles to provide stability. It is evident through this analysis that due to the 
inexhaustible numbers of agencies, levels of government and disparate missions, a 
commensurate number of solutions are being implemented to address the vortex created 
by the gaps in information sharing.  
In 2007, seven core partner agencies in Colorado embraced the notion that a 
combined effort to research, purchase, and install a software platform bridging these 
disparate systems would be ground breaking in crime reduction. The product known as 
COPLINK became the focus for a solution. COPLINK was known for its ability to 
connect separate law enforcement records management systems seamlessly so that 
detectives can obtain a key piece of information in an afternoon instead of weeks of 
research. As a result, the CISC was born. The formation of such a consortium may be 
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unique in and of itself, but when adding the fact that the partners agreed to contribute 
nearly $2 million combined not only to license the core partner agencies but to provide 
licensing for future and as yet unidentified partner agencies, was beyond doubt, quite 
visionary. While sustainability is a high priority especially when investing as these 
agencies have, the realization that newer and more disruptive technology looms at very 
turn makes these kinds of efforts look impressive and imposing at the same time. 
Impressive, because of the risks and expenditure; imposing because the next best thing 
may require the next one-time shot. 
At the national level, as Bellavita observes, fusion centers have become an 
emerging pattern.298 In other words, they act and adapt given the situation that appears, 
or some other external stimulus, such as criticism. A given solution may be well received 
until a piece of information is missed or improperly disseminated, or the fusion center is 
perceived as having encroached on another discipline’s or agency’s mission as indicated 
in the Coburn Report.299 The expectations of the fusion center changes the solution 
worked in that period of time or perhaps it did not. If effective feedback is received, it 
may help to reassess and apply another approach getting closer to the expectation, and 
yet, if the expectation continues to morph, the one-time shot becomes archaic. Recent 
reports by the Senate and House illustrate how an analysis of the same group of fusion 
centers within a year of each other provides two diametrically opposing views. 
Notwithstanding the partisan aspects of these reports, one provides the recognition of the 
importance of fusion centers with constructive criticism, and the other takes the view that 
fusion centers are severely flawed in their methodology and performance. The following 
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Two Federal Assessments Found Fusion Centers Lack Basic 
Counterterrorism Capabilities…Reporting from Fusion Centers was Often 
Flawed, Unrelated to Terrorism…Terrorism-Related Reporting was Often 
Outdated, Duplicative, and Uninformative…300 
A top down, wholly Federal approach simply does not and cannot suffice. 
Fully integrating State and local law enforcement and emergency response 
providers as National mission partners requires a grassroots intelligence 
and analytic capability. Stakeholders rely upon fusion centers to provide 
that capability…301 
To apply solutions to meet such opposing expectations places an interesting 
burden on those in leadership positions responsible for such outcomes. The orientation 
the leader has to the problem provides a given context in which to frame it, which begins 
the process of creativity and resilience.302 
6. Wicked Problems Have No Given Alternative Solutions 
A number of viable solutions to a given problem from which to choose may or 
may not be available; the leader must create solutions that appear feasible, and discern 
through judgment, which are best. Conklin urges against spending too much time in 
trying to determine whether the problem is a wicked problem, rather than the wickedness 
of it.303 Recall that the dynamic of the relationship of cause and effect in complexity or 
wicked problems is that the cause and effect between problem and solution is not known 
until being immersed in the problem or until emerging and looking retrospectively at it. 
In homeland security, this proposes daunting challenges. These kinds of problems are 
based in social contexts as opposed to a math problem or chess move, both of which have 
finite options.  
                                                 
300 Coburn and Levine, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs. 
301 Peter T. King and Michael T. McCaul, Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion 
Centers (Washington, DC: United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 
2013). 
302 Uhl-Bien, Russ, and McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting Leadership from the 
Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” 298–318. 
303 Conklin, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems. 
 143
In 2002, during the contemplative process of creating the DHS, former director of 
central intelligence George Tenet testified before the Government Affairs Subcommittee 
that while the United States had an intelligence community and a law enforcement 
function, “we don’t have a cohesive body responsible for homeland security.”304 He 
committed that the newly created DHS would not simply duplicate the capabilities of the 
IC and law enforcement; rather, it would create a unified department to assess, map, and 
take action against threats. A further pledge was made that the IC/CIA would not simply 
change but expand its mission and treat the DHS not only as a customer but also as a 
partner. This statement would later prove to be prophetic in what would become a 
sticking point between the DHS and the IC.305 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the DHS. One of the first 
measures was to create the Directorate of Intelligence, Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP), which became the 16th member of the IC. This body, authorized by 
Congress, was charged with a full spectrum of intelligence/analytical functions aimed 
chiefly at domestic counterterrorism.306 Once formed, the DHS faced formidable 
challenges in executing its mission. 
 A lack of respect within the IC. Early complaints from those inside the 
IAIP was that they were ill equipped, understaffed, disorganized, and 
unprepared for the challenging bureaucratic environment involving other 
governmental agencies. 
 Congressional restriction of DHS’s ability to receive raw intelligence. 
Consistent with the lack of respect, the DHS was initially considered the 
“B” team within the IC. Congress felt that rather than IAIP receiving raw 
intelligence, it would be relegated to the review of finished product 
created by the FBI or CIA to determine what relevance would result for 
SLTP agencies.  
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 Confusion and competition between the functions of the DHS’s 
congressionally mandated IAIP and the non-DHS Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) designed a year later.307 
Blum claims that the DHS has overcome these limitations. The IRTPA, enacted in 
2004, called for further restructure of the IC by establishing the ODNI and the NCTC, 
which replaced the TTIC.308 
Secretary Chertoff, based on a 2005 WMD Report, as well as other input, called 
for an internal DHS study, which resulted in a number of measures improving efficiency 
and effectiveness. An example was the creation of the Office of I&A, which replaced the 
embroiled IAIP. I&A reports directly to the secretary; its mission is to run the IC 
component of the DHS and to ensure intelligence from a multitude of sources is 
effectively collected, analyzed, and disseminated to relevant consumers within the 
homeland. Then, intelligence chief Charles Allen testified that the DHS was building an 
intelligence agency from scratch, and that while it had faced enumerable obstacles, it had 
achieved standards commonly recognized by the IC. Blum concluded, “DHS has made 
obvious and substantial progress since its inception in 2002.”309 Put forward as two of 
many key DHS information-sharing initiatives, Blum highlighted state and local fusion 
centers and the ITACG as having vast potential.310 
Born of the 9/11 [Commission] [A]ct, state and local fusion centers are state-level 
owned facilities that bring together multiple jurisdictions and disciplines effectively to 
share information regarding terrorism, crime, and other hazards. The Bush and Obama 
Administrations, Secretary Napolitano and the National Strategy for Information Sharing 
have supported these centers and touted them as critical components to information 
sharing. However, since their inception in 2006, they have come under fire from state and 
local officials for missing the mark in terms of effective information sharing, citing when 
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information is shared with the DHS, it does not necessarily result in adequate reporting 
back to the customers.311 
In an effort to address this situation, fusion centers developed baseline capabilities 
for all fusion centers to provide consistent treatment of collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of important information. In addition, Napolitano emphasized the use of 
technology to improve information sharing. The introduction of the Homeland Security 
Data Network (HSDN), a classified information-sharing network, was extended to  
29 fusion centers by 2009. Finally, Napolitano encouraged fusion centers to broaden their 
contribution to state and locals by including all crimes and other hazards to better serve 
their partners.  
The former ITACG, and current JCAT, also in existence due to the 9/11 
[Commission] [A]ct, are programs housed at the NCTC in Washington, DC, designed to 
embed state and local police, fire and public health officials, in the IC for one year. The 
purpose is to provide a two-way educational environment between IC members and the 
broader SLTP community. In addition, ITACG members help to shape intelligence 
product content and format to meet the needs of the state and local audience.312  
The ITACG had a rough start when it appeared that the DHS I&A was not 
supporting the initiative. During the early stages of the implementation, key partners, 
such as the FBI, NCTC and the ISE, signed an essential memorandum MOU, then waited 
two additional months for I&A to sign it. I&A reportedly controlled what information 
would be disseminated to state and locals without the input of ITACG detailees. This 
restriction troubled Intelligence Subcommittee Chair Jane Harman, who, with the support 
of other members of Congress, authored a letter to then I&A intelligence chief Charlie 
Allen, firmly directing him to “… get the ITACG done right and get it done right 
now….”313 Allen finally implemented measures to support fully sustaining those who 
traveled to Washington, DC, to participate in the program, as well as to broaden the 
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disciplines invited to participate in the ITACG to include the fire service, as well as 
public health.314 
Blum cites comments by Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber in Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence who say that while organizational restructuring and technology will be 
effective to a degree, strong leadership and protection of civil rights and liberties will 
provide a strategic advantage for the United States. In his 2005 testimony, Lee H. 
Hamilton, former vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, stated that while laws and 
technology may be effective, individuals and institutions must be willing to shift the 
culture for effective information sharing to occur. A 2009 report by the Markle 
Foundation called for the reaffirmation of the President and Congress in making 
information sharing more of a priority among policy makers; indicating information 
sharing is considered unfinished business.315 
Secretary Napolitano committed to making fusion centers and information sharing 
a high priority. In 2009, she promised to create a Joint Fusion Center Management Office 
(JFC-PMO) within I&A.316 Blum concludes with the sentiment that while the DHS has 
had its share of struggles since its creation, it has overcome much criticism of its 
initiatives, and information sharing is one of its highest priorities. DHS and its faithful 
workers should not be underrated.  
For example, the challenges of how the DHS was not afforded respect within the 
IC, the reluctance to share raw intelligence even though statutorily they were authorized 
to perform as an IC agency, and the competitive, confusing relationship between the 
TTIC and IAIP, all result from an unwillingness to allow for or effectively manage 
change. Blum’s observation of DHS I&A’s subversive mindset is somewhat accurate, 
and still exists, to some extent, today. 
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This historical perspective helps to illustrate the solutions applied to perceived 
problems, assessing effectiveness, re-attempting solutions, and reassessing. Today, the 
DHS still struggles with its credibility within the IC but it continues to probe and try new 
solutions. What is missing is continuity in leadership. While new thinkers in leadership 
may surface and implement innovation (to the degree the federal government’s culture 
withstands), they are soon whisked off to another assignment or leave to join the private 
sector.  
7. Every Wicked Problem Is Essentially Unique 
Rittel distinguishes between the trivial similarities in the traditional sense between 
one problem and another and “essentially unique” properties.317 In traditional problems, 
distinct properties may be identified between any two problems. In the wicked problem, a 
long list of similarities may exist between one problem and the next, but an overriding 
characteristic sets them apart. 
In tame problems that may be classified as similar enough, a prescribed technique 
or framework may work for all problems deemed to have such similarity or continuity of 
properties. In this case, a chess game may be analogous to a tame problem in that it has a 
finite set of rules for every situation that could occur.  
To illustrate the wickedness of an information-sharing problem, in 2009, the 
Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC), Missouri’s fusion center, produced and 
distributed an eight-page document aimed at bringing awareness to an extremist element 
of the militia movement. The bulletin was considered constricted to law enforcement 
personnel but its dissemination went beyond the law enforcement community (by a law 
enforcement member) to those who found it very concerning.  
Entitled “The Modern Militia Movement,” the document linked presidential 
candidates and associated bumper stickers to the militia movement and domestic 
terrorism. While the document may have had a noble agenda to communicate potential 
threats to law enforcement personnel, it may have encroached upon the civil rights and 
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civil liberties of law-abiding citizens. The report was misinterpreted claimed the State of 
Missouri. A Missouri State Highway Patrol Lt. and MIAC representative argued the 
source of the data used to create the bulletin was from widely accessible information 
indicating patterns regarding militias.318 “All this is an educational thing,” [the Lt.] said 
of the report. “Troopers have been shot by members of groups, so it’s our job to let law 
enforcement officers know what the trends are in the modern militia movement.”319 
Three key issues emerged from this experience. First, the MIAC put into motion a 
solution to the problem that seemed well defined, that of ensuring it disseminated key 
officer safety information to law enforcement officers. Second, opponents claimed the 
government was unfairly (some would say illegally) categorizing differing political views 
as those indicating domestic terrorism tendencies. The MIAC may have overlooked the 
potential impact of its document as it prioritized the need to distribute what was viewed 
as key officer safety intelligence. Third, setting aside for the moment the controversy 
over the content, the MIAC learned that simply trusting recipients may not be adequate 
for security of sensitive information and that sending sensitive documents in a mass email 
distribution method (no matter how secure it seems) might not be the best approach for 
dissemination of sensitive material. Other considerations, such as posting such a 
document to a secure web portal, may become a preferred technique in the future. In this 
fashion, clients who have been vetted and have signed non-disclosure agreements may 
attain the documentation; thereby, reducing the possibility of an unintentional disclosure. 
All solutions considered are based on the problem as it emerges and none will be 
predictably successful.  
While this case study may exemplify what would now be considered an obvious 
misstep by the MIAC, the seemingly urgent sense of obligation to send out officer safety 
information may have obfuscated well-meaning fusion center personnel from considering 
the overarching constitutional implications. Their problem morphed as they attempted to 
deliver what they believed were the expectations by recipients. Other fusion center 
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directors and personnel are well informed of this incident and while it may provide 
similarities to the next problem for the next fusion center, it will also stand alone and be 
essentially unique in its properties due to the uniqueness of the social context in Missouri 
at that time, with that context, and that group of actors.  
8. Every Wicked Problem Can Be Considered To Be a Symptom of 
Another Problem 
The nature of a problem can be described as the discrepancy between the current 
state and the desired state of affairs. To solve the problem, the root cause must be 
discovered. If the cause is removed, it reveals an underlying problem from which the 
original problem is derived. The original problem could also be viewed as a symptom of 
the originally detected problem. The criticisms of information sharing in American 
homeland security today could be a symptom of poor system interoperability, silo 
mentality, apathy, mistrust, fragmentation between levels of government, jurisdictional 
conflicts; the list could go on. The degree to which the problem can be identified and 
addressed is determined by the “self-confidence of the [one who is assessing] and cannot 
be decided on logical grounds.”320 Further, an interesting dichotomy occurs; the higher 
the problem is formulated, the broader, more general, and more difficult, it becomes. 
Conversely, if the problem is attacked at too low a level and incremental methods are 
relied upon, the solution will be ineffective, “marginal improvement does not guarantee 
overall improvement.”321 
As an example, the national network of fusion centers is at the time of this 
writing, creating a national strategy for the network. Many have called for such a strategy 
or even a national doctrine in the past. This new development could be attributed to 
timing and acceptance given the voices of the past, which may have been heard but not 
embraced. It could be credited to the recommendation of the Majority Staff Report on the 
National Network of Fusion Centers.322 However, it could also be related to the fact that 
other problems have been segmented over time from the larger issue of “no national 
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fusion center strategy.” These problems have been addressed incrementally, and the 
larger or higher problem is now more visible, and therefore, more attractive as something, 
which will provide more stability in the complex domain of a lack of continuity or 
common mission, vision, or values.  
9. The Existence of Discrepancy in Describing a Wicked Problem Can 
Be Explained in Numerous Ways. The Choice of Explanation 
Determines the Nature of the Problem’s Resolution 
The idea parallels Krug, Oakley, Barrett and Fry’s precepts that the quality of an 
inquiry will determine the quality of the outcome produced. Shifting the focus toward the 
solvability of a problem, while in the midst of the problem unfolding, presents a broader 
range of choices from which the potential best choice can be made.323  
“Crime in the streets can be explained by not enough police, too many criminals, 
by inadequate laws… cultural deprivation, deficient opportunity, too many guns…”324 
Which of these is correct and how would a strategy be built for overcoming crime in the 
streets? It would depend upon the causal factor determined to be at the root of the 
problem. As a wicked problem, the choice is distinct from a scientific model in that when 
conflicting evidence exists, science would call for the following resolution: crime in the 
streets (C) is caused by too many guns (G) (assuming this hypothesis is accurate); 
applying a measure to reduce guns should have an impact on crime in the streets resulting 
in (I). If (I) does not occur, (G) is refuted as a valid hypothesis per the scientific 
approach.325  
Wicked problem interaction allows for more permissive explanations: it can be 
stated that with (I), other forces intervened or that the appearance of (I) not occurring is 
inaccurate. Due to the essential uniqueness of the problem, and the lack of opportunity 
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for rigorous experimentation, the choices in wicked problems become arbitrary based on 
the leader’s best intentions and available actions.326  
10. The Planner Has No Right to Be Wrong 
It is a principal of science that solutions to problems are only hypotheses 
offered for refutation. 
–Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”  
In traditional or tame problem solving, hypotheses are not proven; rather, they are 
refuted repeatedly until corroboration or credible quality to them exists. Wicked 
problems, because they are based in social context, come with a criticality, as 
consequences to people and their qualities of life occur. Therefore, for homeland security 
leaders, solving such problems brings with it a dichotomy; to ensure the best choice is 
made in an unclear situation until they are well immersed in the problem. In addition, 
since the homeland security leaders best informed in the problem set are the best suited 
for assessing the parameters of the problem, they have very limited resource pool from 
which to draw upon for collaboration, support, concurrence, or validation.  
This approach can take a deceptive turn as well. For example, being so focused on 
creating the appearance of safety that a security theater is produced whether due to 
deliberate innovation or to stabilize a chaotic (threatening) environment, can be deceiving 
and expensive. By reviewing some post-9/11 measures, such as airport security, or 
building target hardening, a better set of questions that could be posed may be the 
following. Is this nation willing to recognize that it responded to the attacks of 9/11 in 
such a way as to recover from the event but also to protect, in the best way possible for 
the time, from future attacks? In addition, is this country willing to diagnose and fully 
assess the systems put into place throughout the past 10 years with an (honest) eye 
toward being safe, more cost effective, and efficient? 
Mueller and Stewart not only ask the questions but offer plausible responses 
backed with statistical and acute if cynical observations about how this nation as a culture 
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pay more attention (and money) to virtual non-existent threats than the $360 billion spent 
on homeland security since 2001; with no apparent established rate of return by the DHS 
according to the Congressional Research Service.327 
The authors, however, are careful not to marginalize the terrible losses Americans 
have faced not only with 9/11 but other attacks. The precarious obligation they have 
taken on acknowledging the source of U.S. collective fears while offering the data that 
can free Americans to concentrate on more productive and sensible safety measures is 
admirable.  
Their work puts forth the notion that this nation has invested more in a perpetual 
hysterical mindset around terrorism, born out of 9/11 attacks, and carried through by 
government officials’ carefully chosen phrases, such as “existential” risks or threats, 
“critical infrastructure” and “key resources.”328 As the authors adeptly illustrate point 
after point, when the risk is assessed, whether past documented atrocities or the potential 
for future attacks, the prospective worse case does not support an “significant existential 
[struggle]” to this country.329  
In addition, some of the most “critical” of “infrastructures” if destroyed would not 
stop Americans from traveling, attending events, or entering business or government 
buildings.330 The numbers simply do not prove out what the rhetoric seems to suggest. 
As an example, the authors analyze the seemingly more popular aspects of terrorism to 
fear, such as al-Qaeda in general, atomic terrorism, other WMD, and airline safety. They 
are effective in countering the baseless but powerfully fear-centered beliefs that this 
nation is in grave danger. By illustrating more Americans die each year in bathtubs (320) 
than in the world from non-war zone Muslim extremists (200 to 300) since 2001, it offers 
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the reader an opportunity to focus on those things that may actually have an impact on 
“an individual’s life.”331 
As summarized by Jeffery Rosen, “We have come to believe that life is risk-free 
and that, if something bad happens, there must be a governmental official to blame.”332 
This country has many critics in of many things not the least of which is the U.S. 
government. In the final analysis, perhaps it is possible to consider ways, after careful 
research, to re-purpose money to life-saving measures supported by careful evaluation. 
As an example, if a small percentage of the $10 billion spent on airline security was 
diverted for items, such as seat belts, bicycle helmets, front airbags, tornado shelters, and 
smoke alarms, the authors say more lives would be saved at a fraction of the cost.333 
These examples serve as reminders of the legitimacy of the wickedness of the 
homeland security project. In each case, leaders have recognized the problem or a 
problem and employed one or more solutions. The willingness to act or address what is 
perceived to be the problem is apparent. The desire to provide continuity to the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations is also apparent.  
However, as systems, environments, and new relationships between the federal 
government and state, local, and tribal agencies become more complex and more 
integrated, the likelihood that the players representing these organizations will understand 
each other’s equities becomes weakened. Today, the stakeholders have only begun to 
understand the value each offers the other. While clear signals of what is to come are 
available, in terms of how the IC and SLTTP will interact in the future, it is still viewed 
by many (on both sides) as something to be avoided or ignored. 
In retrospect, as suggested in the complex domain of the Cynefin Framework, the 
events of 9/11 serve not only as this nation’s awakening to what is conceivable in terms 
of the threats that possibly be faced, it illustrates the very ideas discussed in this thesis; 
met with an overwhelming menace, and an uncertain future of what the danger 
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represented, the United States moved from the domain of what was known or knowable 
to an unordered realm. Suddenly, this country was attacked in a way that most could not 
have imagined. In fact, the 9/11 Commission specifically commented on this nation’s 
inability to anticipate such a threat for lack of imagination.334 Today, it is struggling with 
applying a methodology and thinking appropriate for preemptively identifying threats not 
yet conceived.  
C. ABOUT INFORMATION SHARING 
The homeland security project has existed since the attacks of 9/11. Changes in 
American government after the attacks represent the most complex and significant since 
the creation of the DOD in 1947. Much of the homeland security project has been 
focused on streamlining information and intelligence sharing at all levels of government, 
as well as with the private sector.335  
Advances in information sharing have occurred within the federal IC. For 
example, the IRTPA of 2004 created the, DNI, which superseded the DCI as the chief 
intelligence community official. The DNI is now the principal intelligence advisor to the 
president and NSC. Formerly, the focus of the IC has been on foreign and domestic 
intelligence as distinct realms. The DCI’s responsibility centered on foreign intelligence. 
The IRTPA generated two shifts. First, it altered the definition of intelligence to that of 
national intelligence with subsets of foreign, domestic, and homeland security. Second, it 
has broadened the DNI’s responsibility beyond that of the DCI’s, particularly in the 
domestic realm. While the DCI represented a specific agency, the CIA, the DNI does not. 
Thus, the DNI is not only in a position to have access to all intelligence but to ensure 
intelligence is shared appropriately across all IC agencies. The position is also 
responsible for safeguarding intelligence sources and methods. The main thrust of the act 
was aimed at improving intelligence sharing between IC agencies, particularly within the 
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foreign-domestic intelligence rift.336 The research has shown that this rift is not unique to 
the differences between the IC and SLTTP.  
The most recent progress report of the 9/11 Recommendations highlights efforts 
summarized as having made … “America stronger and more resilient as a result…”337 
However, the 9/11 Commission states, “As presently configured, the national security 
institutions of the U.S. are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War.”338 The 
theme that the American IC has not graduated from the archaic constructs of the Cold 
War era pervades throughout the literature. Yet, while it has been discussed in numerous 
government documents, books, articles, and theses since the release of the 9/11 
Commission Report, it lingers in 2014 as a chronic topic associated with the dysfunction 
of true intelligence reform. In spite of this seemingly limiting aspect, it may be useful to 
consider what has been delivered consistent with and supporting the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations and then observe what remains to be done. 
As the literature has demonstrated, deep cultural divides exist within the 
subcultures of the IC. Nolan described her first-hand experience working within the 
NCTC. Beginning with the difficulty of a new analyst learning the internal IC lexicon, 
she describes this special language as having unique qualities for each IC agency and yet 
a separate and distinct vocabulary for the NCTC. Most NCTC analysts are not full-time 
NCTC cadre; rather, they are detailees from respective IC agencies for short durations. 
This tenuous environment she says does not support establishing social or professional 
networks from which to build stability, as just when analysts start to gain confidence in 
their knowledge, everything changes, which creates a dissonance between the expectation 
of being perfect and the reality of the chaotic environment.339 
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The rapid-fire environment would provide unique challenges for those in 
leadership positions as well. While Nolan uses the term chaos, it is known that chaos as 
defined in the Cynefin Framework means either innovation through deliberate means or 
an accidental entry into chaos, which requires immediate stability or failure, will 
ensue.340 As Keene noted the degrees of complexity in today’s work environment place 
such demands and expectations, they may outstrip an individual’s capacity.341 It would 
behoove leaders to understand the dynamics of complexity leadership theory as defined 
by Uhl-Bien et al., and to know the principles of administrative, enabling and adaptive 
leadership thus enabling them to provide an environment that would support high 
performance in the complex NCTC environment.342  
To exacerbate the problem, the author writes of the social and professional caste 
system within the IC, which is amplified within the NCTC. The CIA is deemed a “greedy 
institution,” one in which exclusivity and undivided loyalty are demanded of a member of 
the organization.343 
While the NCTC houses most of the participating agency databases they generally 
are not compatible says Nolan. The term “stove piping” was alluded to regarding pre-
9/11 databases both at the federal, as well as the state and local levels of government, and 
has been one of the key focuses of post-9/11 reform. Analysts detailed to the NCTC for a 
little as one year could wait for weeks or months to regain access to their own system.344 
In the author’s experience, access to the classified system, common work environment 
(CWE), took six weeks, and the unclassified, agency information network (AIN), much 
longer at three months. This delay did not cripple his ability to perform as it would have 
an analyst, as he was not under the same pressures to produce intelligence products. One 
analyst interviewed by Nolan believed the lack of interoperability to be by design as a 
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compartmentalized feature, citing the billions of dollars it took to build the systems to be 
impenetrable; to make them interoperable would defeat the purpose.345  
Nolan’s research seems to validate what has been acknowledged at least 
anecdotally, that a paradox exists in that too much information is available for analysts to 
deal with effectively, and yet, it is difficult to obtain the right access to the right 
information. The process of sorting and indexing information delays an analyst’s ability 
to access it even though they are expected to perform at a rapid pace.346  
Nolan describes a few coping mechanism for IC analysts based on the rigors of 
their pressure-filled environment. One such coping strategy termed emotion work, 
describes how analysts manage their feelings to display a public face or bodily 
expression. She notes that two of the highest compliments that can be paid to IC analysts 
are to call them “a machine” or “made of Teflon.”347 As a law enforcement officer, the 
author has had to be an extrovert in social situations especially those in which social 
disorder exists that needs to be stabilized, which is called having a command presence or 
command bearing when needed. Those in law enforcement, who were detailed to the 
ITACG, may have witnessed indicators of emotion work among IC analysts. For 
example, when riding in the elevator to the appointed vault (secured environment), they 
would deliberately try to engage analysts by saying good morning. This engagement 
often would startle the analysts who were staring at their shoes, and the common joke 
was that most analysts were noticeably introverted, and then came to the conclusion that 
extroverted analysts would have to be those who stared at someone else’s shoes. While a 
humorous anecdote, a more solemn message emerges in that it illustrates the constricted 
environment resulting from Conklin’s notion of the fragmented context from which each 
of these disciplines is operating.348  
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Carabin noted in 2011 that barriers existed to effective information sharing from 
the IC to the SLTTP. He acknowledged that fusion center leaders and the IC leadership 
had yet to accomplish a cooperative relationship that would streamline the process.349 As 
of this writing, while more frequent and robust conversations occur around this issue, this 
relationship has not improved to any significant degree. The fragmentation between the 
IC and SLTTP discussed earlier remains entrenched. In the author’s experience while 
serving in the ITACG, most IC analysts he came in contact with had no consciousness of 
what state, local, or tribal first responders do or the implication of SLTTP resources for 
an IC analyst. Others were antagonistic not only toward other analysts of different 
agencies within the IC, as described by Nolan, but toward state and local first responders. 
An unmistakable undercurrent occurred among some in the IC that information sharing 
was over blown and simply represented the buzzword of the day; Nolan’s ethnographic 
dissertation analyzing NCTC’s culture validates this undercurrent.350 
Moreover, Carabin discussed the skepticism on whether the ITACG was 
sufficiently supported, as well as whether it competed with DHS Office of I&A. Would 
ITACG be able to deliver on its mission to improve information sharing between the IC 
and SLTTP given its limited size?351 No question exists that the ITACG was always 
limited in size, as it was funded for a maximum of 10 state, local, or tribal first 
responders. Its mission to enhance information-sharing aspects had to be scaled for 
obvious reasons, but the broader consideration is perhaps not the amount of information 
impacted based on the size of the unit, therefore, the volume of product; rather, the 
impact on the context in which the relationships between the two are viewed. Recall that 
the fragmentation between the SLTTP and IC is a historical gap defined by the Cold War 
era. Part of ITACG’s mission was to use the newly acquired perspective of the IC from a 
SLTTP perspective’s lens and create national initiatives designed to bridge, if only in 
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small ways, those abundant gaps present between the SLTTP and IC. A more notable 
example of one of these initiatives would be a national training curriculum created to 
address jail radicalization in cities and counties across the country, which was a 
cooperative effort between the ITACG, the NCTC, the DHS and the National Joint 
Terrorism Task Force.  
What is more, he comments on the difficulty of achieving effective outcomes 
based on the constraints of the formal leadership construct within the ITACG.352 The 
author experienced this difficulty as well. The ITACG was led by a DHS director and 
FBI deputy director neither of whom had law enforcement, fire, or public health 
experience, nor did they come from a state, local, or tribal background. While good 
intentions are important, the vast differences in the cultures required then and requires 
now SLTTP representation in a leadership role, otherwise “…the [JCAT] presents its self 
as a ‘feel-good’ organization that allows state and locals the ability to interact with 
federal information, but does not necessarily provide the organization the appropriate 
means for true collaboration on solutions that advocate for state and local interest….”353 
No concerted effort has been made to integrate former ITACG members into 
positions within the information-sharing enterprise.354 This situation is still accurate; 
ITACG members were processed for a year, achieved clearances, interacted within the IC 
for another year, and then sent home upon completion of the detail with no plan for 
assimilating the useful and unique skills and abilities developed while at the NCTC. 
Hundreds of thousands of dollars are spent on this process and detail. If the objective is to 
bridge the IC vs. SLTTP gap(s), to continue to leverage expertise gained while at the 
ITACG and now JCAT, a missed opportunity occurs to leverage this effort fully. A 
number of former detailees are peppered across the nation who could be involved in 
JTTFs, JRIGs, or fusion centers in an effort to maintain the skills used while at the 
ITACG to include maintaining clearances and reviewing classified traffic to advocate for 
                                                 
352 Carabin, “An Intelligence-Sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. 
Counterterrorism Efforts,” 36. 
353 Ibid., 96. 
354 Ibid., 103. 
 160
downgrades to be integrated in joint intelligence bulletins for regional implications. 
During the author’s tenure at the ITACG, an effort was made to create such a program for 
former fellows whereby some level of interaction between the active members and 
former members was to be the objective. While tacit support existed at some levels 
within the ITACG hierarchy, its support ultimately waned with no goal champion other 
than ITACG members to advocate for such a program. This situation may serve as 
evidence of the fragmented perspective as discussed by Conklin and the resulting ill-
perceived importance of such initiatives depending upon an individual’s view of the 
concept.355 
Today, an improved understanding and appreciation for the bottom-up 
intelligence collection architecture has occurred predominantly among elements within 
the SLTTP, which is utilizing state, local, and tribal first responders better. As will be 
discussed later, the British special branch construct offers such an advantage. Moreover, 
relying on former detailees could be exploited to help augment such an effort. 
Carabin further suggested the involvement of former detailees in the advisory 
council.356 The author agrees; this council was an integral part of the ITACG, and by 
law, provided representation of one-half IC entities and one-half state, local, and tribal 
organizations for an equitable split. The ITACG advisory council met quarterly at the 
NCTC where it was briefed on ITACG activity and progress. Former ITACG members 
would be a wealth of knowledge to advise council members or maintain continuity for 
projects that may have passed on from member to member, which risked the loss of 
momentum or continuity. 
ITACG members began their application process with a telephone interview. Key 
exploratory questions were asked to gain insight as to the prospective member’s fitness 
for the fellowship. Consistent with the prior recommendations, prospective detail 
members already has the support of their chief executive officer but they should also have 
a cogent idea of how to leverage the members once they return to their home state.  
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Today, the ITACG has been defunded and the JCAT exists to achieve the same 
mission in similar ways. The JCAT is housed within the NCTC as was the ITACG, but it 
is funded by the NCTC and its hierarchy rests within the NCTC’s organizational structure 
under the DOS. While at the ITACG, the author and others called for the restructuring of 
the leadership to help bring continuity to the overall mission of the then ITACG and now 
JCAT. This gap that remains in the leadership structure dilutes the effectiveness of 
SLTTP detailees; the JCAT director is a NCTC lead analyst while the DHS and FBI hold 
deputy director status. With no contextual foundation for state, local, or tribal equities, it 
is unreasonable to expect an IC member to understand, much less actively support, 
reform within their environment that may challenge status quo thinking. In addition, 
given the research based on Nolan’s dissertation, as well as this author’s professional 
experience, some elements within the NCTC work to undermine each other; it would, 
therefore, be difficult to rely on them to advocate for state, local, or tribal interests as 
expected for these fellowships by Congress.357  
Should Cops be Spies? In his thesis, the preceding question as posed by Gomez, 
as a notion, sidesteps the reality that state, local and tribal law enforcement patrols 
America’s streets. Therefore, it is an exponentially greater possibility that an agency at 
this level will intervene intentionally or inadvertently in a terrorist plot being conducted 
within this country. It also neglects the current and unquestionable emergence of the 
interconnectedness of traditional and transnational crime to terrorism.  
Gomez asserts that ILP, as well as the NSI, are ill equipped to serve as models for 
intelligence collecting for the SLTTP level. His argument for disqualifying ILP is 
centered in the following quote. 
In regards to the status quo, Intelligence-Led Policing is ineffective 
primarily due to police executives failing to understand the purpose and 
limitations of Intelligence-Led Policing as a tool for the collection of 
classified national security intelligence. Little empirical evidence in the 
literature or within the law enforcement community suggests Intelligence-
Led Policing is an effective policy model for the collection of classified 
national security intelligence. This is partly the result of the desire by the 
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United States Intelligence Community to engage in ‘analysis driven 
collection,’ by which is meant intelligence collection priorities “should 
reflect the intelligence needs of those crafting the analysis.358 
While the author does agree with pieces of this quote, it has flaws. Gomez’s 
position perpetuates the confusion beyond the state and local level to the federal level as 
well. Police executives do not fully understand the concept of ILP, which he would 
submit goes to the effort of educating such executives as to the value the model holds 
rather than the efficacy of the model itself.  
What is sure, however, is that ILP and the NSI emanate from the same precepts as 
problem oriented policing, a robust relationship between the police and community.359 
One of the key aspects of ILP is the introduction of the intelligence cycle to the crime 
reduction effort. Carter acknowledges that no universally understood or agreed upon 
definition exists for ILP but offers the following.  
The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions 
that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product 
intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats 
and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.360 
The NSI may also be viewed as a natural extension of problem oriented policing 
in that it educates citizenry in suspicious behavior, but more importantly, encourages and 
offers ways in which they can report suspicious behavior, which follows the notion 
consistent with community oriented policing and problem oriented policing that the 
police cannot be everywhere or see everything. Community members are required to be 
active in securing their own neighborhoods by reporting suspicious behavior and building 
relationships with the police. The information reported is vetted by fusion center, law 
enforcement or, JTTF personnel and entered into a central database. While imperfections 
do occur within the system, it offers a conceptual foundation from which intelligence 
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from the bottom level can be coalesced with intelligence from federal law enforcement or 
the IC providing a more holistic threat picture. 
Further classified national security intelligence emanating from domestic sources 
is likely first derived from what may otherwise be construed as innocuous information 
until it is collected, analyzed, and determined to be of value—then classified. From an 
organic perspective, assuming state, local, and tribal law enforcement fully understand 
and utilize both ILP and the NSI, information is information and not intelligence until it 
is given value, which only occurs after analysis; post collection. Given the intelligence 
cycle, it is agreed that priorities have been identified, some of which will be defined as 
national security-related. Using ILP or the NSI would simply provide more tools from the 
tool belt of the enterprise as a whole. Therefore, to presuppose that these models are 
inherently useless undermines the holistic approach of a coalesced information-sharing 
architecture, which in this author’s view, is emerging.  
Gomez does recommend adopting the British Special Branch format by creating a 
National Police Intelligence Corps. In addition, he recommends the creation of what he 
terms a national strategy to be created by the DHS I&A to formalize what he limits to 
national security intelligence. The term National Police Intelligence Corps as used by 
Gomez may raise eyebrows suggesting a collapse of the distinctions of states rights and 
federal domain as defined in the 10th Amendment, but the concept is attractive. The 
author also agrees with the recommended introduction of a central national information 
sharing guidance or doctrine.  
He disagrees with Gomez that ILP is ill equipped to serve as a model for the next 
generation of intelligence reform in the United States as he has argued previously. He 
does agree with adopting a form of the Special Branch construct based on the much-
needed bottom-up part of the intelligence architecture currently missing in the U.S. 
system.  
Evolution in the homeland security project post-9/11 is based on emerging 
patterns; it could be stated that advancement is driven by timing and by technology. For 
example, the NSA surveillance programs currently in the spotlight due to recent leaks 
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were discussed in 2006 with much less public fervor than today.361 Today’s concerns 
about big data may account for the difference. The timing for a national intelligence 
manager at the cabinet level was not supportive when the 9/11 commission contemplated 
that such a position be created. Perhaps, the timing of today’s interest in information 
sharing would support such a change.  
D. IS THIS NATION NOW READY FOR A SECRETARY OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE? 
In Chapter II.C.2., the author acknowledged the levels of reform the United States 
has accomplished regarding the post-9/11 fear of future threats and posed the question of 
whether this country would be willing to continue the necessary changes without the 
imminent fear of being threatened. While the question remains, the following sections 
may provide a more enlightened context. 
In a recent panel discussion at the Bipartisan Policy Center in December 2013, 
Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, posed this very question. In 
his comments, he added the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations had to be watered 
down so that they would become more palatable for Congress if they were to approve this 
bill, which already had the makings of sweeping reform. Zelikow credited President Bush 
with championing the passage of the bill with the narrowest of political margins. It had 
been crafted by the 9/11 Commission and brought to the fore but it was Bush’s White 
House that massaged it into a form that would be accepted.  
Zelikow and his commission wrestled with which model of national intelligence 
to offer as a recommendation. The following were among the choices. Three primary 
models, some of which include historic arguments, surfaced by the end of the Eisenhower 
administration, 1) create (or resume) a defense driven mission with intelligence missions 
on the side including the CIA and other IC agencies, which was the model pre-9/11, and 
2) form a CIA Langley-centered central intelligence model. In other words, the CIA 
would run domestic intelligence including having purview over the FBI. This scenario 
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would have been met with heavy resistance and never would have survived. Some 
discussion occurred over a model wherein the CIA would have responsibility for all 
intelligence collection but in the domestic realm. In this model, the CIA would have 
authority over the military. Substantial opposition would be brought bear for this scenario 
as well. 3) Create a national coordinating model giving it significant powers but not to the 
degree of a cabinet level member. The director of national intelligence, a concept 
discussed as early as President Nixon’s administration by Jim Schlesinger, was the model 
the commission chose to bring forward. 
Zelikow highlighted the fact that these discussions exposed what he characterized 
as a “vulcanized environment of pre-9/11.” The commission’s principal focus was on the 
need to have a “pretty damn good” connection between foreign and domestic 
intelligence; namely, a pure CIA model would not work. They agreed to bring forward 
option 3. While they considered a cabinet level intelligence manager who would oversee 
The Department of Intelligence, for example, it was viewed as not “have[ing] [a] snow 
ball’s chance in hell.”362  
Given the challenges of implementing the 9/11 recommendations, very few would 
say this nation should roll the clock back and operate like it did pre-9/11. These major 
types of changes in established systems, gigantic enterprises, such as the IC, that were 
decisively formed between 1940 and 1960, are still primarily the institutions of that era. 
Massive reform, such as what American has been involved in, tends to occur in an 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary way and the question at this juncture is whether 
this country is now ready for the next step in evolution. Does the energy, or the will exist 
to go forward with the further step, the more ambitious design, the Secretary of 
Intelligence?363 
While a better understanding and acceptance of change dynamics within 
American information-sharing and leadership realms seems to exist, the rapid and ever-
changing national political environment places a tentative quality on any initiative 
                                                 




requiring bipartisan agreement much less significant action. The 9/11 Commission and its 
recommendations were enacted on the heels of a national security crisis. All of today’s 
intelligence efforts are top-down and driven by federal agencies. While these agencies, 
primarily the FBI, interact with SLTTP, no formal construct leverages SLTT information 
from the officers on the beat. Herein lies the best opportunity due to inherent 
relationships the police have with the community, to create awareness, as well as a formal 
structure between the SLTTP and IC.  
The preceding sections have demonstrated the pre- and post-9/11 worldviews of 
the IC and SLTTP, the associated evolution of the two disciplines toward better levels of 
information sharing, and the paradoxical resistance toward such collaboration created in 
the process. They have discussed how interrelated leadership and complexity science are 
in today’s government environment and the author’s first hand experience as it relates to 
these emerging environments. Thus, remaining is the question of how to overcome the 
inefficiencies created since 9/11? 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Is there a will to create?—Infusing bottom-up model of intelligence 
collection aspects of the British system; create national doctrine to help 
shape state strategy 
In the following section, the author recommends adopting portions of the British 
system to create an intelligence collection architecture that leverages the SLTTP. He also 
recommends a central guiding information-sharing doctrine from which states can create 
strategies to support the doctrine and remain autonomous to fulfill their responsibilities. 
Moreover, he recommends a national leadership curriculum focused on leading initiatives 
and leveraging complexity science. Understanding the British form of government is 
sufficiently dissimilar to the American form of government as to prevent the 
configuration of the having the Special Branch officers reporting to the MI5 or Security 
Service. Much of the literature dating back to just after 9/11 suggests implementing an 
MI5-like agency with no arrest powers, as well as replacing the FBI as the domestic 
intelligence agency. 
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The MI5 is a civilian agency given authority by Britain’s home secretary. Its 
central responsibility is protecting Britain’s national security against terrorism, 
espionage, the proliferation of WMD, and attacks aimed at crippling the national 
economy. It has been effective at subverting and diminishing foreign saboteurs. In 1992, 
responsibility for leading the intelligence effort against Irish republican terrorism on the 
British mainland was transferred to it from Scotland Yard and other law-enforcement 
agencies to the MI5.364 However, the collection for intelligence is still focused on the 
officers who know their respective community best, the Special Branch officer.  
This thesis recommends adopting the Special Branch portion of Britain’s system 
but rather than replacing the FBI with a MI5 type-agency based on the argument that 
criminal and terrorism investigations should have separated information-sharing systems, 
reporting to different agencies. Rather, due to the relationship of crime and terrorism, the 
collection points should rest with officers and intelligence sources closest to the activity.  
Intelligence is the cornerstone of counterterrorism, the U.S. approach to 
intelligence collection is largely top-down. What is missing is a bottom-up process 
derived from where first responders operate daily. This recommendation addresses the 
need for stronger interaction between the IC and SLTTP community using a proven 
formula demonstrated by the U.K.’s special branch officer deployment within local 
police forces. It will also recommend ways to improve coordination and information from 
the local to the federal level effectively to define the current and future desired state 
within the federal IC and SLTTP communities, and provides effective solutions to 
achieve results. The challenge is to create a more cohesive relationship given the 
dichotomy between the two environments within the American system using aspects of 
the successful British model. 
1. Reintroducing a New Idea 
The events of 9/11 exposed severe limitations in how information was shared 
between federal IC agencies and within state and local first responder agencies. Due to 
recommended stages of reform, numerous American initiatives have since improved 
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information sharing at the various levels of government but they have underutilized the 
vital relationships between disciplines within the IC and SLTTP first responder 
community. Since the relationship between these entities is underdeveloped, a 
considerable rift is present, which left unaddressed, will further exacerbate the ability of 
the United States to identify and interdict terror plots within the United States. 
State and local first responders are neither sufficiently aware of specific terrorism 
trends, tactics and techniques, nor prepared to link or report activity upward to ensure 
effective intervention. The American system is currently a top-down system driven by 
archaic pre-9/11 relationships between the IC and SLTTP community. This current 
configuration is ineffective. Key indicators of terrorist plots, if conducted within the 
United States, could be effectively detected and thwarted if local officers were properly 
educated and connected to national and international counterterrorism mechanisms.  
The British system includes special branch (counterterrorism) officers selected 
from within the local ranks of each police force within Britain. These officers are 
specially trained, cleared, briefed, and held accountable to ensure effective information 
sharing between the local police and the British Security Service (MI5). In turn, this 
practice makes certain that suspicious activity discovered at the local level is immediately 
shared and integrated into a national big-picture perspective if it exists. It also 
decentralizes assets should an investigation expand across Britain, which adds the 
dynamic of bottom-up intelligence that is essential to the national counterterrorism effort. 
While differences exist between the British and American government structures, key 
components of the British intelligence architecture could be adapted to fit the U.S. 
national security enterprise. 
2. British vs. American Police 
The American local law enforcement community has been relatively disconnected 
from national security or the IC until post-9/11 reform emerged. By contrast, the local 
British police services have been used to collect counterterrorism intelligence since the 
late 1800s. Due to the threat of violence from the Irish Republican Army, the 
metropolitan special branch was created. These officers are specially trained in 
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counterterrorism, provided appropriate clearances, and are responsible for ensuring 
bottom-up reporting of suspicious terrorist activity. By contrast, the United States has 
18,000 law enforcement agencies, and approximately 800,000 law enforcement officers. 
No central focus or coordinated effort at this level exists to educate, provide security 
clearances for, brief, or rely on local officers for terrorism tips or leads. While the NSI 
exists, it is not currently streamlined or easily accessed for analysis to convey intelligence 
from the local level.  
Most fusion centers across the country have TLO programs. TLOs represent 
SLTTP agencies, as well as private organizations, are trained at an awareness level for 
counterterrorism and routinely briefed by their respective fusion centers. TLOs are 
expected to collect and submit suspicious activity information to their fusion center based 
on their training and briefing. While this configuration provides for a potential basis for 
bottom-up reporting, it lacks consistency in its focus, application, and effectiveness 
across the national network of fusion centers.  
3. The U.S. National Intelligence System 
While positive steps have been taken in improving American information-sharing 
efforts post-9/11, no substantial consciousness exists in the American culture among 
national intelligence agencies acknowledging the benefit of creating strong ties between 
the IC and SLTTP communities as occurs in Britain. The United States has 17 national 
intelligence agencies, all of which compete with one another for funding, notoriety, and 
mission space. No national doctrine is used by these agencies as a common operating 
platform with the SLTTP community. To consider coordinating information between 
national and local level agencies, a central guiding doctrine is essential. Further, the 
United States has no equivalent to a central counterterrorism command or national 
coordinator of terrorism investigations as exists in Britain. Instead, the United States has 
a top-down model that derives intelligence from foreign counterterrorism and counter 
intelligence sources. If information is developed that impacts local U.S. jurisdictions, 
personalities rather than common operating doctrine drive whether and to what degree the 
information is shared either with other national intelligence, or state and locals agencies. 
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The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency in charge of U.S. terrorism 
investigations. Twelve FBI special agents in charge (SACs) of the 56 field offices are 
geographically designated as Domestic Director of National Intelligence Representatives 
(DOMDNIs). In their current capacities, they are to coordinate IC interaction (including 
the NCTC) within their geographical areas of responsibility (AoR).  
Using the Boston bombing as an example, it was apparent that federal intelligence 
agencies had information indicating one of the Tsarnaev brothers had shown signs of 
adhering to increased Islamist extremism and had been radicalized to violence over a 
number of years. In early 2011, Russia informed U.S. officials of Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s 
perceived radical behavior in Chechnya. In the subsequent investigation, Tsarnaev’s 
uncle revealed that Tamerlan became radicalized in Cambridge, MA, rather than 
Chechnya. Evidence exists that may validate this assertion as Tamerlan displayed 
outbursts in a Cambridge mosque in late 2012 and early 2013 expressing an extremist 
Islamist worldview.365 While the FBI was aware of the concerns for Tamerlan’s 
behavior, Cambridge police appear not to have been.  
Decisions must be made to ascertain the level of threat once intelligence is 
received and this case was no different. Those in the JTTF who assessed the information 
and drew the conclusion that Tamerlan Tsarnaev posed no imminent threat did so based 
on identifiable criteria that supported the decision. However, is that where it should stop? 
These cases, in this nation’s current introspective atmosphere, call for an informed degree 
of speculation. Had the Cambridge, MA, Police Department been part of a prescribed 
information-sharing architecture, including local Special Branch officers, and afforded 
the information known to the JTTF, perhaps it would have been able to learn of the 
developments involving Tamerlan Tsarnaev after having been confronted at the mosque. 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev was reportedly entered into the Terrorist Identities Datamart 
Environment (TIDE) and added to the KST watch list based on two reports from the 
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Russians. However, Tsarnaev was able to travel to Chechnya from the United States 
undetected; the Cambridge, MA, police appear not to have been informed.366 
4. The Problem to Be Tackled  
This thesis is an autoenthnographic study that explores some ineffective practices 
of American information-sharing and intelligence in a post-9/11 world. The study has 
combined personal experiences of the author with a methodological framework that 
leverages complexity science, social planning (wicked problems), and leadership doctrine 
to discover improved coordination at the scale of the federal IC and SLTTP first 
responder level with the objective of closing the gap between the two. 
5.  The Challenge of Innovation 
As Snowden and Boone suggest, innovation is a deliberate attempt at creativity 
resulting in chaos until stability is restored.367 To suggest a central guiding doctrine and 
introduction of a British-style Special Branch Officer architecture within the current 
configuration of the American homeland security project is a difficult transformation to 
imagine, much less implement, as substantive changes involving the relationship between 
the federal IC and state and local first responders require a disruptive-thinking approach 
to the relationship between the two environs. To accomplish this scenario, homeland 
security leaders must challenge entrenched policies and philosophies, which can only be 
accomplished by understanding complexity, as well as how to navigate and lead new 
initiatives in a complex adaptive environment. The importance of the endlessly shifting 
and evolving dynamic of the threat to Americans, and the relationship between crime and 
terrorism, continues to intensify requiring an increased coordination between the IC and 
SLTTP. An essential consideration for those who will lead the future of the U.S. 
domestic intelligence approach is the acute realization of how intelligence is perceived as 
becoming more intrusive in American lives. Leaders must view the emerging trends not 
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as a predictor of the future but an indicator of how complex and rapid the homeland 
security information-sharing environment shifts. Recent revelations based on 
unauthorized disclosures of classified material and resulting global backlash serves as 
ample evidence of how this nation’s seemingly stable systems can be disrupted in short 
order. Americans look at the IC with a jaundice eye and the federal government as a 
whole with disdain. To bring forward a salient argument for coalescing aspects of both 
state and local and federal government under a central guiding information-sharing 
doctrine presents daunting challenges. 
6. Current State of Affairs 
Changes in American government post-9/11 represent the most complex and 
significant since the creation of the DOD in 1947. Much of the homeland security project 
has been focused on streamlining information and intelligence sharing at all levels of 
government, as well as with the private sector.368  
Advances in information sharing have occurred within the federal IC since the 
implementation of the IRTPA of 2004. The IRTPA created the DNI, which superseded 
the DCI as the chief intelligence community official and the principal intelligence advisor 
to the president and NSC. The main thrust of the act was aimed at improving intelligence 
sharing between IC agencies particularly within the foreign-domestic intelligence rift.369 
The IRTPA generated two shifts. First, it altered the definition of intelligence to that of 
national intelligence with subsets of foreign, domestic and homeland security. Second, it 
broadened the DNI’s responsibility beyond that of the DCI’s, particularly in the domestic 
realm. While the DCI specifically represented the CIA, the DNI represents all 17 
agencies comprising the IC. Thus, the DNI is not only in a position to have access to all 
intelligence but to ensure intelligence is shared appropriately across all IC agencies, 
while safeguarding intelligence sources and methods.  
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Similarly, SLTTP information-sharing innovations have revolutionized how 
information is shared and crimes are solved. As an example, state and local law 
enforcement has endeavored to simplify and improve efforts in information sharing to 
better address crime trends through cross-jurisdictional and multi-discipline information 
sharing through the creation of such entities as the CIE initiative—a groundbreaking 
initiative that proposes a whole of government intelligence-cycle-driven approach 
emphasizing valuable analysis utilizing a formal and quality driven collection process.370 
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI)—formalized by 
the ODNI and PM-ISE—in theory has potential for evolving into a national program to 
share terrorism-related SAR data at all levels of government, but in its current state, 
struggles to provide comprehensive data or analytical capabilities.371  
7. Limitations Have Lingered 
Considering the advances, state and local first responders are neither sufficiently 
aware of specific terrorism trends, tactics and techniques, nor are they prepared to link 
activity to disparate information or report activity to ensure effective intervention. The 
American information-sharing architecture is currently a top-down system driven by 
archaic pre-9/11 relationships between the IC and SLTTP community, which is an 
ineffective configuration. Key indicators of terrorist plots, if conducted within the United 
States, could be effectively detected and thwarted if local officers were properly educated 
and connected to national and international counterterrorism mechanisms. 
To illustrate, the blurring distinction (as described by Director Clapper)372 
between crime at the state and local level and terrorism is a compelling reason for 
interdisciplinary collaboration. The growing number of incidents resulting in disrupted 
terror plots exposed at the local policing level was highlighted in a Major City Chiefs’ 
Association white paper. Of note, 22 percent of 68 thwarted terror plots (15 incidents 
from 1999 to 2009) were discovered by state and local law enforcement agencies. 
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Further, 50 percent of these cases required some form of state or local preliminary 
investigation before being forwarded to federal law enforcement. Finally, in 18 percent of 
these cases, initial detection of the plots came from traditional police interaction in a non-
terrorism scenario.373 An effective relationship between the IC and SLTTP communities 
becomes critical when the likelihood of conventional crime/terrorism correlation is 
understood.  
While the IC and SLTTP have focused on streamlining information sharing in 
their respective spheres, the need for a reinforced relationship and collaborative efforts 
between the IC and SLTTP remains. By considering that approximately 2 million-law 
enforcement and fire first responders at the state and local level provide services inside 
American homes every day, it is easy to imagine the importance of ensuring they are 
aware of TTPs.  
Additionally, in a recent poll of section chiefs from the intelligence units of major 
American metropolitan police departments, counterterrorism intelligence collection and 
analysis is a shared function between local and federal governments. Analytical and 
collection skills were interchangeable when compared to traditional police work and 
counterterrorism. Survey participants expressed concern about the training and skill level 
of SLT analysts. Twenty-six out of 42 respondents indicated that increased analytical 
capability was either their first or second most important area of needed improvement 
within their department.374 Despite these compelling examples, a large chasm exists 
between the local police in America and the national intelligence agencies. Creating a 
formal information-sharing structure between the two would streamline the process, and 
ensure timeliness, accuracy, and operational coordination among all agencies involved. 
While positive steps have been taken in improving American information-sharing 
efforts post-9/11, no substantial consciousness in the American culture among national 
intelligence agencies acknowledges the benefit of creating stronger ties between the IC 
and SLTTP communities as in Britain. For example, the United States has 17 national 
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intelligence agencies, all of which compete with one another for funding, notoriety, and 
mission space. With no single national doctrine used by these agencies as a common 
operating platform with the SLTTP community, nor a common doctrine under which the 
SLTTP operates, the top-down model of foreign counterterrorism and counter 
intelligence sources is ineffective at best without a bottom-up piece to complement it. 
Personalities rather than common operating doctrine determines whether and to what 
degree information impacting local U.S. jurisdictions is shared either with other national 
intelligence agencies or state and locals agencies. 
8. Emergent Thinking—A Disruptive Approach 
To consider coordinating information between national and local level agencies, a 
central guiding doctrine is essential to drive the process. It is important to note this 
doctrine would be a national doctrine developed and agreed upon by state governments 
whose interests lie in serving their constituents locally as opposed to a federal mandate 
that may impinge on the responsibilities of states.375 The enormity and complexity of 
both the IC and SLTTP is daunting. To create reform in this area effectively, it is 
important for leaders to first understand the subtleties of complexity, and second, 
recognize that effective dynamics of leadership do exist in complex adaptive systems.  
As a reminder of Conklin’s concept of fragmentation, one of many manifestations 
of complexity occurs when stakeholders in a project (or fragmented elements in 
organizations) feel their perspective of the problem is the only one that matters, which 
can be hidden when stakeholders do not know different perspectives should be observed. 
The analogy is that the IC and SLTTP agencies had virtually no consciousness of the 
unique perspectives for each until post-9/11 reform forced the exploration of enlightened 
perspectives from both sides.376 Further, a naturally emerging relationship between the 
IC and the SLTTP community is occurring due to increased awareness of the relationship 
between crime and terrorism in addition to rapidly developing methods of 
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communication and data collection. Due to this emerging relationship, the IC and SLTTP 
would be considered subsystems of a larger hierarchical system called the U.S. national 
security enterprise. Levels of relationship or communication within each subsystem (i.e., 
the IC), are stronger and denser than between the subsystems of the IC and SLTTP.377 
The objective is to reduce the fragmentation and to strengthen the communication 
between the two subsystems. Such a strengthened relationship would qualify as 
sustaining technology or improving performance with what exists today with information 
sharing. This newly created relationship may, however, pave the way for disruptive 
technology, or completely new forms of information sharing that may be simpler, cheaper 
to produce, and more convenient for consumers to access.378  
Of the roughly 40 leadership theories in existence today,379 the prevailing 
principals of leading are based on a top-down hierarchical precept, and of control and 
prediction.380 However, Uhl Bien and her colleagues’ Complexity Leadership Theory, 
may offer an opportunity for homeland security leaders to embrace complexity while 
accomplishing organizational goals. Understanding the distinction between simply 
complicated systems and complex ones may serve as the genesis for taking on massive 
government reform. Simply stated, if a system can be described in terms of its component 
parts (no matter how many there are), it is complicated. If, however, the system’s 
components interrelate and interact with each other and the environment in such a way as 
the whole (system) cannot be fully understood by simply analyzing the individual parts, it 
is complex; even more succinct, a complex adaptive system is one in which 1) order 
within the system is emergent rather than predetermined, 2) the system’s history is 
irreversible, and 3) the system’s future is unpredictable.381  
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While today’s homeland security leader hears encouraging news in that academia 
is recognizing the value of exploring leading in complexity and creating theories to 
support new thought, in the author’s professional experience, few practitioners are among 
those in academia, and the interested few have no access to formal training for interested 
leaders to explore the new thinking while learning to apply it, much like the model at the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security. As an example, until recently, no universal 
training regime for law enforcement has addressed a comprehensive behavioral science-
based curriculum. Traditionally, retired cops would create a training course based on their 
area of expertise and travel the country delivering the training until local budgets ran dry 
or the topic became passé. Today, LPO is a nationally adopted curriculum based on a 
West Point model and is being delivered across the country by active officers.  
This type of model should be created for the information-sharing realm. It should 
include the latest behavioral and complexity science and be driven by andragogy with 
real life case study interaction between senior leaders from both the SLTTP and IC 
environments. In the following few pages, the author recommends a national 
information-sharing doctrine, as well as a bottom-up collection architecture to fill the 
present gaps as illustrated by the research and his experience. This type of new leadership 
training would support or provide the foundation for the kind of innovation that will 
emerge whether this nation embraces it or not as asserted by Keene.382  
With 17 massive national level intelligence agencies each with its own legacy, 
culture, mission, and policy, and thousands of state and local first responder agencies—
18,000 law enforcement agencies alone, with their unique idiosyncrasies—rather than 
falling prey to the urge of designating this system as merely complicated, the constant 
and emerging relationships between these entities must be observed to understand the 
system fully as a whole. Complex Leadership Theory therefore, becomes an attractive 
alternative model for leadership in and of complex adaptive environments in knowledge 
era organizations and systems.383 This implementation also addresses the innumerable 
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organizational value systems and processes, which must be acknowledged since people 
are much more resilient in terms of learning to adapt to new ways of supporting the 
organization and organizational value systems, while actual processes value systems are 
not.384 Thus, a central guiding doctrine becomes more vital in aligning employee 
resiliency with organizational values.  
9. Construction—Timeframe—Costs 
In developing the central guiding doctrine necessary to implement an initiative 
aimed at coalescing the IC and SLTTP, a task team comprised of subject matter experts 
(SMEs) from key institutions should be formed. This team will research and determine 
what if any legislative measures should be undertaken, costs involved, training, public 
opinion concerns, ensuring political will, as well as other areas of potential concern in 
creating a bottom-up streamlined American information-sharing system that also includes 
centralized information coordination at the state and local level. The group of included 
SMEs will play an essential role in not only conceptualizing the necessary aspects of such 
an implementation but provide key leadership in conveying the vision for a newly created 
information-sharing environment, an indispensable ingredient in change management. 
Each implementation recommendation leverages existing guiding documentation and 
positions within the current system to be modified to accomplish streamlined reform.  
Based on their charge at inception and providing continuity in American 
information-sharing, this team should be assembled through the CICC and Global 
Intelligence Working Group (GIWG). These bodies are comprised of organizations, such 
as the IACP, the MCCA and National Sheriffs Association and the National Fusion 
Center Association (NFCA). The National Governors Association would be a key 
stakeholder to ensure buy-in. In addition, due to the shear numbers of and exposure to 
potential terrorism indicators, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) should 
be included. SMEs from the British and American intelligence organization, MI5, 
National NCTC, PM-ISE and British Police Service should also be included to provide 
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insights into program development. Efforts to be considered should include but not be 
limited to the following. 
 
 Draw on existing national guidance documents to develop and establish a 
universally adaptive national doctrine with a clear focus on objectives, 
responsibilities, and procedures for counterterrorism and related crime that 
does not countermand national security public laws or policies. This 
doctrine should reflect a bottom-up orientation of information collection 
beginning with SLTTP personnel who interact intimately with local 
communities. The resulting intelligence can then be coordinated with 
traditional IC collections methods and sources for a complete picture of 
threats in the United States. All subsequent aspects of this strategy will be 
aligned with the doctrine. Guiding documents could include but not 
limited to the following. 
 National Security Strategy, which requires that national 
intelligence is integrated and delivered that includes information 
from federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners.  
 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan,385 which could be 
leveraged to recommend the establishment of special branch 
officers within law enforcement agencies in the United States. The 
NCISP has just been revised; however, it calls for leadership and 
innovative thinking as challenges progress and technology 
advances.  
 Executive Order 12333 (2008), which defines the IC’s obligation, 
role, and functions within U.S. national security, can be amended 
to create necessary reform within the IC. 
 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
which instituted massive reorganization within the IC, could be 
revised to address the new model.386  
 The National Fusion Center Guidelines, which defines common 
standards for fusion center implementation across America, could 
be adapted to meet newly established guidance to ensure 
coordination with special branch officers and JTTFs.387 
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 At the time of this writing, the National Network of Fusion Centers is 
developing a national strategy. This strategy (through each respective 
fusion center) will emphasize the facilitation of assisting local partners in 
identifying standing information needs (SINS) and priority information 
needs (PINS), which are categories of types of threat information viewed 
as essential for the particular agency to have collected and analyzed. The 
CIE could be used as the model into which this information could be 
collated. Information collected in each fusion center’s AoR would then be 
codified with local JTTFs and to DHS I&A resulting in a national threat 
picture.  
 To execute this process, utilize TLOs or fusion center liaison officers 
(FLOs) to involve local jurisdictions in the process. As mentioned earlier, 
ILP is misunderstood among state, local, tribal, as well as federal law 
enforcement. It essentially means employing the intelligence cycle. This 
process re-orients agencies to 1) become aware of and utilize the 
intelligence cycle, and 2) develop a bottom-up collection process to be 
conjoined with the national security, top-down system.  
 Using the example of the TLO program and its connection with fusion 
centers, create a model wherein officers from local agencies are 
designated, trained in counterterrorism principles on the level of U.K. 
special branch officers and provided security clearances so as to navigate 
and communicate effectively within the IC. 
 These officers would coordinate with local fusion centers and 
JTTFs with official status and credibility to facilitate the bi-
directional flow of information between TLOs, JTTFs, and fusion 
centers.  
 Utilize former ITACG, JCAT and other SLTTP fellowship 
participants who have worked within the IC. This resource is 
underutilized and would provide ongoing support for creating new 
initiatives, relationships or programs to meet emergent trends in 
intelligence.  
 Create a National Counterterrorism Coordinator position 
 Utilize the existing FBI domestic DNI representatives to 
coordinate counterterrorism operations, case preparations, arrests, 
and prosecutions within their areas of responsibility, as well as 
with their counterparts across the country.  
 Introduce a CTC to provide coordination of IC resources to local law 
enforcement agencies through respective special branch officers. 
 Since domestic terrorism cases fall under the purview of the FBI, 
local JTTFs could fulfill this function.  
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 Fusion centers would assist in the development and coordination of 
relationships between local agencies and CTCs.  
 The CTC coordinates with the office of the National Coordinator. 
 Introduce an ELG comprised of appropriate IC representatives, senior 
local law enforcement, and JTTF leadership. 
 The group is responsible for coordinating all efforts between 
intelligence, operations, and prosecutions. 
 The National Coordinator chairs this group.  
 Create a national leadership model introducing complexity science as 
related to organizational leadership. Pattern this model after the IACP’s 
LPO curriculum, and the Center for Homeland and Defense utilizing 
practitioners who know and understand these issues to teach practitioners.  
 Establish milestones at six-month intervals to review efficiency and 
effectiveness of the program. Members of the MI5 and Metropolitan 
Police Service should be involved in the analysis and assessment of 
outcomes measured against identified objectives. 
10.  Why Would This Work? 
This approach would be successful for at least two reasons, 1) the British have 
successfully operated for years using a much more streamlined, efficient, and effective 
national security enterprise based on a bottom-up reporting system with centralized 
coordination, and 2) a mounting realization is occurring among homeland security 
practitioners that crime and terrorism are more often related; therefore, the intervention 
efforts for the two must be coordinated. This coordination requires a much more agile, 
robust, and responsible relationship between the IC and SLTTP. 
11. Who Cares Most? 
The author has worked in the IC under the auspices of the ITACG at the NCTC in 
Washington, DC. Those like the author from state and local agencies who have lived in 
Washington, DC, and operated within the IC on a daily basis to both educate members of 
the IC about SLTTP equities, as well as helping to streamline ways in which the two 
disciplines communicate, will be invested in contributing to future solutions. In addition, 
state and local representatives exposed to similar fellowship environments are 
encouraged to identify gaps within the system and possibly create initiatives to address 
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those gaps. While still limited, a growing element of homeland security practitioners in 
the United States, who, due to such fellowships, and a growing number of state and local 
agency members entering federal service, have been exposed to the inadequacies between 
the IC and SLTTP, as well as the growing importance of filling those shortfalls. These 
individuals will care most and emerge as the leaders of such initiatives to create closer 
ties between the IC and SLTTP in the future. 
12. What Difference Will It Make? 
A strengthened relationship between the IC and SLTTP would create 
opportunities for increased reporting between the two disciplines. If American first 
responders do not know what is important, they clearly will not be alert to terrorist 
indicators or be in a position to intervene in a terrorist plot. An enhanced relationship 
would inspire a vision for the future that would ensure better collection methods, 
heightened ability to respond to emerging threats, and more effective resource 
utilization.388  
This proposed doctrine in essence would provide clarity for all members of the 
national security enterprise in how local first responders would focus on or collect 
criminal or terrorism information. It would strengthen the mechanism of reporting and 
coordinating and add a level of expediency in which they are able to interact with federal, 
SLTT members of the national security apparatus. 
Due to a simplified relationship between the IC and SLTTP, vast improvement 
would occur in coordination of information between the two disciplines. Further, the 
likelihood of intervening in a terrorist plot in the United States increases due to a central 
guiding doctrine outlining well-defined roles and responsibilities among all partners. A 
bottom-up configuration of suspicious activity reporting with a well-established 
communication matrix reduces the possibility of key threat information being 
overlooked. It also allows for a quicker response to imminent threats if the information 
related to the risk is recognized and developed at the line-level closest to the execution of 
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the threat itself. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities amount to a more rapid 
deployment of tactical intervention when needed. 
13. Who Will Oppose? 
While strong potential benefits of expanding information-sharing components are 
possible, opponents are concerned that broadened information collection and sharing 
processes may jeopardize privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of citizens, a concern 
shared by law enforcement and IC leaders alike. It is important to note that all changes in 
information-sharing practices require the creation of stringent privacy policies and 
adherence to the privacy and civil rights guidelines of the ISE.389  
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) may oppose any movement in 
which the IC operates domestically. Clearly, the recent exposure of NSA collections 
methods has, according to the ACLU, created a global chilling effect. The ACLU has 
claimed that NSA’s practices are intrusive and unconstitutional based on the assertion 
that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is flawed and that effective 
congressional oversight is difficult and public oversight impossible.390  
Two recent federal court decisions take opposing views of the constitutionality 
and statutory authority of NSA’s operations under the FISA Section 215 and Section 702 
or PRISM program. These conflicting rulings addressing separate but related lawsuits, 
one filed by the ACLU, will play havoc with those whose agendas are served by one or 
the other of these decisions. Any new approach to collecting intelligence especially at the 
local level may very well be perceived as a further encroachment of the IC within the 
domestic realm. The reality of this country’s history and today’s environment is such that 
Americans collectively rise up and confront inequities real or perceived. Today is no 
exception as evidenced by the fervent opinions written by District of Columbia Judge 
Richard Leon and Southern District of New York Judge William H Pauley III.  
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Judge Leon’s ruling highlights issues that must be taken seriously and addressed 
if for no other reason than correcting a misguided notion or ill-informed conclusion. As 
an example, Judge Leon cites three instances in less than three years in which the NSA 
has been deemed misrepresentative to FISA Court judges. As a result, Judge Walton of 
the FISA Court required that NSA come before the FISA Court on a case-by-case basis 
when requesting to query data within the bulk telephony metadata. Previously, the NSA 
was expected to only conduct queries within the data when the query met the approved 
standard of reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS).391 As a parallel, law enforcement in 
America is historically fraught with examples of abuses of citizens’ search and seizure, as 
well as due process rights. The U.S. system of justice is constructed so that course 
correction measures are taken when these abuses occur, and at times, resultant case law 
becomes the new guiding measure for the future.  
To highlight and summarize U.S. District Court Judge Leon’s essential view, he 
stated the following in his opinion.  
I cannot imagine a more “indiscriminate” and “arbitrary invasion” than 
this systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on 
virtually every single citizen for purposes of querying and analyzing it 
without prior judicial approval. Surely, such a program infringes on “that 
degree of privacy” that the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. 
Indeed, I have little doubt that the author of our Constitution, James 
Madison, who cautioned us to beware “the abridgement of freedom of the 
people by gradual and silent encroachments by those in power,” would be 
aghast.392 
While the quote is narrowly aimed at the NSA’s collection of bulk telephony 
metadata, the broad brush of the “…abridgement of freedom of the people by gradual and 
silent encroachments by those in power”393 may well be used to paint emerging, perhaps 
misunderstood, trends in intelligence, and certainly, if modified at the local level.  
Judge Pauley, as if theatrically orchestrated, released a contrasting opinion days 
after the Leon decision highlighting the position that America … “learned from its 
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mistake [of pre-9/11 intelligence failures] and adapted to confront a new enemy: a terror 
network capable of orchestrating attacks across the world. It launched a number of 
counter-measures including a bulk telephony metadata collection program—a wide net 
that could find and isolate gossamer contacts among suspected terrorists in an ocean of 
seemingly disconnected data.”394  
These two decisions capture the diametrically opposed views in this country and 
indeed across the globe. The striking challenge for this initiative is that many in the 
homeland security enterprise do not fully understand the nuances between the IC and 
SLTTP. Those who have worked within both environments do but that is a minuscule 
society. The current and impending relationship between the IC and SLTTP is emerging 
whether it is created, promoted or simply allowed, which then becomes a wicked 
problem; one in which those few who know the inner sanctum of both the SLTTP and IC 
and the nascent relationship, understand the problem as such, but only as it develops.395 
Wicked does not mean a degree of difficulty, it means that traditional problem solving 
methods are inadequate to address them.396 To add to the complexity, the upheaval 
generated by modern day issues of the NSA whether connected directly to this effort or 
not, may become associated with and collapsed into part of NSA’s purported abuses to 
those whose bias dictates such a declaration, which will add to the amorphous quality of 
the problem as it progresses. 
Further, a high degree of disparity occurs in the awareness of or operations within 
the intelligence function among state and local law enforcement. Any attempt to 
standardize or structuralize such a function may exacerbate existing suspicion or 
resistance some police chiefs or sheriffs have regarding national initiatives or the federal 
government.  
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Moreover, an on-going debate is occurring between Juliette Kayyem of the 
University of Chicago’s Law School and Federal U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Richard 
Posner over whether an MI5-style agency replacing the FBI as the domestic intelligence 
agency should be instituted. While this thesis is not advocating this specific method of 
reform, it does go to the central issue of improving the domestic intelligence architecture. 
As has been outlined previously, this thesis recommends modifying existing structures 
initially to achieve better domestic intelligence. Further, Posner and Kayyem discuss the 
distinction between criminal investigative procedures versus national security 
intelligence, citing the MI5 as having no enforcement authority. As mentioned earlier, a 
demonstrated relationship between crime and terrorism exists in the United States. While 
key distinctions must be adhered to between criminal procedure and national security 
procedure, a mechanism must also exist wherein any information that is collected is 
treated appropriately once it is determined how best to do so. The bottom-up collection 
mechanism should account for leveraging local authorities, funneling the information up 
through appropriate channels, and ensuring it is dealt with appropriately once introduced 
in the system.397  
14. What Limitations Are There?  
Fundamental differences between IC and SLTTP agencies represent a legitimate 
issue and may place some appropriate constraints on aspects of coalescing the IC and 
SLTTP. The IC is charged with providing necessary information for executive decision 
making on foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of this nation’s 
national security interests from foreign security threats.398 Further, Title 50 of the U.S. 
Code designated for agencies directs the IC and activities involved in war and national 
defense activities.399  
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Very few SLTTP community members have security clearances, and by contrast 
with the IC, work predominantly within the open source realm. Those with clearances 
sponsored by one federal agency experience difficulties in being recognized by different 
IC agencies with whom they may need to exchange information. Security clearances 
require additional funding, the cost of which depends on the level of clearance to be 
granted. The DHS is responsible for addressing these needs for SLTTP members by and 
large, and the attached budgetary issue if new Special Branch Officers are to be created. 
The IC operates under vastly different rules than the SLTTP community in terms 
of collection, and certainly, storage of information. For example, IC information is 
collected through specific and various methods and is treated as classified national 
security information on varying levels.400 By distinction, SLTTP government agencies 
cannot store PII on U.S. persons without a criminal nexus,401 and all actions must be 
based on a minimal standard of reasonable articulable suspicion or the higher standard of 
probable cause (in which case an arrest can be made). Code of Federal Regulations Title 
28 Part 23 provides guidance for federally funded multi-jurisdictional law enforcement 
agencies on maintaining criminal intelligence information systems effectively while 
protecting individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights during the collection, storage, 
and dissemination of criminal intelligence information.402 A poorly planned and executed 
strategy could open the door for a mission creep scenario that could not only jeopardize 
important cases, but also encroach on civil liberties, erode public trust, and violate laws 
or policies designed to protect against such intrusions. 
While much of this proposal seems intuitive to those who know and understand 
the subtleties of the IC and SLTTP and resultant shortcomings, it will require 
reorganization of aspects of the system as a whole. As such, it threatens the status quo 
silo mentality of existing competition for funding and power and control among agencies 
within the IC. State and local entities will find it difficult to trust federal agencies, in 
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particular the FBI, due to historical turf wars and negative imagery from contentious 
relationships over time. Nolan validates the conflict among the members of the IC 
serving at the NCTC. Given that they are, at times, more interested in undermining each 
other than overcoming differences, adding the aspect of working with the SLTTP would 
simply be at worst dismissed by some and passively accepted at best.403  
15. A Leader’s Strategy 
The preceding may appear bleak; on the contrary, it offers the opportunity to 
reinvent a colossal enterprise in this country while leveraging existing systems. 
Consistent with appreciative inquiry,404 as well as precepts brought forward by Krug and 
Oakley,405 it is essential to focus on the way in which the challenges and problems are 
thought of that will determine the degree of success. A thorough understanding of the 
dynamics of this problem emanates from the notion that it springs from entangled and 
complex roots due to numerous stakeholders with different values and priorities. No 
precedent exists; no sure indicator of success will appear until it is realized.406 Wicked 
problems are based in social context. If the challenges that have been laid out in this 
document are analyzed, it can be seen that much of the complications faced or envisioned 
bring with them a social aspect of sorts. Whether a group is concerned about its shrinking 
identity, or mission space, or budget considerations, its fears have not been realized for 
the most part, and yet it, in some cases, is vehemently opposed to a new idea based on a 
fantasy-based fear.  
A solution as suggested by Occam’s razor may be one of simplicity, to 
communicate profusely and be as inclusive as possible. Not everyone will agree on what 
the problem is but the stakeholders should have the best perspective.407 For this reason, it 
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is important for the stakeholders, in this case, key members of the CICC to be involved at 
the onset. Born of the post-9/11 fallout, the CICC represents the most appropriate and 
influential stakeholders in both the SLTTP and IC realms. Crucial members, representing 
the most important stakeholders, will not only be able to provide professional guidance 
but they will quickly determine who among key participants should be involved who 
have not yet been invited.  
Leveraged effectively, the CICC could produce indispensable guidance on the 
overall: 
 Values: What is important to this group in producing a newly forged 
relationship between the IC and SLTTP where intelligence from the 
bottom-up is coalesced with the national big picture?  
 Competencies: What do the various stakeholders do best and how do they 
fit the overall scheme? 
 Aspirations: What is envisioned as a perfect outcome?408 
An identity of sorts is thus formed, which provides for a common operating 
picture although it is comprised of a conglomeration of federal, state, local, tribal, 
territorial, and private agencies. It would be within this process that some semblance of 
buy-in among stakeholders might emerge, as they will have been included in the process 
from the start. Next, because this nation is so connected to the Newtonian concept of 
taking action, Camillus recommends taking action, no matter how small and without over 
thinking it. In this case, most of the stakeholders are law enforcement executives and 
intelligence professionals; thus, this concept may be a tough sell although many historical 
examples can be presented to law enforcement to indicate that this kind of approach was 
embraced.  
As an example, community oriented policing tenets called for law enforcement 
leaders to encourage officers to take risks, responsible risk-taking of course when solving 
neighborhood problems. A recent example within the IC is the creation of the JRIGs, a 
concept wherein national intelligence is shifted form a nationally centralized format in 
Washington, DC, to a regional approach, and thereby, providing a more customized 
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perspective on intelligence from the intelligence community. Two pilot programs are now 
in progress, but eventually, all FBI SACs, who are also Domestic Director of National 
Intelligence Representatives, of which there are 12, would have a JRIG in their field 
office.  
Augment the feedback format as is customary in organizational strategy after an 
action has been taken or a strategy has been implemented, by introducing a feed-forward 
concept.409 Feedback is valuable but only provides such value past tense. Feed-forward 
involves a conscious shift in thinking about what is to come in the next period of time 
and because wicked problems do not have timetables, those in leadership positions must 
often check for weak signals of environmental changes rather than wait for formal 
analyses.410 
16. Who Will Be Affected? 
A vast number of agencies within the IC will be affected, as well as potentially 
18,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies, countless fire service agencies, and perhaps, other 
SLTTP disciplines. Thus, the autonomy usually enjoyed by respective disciplines, such as 
state and local first responders, as well as federal entities, would be threatened, or at least 
disrupted, even when considering a strong urgency or advocacy of a national doctrine. In 
anticipation, it should be made clear at the inception that this doctrine should not have the 
appearance of a federal mandate. Rather, due to the national nature of information 
sharing in homeland security, a concept corroborated in abundant post-9/11 strategies and 
other documents, the doctrine should be an overarching guidance. It should be focused on 
mutually agreed fundamental guiding principles adopted by state and local jurisdictions 
upon which they form their respective strategies.411 Congressional funding may be 
consolidated to address specific initiatives to better serve a newly created relationship 
between SLTTP and some IC agencies, which may siphon off normally experienced and 
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routinely expected budgetary line items causing political firestorms, resistance, and 
subterfuge by adversely affected principals. 
This nation has experienced what the American psyche is capable of with 
sufficient motivation, whether as in the example of focusing all domestic activity during 
WWII to support the American effort or restructuring the American government post-
9/11. The urgency of these examples does not exist today; however, inroads consistent 
with this proposal have been accomplished in the past, as evidenced by the creation of the 
ITACG and similar fellowships as a result of great fortitude and non-linear thinking by 
those persuasive with congressional members, as well as senior IC officials.  
 
A final thought  
 
This thesis has delved into the world of leadership, complexity science, and the 
information-sharing enterprise in America. The impulse to be overwhelmed crept in and 
out as I conducted research, wrote, conducted more research and wrote more. With each 
step, my capacity to understand the complexity seemed to expand more and more. Yet, 
the process of writing took on the characteristics of a wicked problem; the more I probed 
into the expanse of this thesis, the more I discovered emerging themes for new problems 
to consider. A simplicity emerged along with the comfort of realizing every problem I 
looked at in this thesis, and indeed every problem this country has, possesses two 
characteristics. First, the problems are solvable given the tenets of wicked problems, and 
second, they are broader than American problems; they belong to the world. While I have 
considered myself an evolved thinker, this process has expanded my thinking beyond 
what it was in terms of understanding the global nature of almost everything and the 
complexity this new thinking brings with it, which is the central theme for Snowden and 
Boone. They developed the Cynefin Framework to help leaders decipher which domain 
of complexity they are in to adjust cognitive thinking, and therefore, decision making.412 
 
                                                 
412 Snowden and Boone, “Wise Executives Tailor their Approach to Fit the Complexity of the 
Circumstances They Face: A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 1–10. 
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The result of producing this thesis and the process leading to its conclusion has 
brought me to the following realizations.  
 Pre 9/11, the IC and SLTTP were focused on their respective missions, the 
IC on the former Soviet Union, and the SLTTP on reducing crime or 
providing first responder services to natural or man-made disorder. Each 
constructed structures, laws, policies, processes, and procedures to address 
their needs, and had virtually no consciousness of each other’s existence 
much less their equities.  
 9/11 occurred; the IC and SLTTP were forced to become aware of each 
other, to somehow come together to solve what the 9/11 Commission 
listed as gaps in this nation’s system. Numerous strategies, policies, 
executive orders, laws, and government restructure have been aimed at 
providing better coordination, and yet, a paradox exists; conflict and 
resistance have been created within this country’s systems of reform that 
would not have existed except for the efforts to coalesce them, and still 
this nation continues to flounder. Some members of the SLTTP first 
responder community, such as myself, have been introduced into the 
mysterious realm of the IC. We have been encouraged to learn the ways of 
the IC and to notice where the gaps lie between the IC and SLTTP. We 
have also been challenged to provide suggestions for improvement. When 
this situation occurs, and we introduce suggestions for improvement, we 
encounter resistance, due in part, by individual agendas, but also due to a 
lack of a central guiding doctrine from which the whole of government 
can derive its strategies whether at the federal or state, local, tribal, or 
territorial level.  
 An analysis into the thematic evolution of the homeland security 
information-sharing enterprise can provide clarity as to what we do next. 
How do we improve these gaps and overcome the self imposed resistance? 
How can a better understanding of complexity science and leadership help 
to create the new thinking, doctrine, laws, and policies necessary to better 
blend these two massive disciplines? The analysis in this thesis has 
allowed for recommended solutions to remaining information gaps, as 
well as leadership doctrine that can be leveraged to provide a foundation 
for operating within the complex domain.  
The process of writing to this degree and reflecting on my experiences while 
attempting to maintain academic rigor, has also caused me to reflect on some of the 
lessons learned that I had forgotten or of which I never really was aware. Every student 
and author brings with them a collective set of experiences, values, beliefs, and biases. 
The road representing my journey over the past seven years has brought me to this point, 
and along with it, a debt of gratitude. I know much work remains. I breathe a sigh of 
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relief not because this thesis has come to a conclusion but because the process the thesis 
and graduate course represents exposes a yet-to-be determined road that lies ahead; true 
to form however, what is emerging is palpable and yet indistinguishable at the same time. 
My unique opportunity of falling down the March hare’s hole as Nolan quoted one of her 
colleagues at NCTC,413 has piqued a curiosity in me that is unyielding. I am better 
prepared now to apply my lessons learned to help move the information-sharing 
enterprise in this country forward.  
                                                 
413 Nolan, “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Community: An 
Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center,” 25.  
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